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Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

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Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#51
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sounds like the conclusion is that the bounty programs needs to work closer together with the product teams if it wants to be more effective. Phrased differently, internal organizational challenges should never be a valid reason why a bug is disqualified. It’s completely irrelevant from an outsider’s perspective.

I don't know if 'extremely valid' is good English but it's how I would characterize your assessment. I totally agree. The challenge, however, is constructing a sustainable model to incentivize product teams to reciprocate this closer working relationship. I would say all but the smallest of companies running bug bounties also have an internal security function that is already doing reporting on vulnerabilities, time…

I think there are two separate issues, though:

* properly qualifying a bug bounty submission

* actually fixing the thing

From what I understood from your original comment, was that sometimes things get qualified as “wontfix” because of internal struggles. I understand that these struggles exist, as with any large org with conflicting priorities, especially when the issues are not 0day severity.

I think, however, from an outsider’s perspective, acknowledging it’s a valid bug, but also saying “this will not get fixed any time soon” is infinitely better than just marking it as wontfix.

As such, I’d argue that the minimum effort the product teams would have to put into the bug bounty program is properly qualifying the submissions. If that, for some reason, is too much to ask, I submit it’s a higher level, leadership problem that they want to have a bug bounty program without the necessary resources to qualify the bugs.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#52
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Google and Apple's bids weren't high enough to get anyone in dozens of shady governments with access to NSO Group's services to successfully risk adding burner phones and then analyze these attacks. I think any alternative explanation to too cheap is even less savory.

People will sell bugs on the grey market no matter what Google pays, because not everybody can do business with Google. A reminder that grey market exploit purchases are tranched; the figures you hear for them are payout caps , not lump sums. If your bug is burned before all the tranches pay out, you're SOL.

True, but I think you missed my point a little.

The NSO group has been entrusting its vulnerabilities to people who would happily embezzle if it is some sufficient amount of money. If the bounty is ~2X these people's typical price in many countries that are NSO Group clients, then it is remarkable these bugs aren't being burned as a form of embezzlement. Your description of tranched payment risk only makes that more remarkable.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#53

I would rather see more transparency once you are a reporter than shinier leaderboards. It is extremely frustrating to spend a week reverse engineering a vulnerability in an opaque cloud service only to be told it was a known issue (but private), won’t be fixed (but is within 48 hours), and that you don’t qualify for any compensation. I would like to see private issues shared with reporters when they are independentl…

> I would like to see private issues shared with reporters when they are independently discovered.

Other people have covered most of the rest of your comment, but there are things to say about this one specifically. The reporting platforms support it. It's a very frequent request from researchers who file duplicate reports. It's rare for a company to do this, because (1) it doesn't do anything to help with the issue being reported; (2) it doesn't change how the report will be handled; and (3) researchers hate it. They don't hate it when they file a duplicate report and want to see what scooped them. But they hate it when their report gets shared with someone who filed a duplicate finding.

Sharing duplicate reports causes a lot more fights than it solves. And it tends to piss off the higher-productivity researchers in an attempt to soothe lower-productivity ones, who generally aren't soothed anyway.

The ticket I saw the most outrage on over this issue was one that I duped to another ticket with a higher number. (HackerOne assigns ticket numbers serially. Fun!) How could I justify calling this report a duplicate of one that, as anyone could see, was filed later?

Well, the second report began

> Hi, I reported this through email and was told that in order to claim a reward I should open a ticket in the HackerOne program...

(This situation is odd enough, and easy enough to explain without sharing private information, that I could explain it to the guy on the lower ticket number without causing problems (or sharing the other ticket directly. That's a big no-no.). I present it here as an example illustrating that, even if you think you have ironclad evidence that the program is out to screw you over, it probably isn't.)

I definitely saw companies doing things that were unfair considering the program as a whole. That generally happened as part of an effort to preserve a relationship with a researcher who frequently filed useful reports. I never saw a ticket duped inappropriately. If you want my advice on how to get the most money out of your bug reports, it's this:

- Don't antagonize the team handling you.

- As much as you can get away with, demonstrate what you can do with the issue you report. The program will say "we investigate the impact of every issue and pay out according to the highest-severity potential impact." They are sincere. But they don't have the motivation you do to find the highest-severity potential impact. Any impact you actually demonstrate will automatically be considered, because nobody had to notice it was possible.

- Sometimes an issue might ambiguously fall into a low-paying category, or maybe a high-paying category. Try to characterize it as belonging to the high-paying category.

- Decide whether you're a "deep" guy who finds complex issues on a handful of platforms or a "shallow" guy who finds the same set of related issues everywhere he can with minimal effort. Both approaches work. If you're a "shallow" guy, make sure that when you report an issue, it's really there, and don't argue too much over what you think it should be worth. If you're a "deep" guy, you have more scope to develop a personal relationship with the team who handles you.

- Watch for existing programs to add new platforms. This often happens when a company with an existing program makes a new acquisition. The new platform probably has a lot of low-hanging fruit.

- Clean up after yourself. The most outrage I've ever seen on the company side was someone who demonstrated full-on RCE on a company server. He installed a webshell. And his webshell was still up when he filed his report. Don't be that guy. You can be disqualified from a bug that would have paid tens of thousands of dollars.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#54
post #6

If only Google could run their other businesses as frictionless as this... Found an interesting bug? Let's have a 1-1 chat over lunch, drinks are on us BTW. Your developer account was banned by some bot gone wild? Sorry, no human interaction is allows in my department. Maybe if you have a famous buddy that can pester some hotshots on twitter...

It's tough; I wish I had a good solution to the latter problem. Half the trouble is the majority of what Google bans is semi-automated bot farms; the "minimal human contact" policies are to avoid making the company vulnerable to social engineering. (That vulnerability goes deep. People would look up the phone numbers of Google offices and call with stories about kidnapped family members and the need to get into a Gma…

To some extent, it all comes down to identity.

If you knew which unique person was associated with each account and if you knew which unique person you were talking to on the phone, it would be possible to verify both that you are talking to the person you should be and that you aren't talking to Notorious Social Engineer #2344 trying to do something shady.

But instead you're stuck trying to figure out if "Saal Weachter" on the the phone is the proper owner of the 'saalweachter' account, or even if it is someone named "Saal Weachter" on the phone at all.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#55
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People will sell bugs on the grey market no matter what Google pays, because not everybody can do business with Google. A reminder that grey market exploit purchases are tranched; the figures you hear for them are payout caps , not lump sums. If your bug is burned before all the tranches pay out, you're SOL.

True, but I think you missed my point a little. The NSO group has been entrusting its vulnerabilities to people who would happily embezzle if it is some sufficient amount of money. If the bounty is ~2X these people's typical price in many countries that are NSO Group clients, then it is remarkable these bugs aren't being burned as a form of embezzlement. Your description of tranched payment risk only makes that more…

NSO's clients have effectively unlimited budgets. The bang for the buck on exploits is probably pretty shocking compared to alternative intelligence collection methods; sending actual people out to do stuff is incredibly expensive. When you raise the price of exploits --- which you should do for other reasons! --- you don't necessarily harm NSO. Since they effectively take a cut of exploit valuation, you may even help them.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#56
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

True, but I think you missed my point a little. The NSO group has been entrusting its vulnerabilities to people who would happily embezzle if it is some sufficient amount of money. If the bounty is ~2X these people's typical price in many countries that are NSO Group clients, then it is remarkable these bugs aren't being burned as a form of embezzlement. Your description of tranched payment risk only makes that more…

NSO's clients have effectively unlimited budgets. The bang for the buck on exploits is probably pretty shocking compared to alternative intelligence collection methods; sending actual people out to do stuff is incredibly expensive. When you raise the price of exploits --- which you should do for other reasons! --- you don't necessarily harm NSO. Since they effectively take a cut of exploit valuation, you may even hel…

As with any asset that's hard to lock down, if the scrap value is high enough relative to salary of employees then they can't estimate how many phones can be exploited before the next "steal stuff from work" event.

As such the NSO Group would end up limiting its clients to fit its pipeline and have trouble buying exploits since most other market participants have a single workforce with a drastically lower rate of loss.

I think that would devolve to countries needing to pay liability pricing per attack on possible honeypot phone's, etc, and more countries being cut off like Morocco, so no more using it like an unlimited plan. Sure these countries have unlimited budgets relative to their own GDPs, but when they can't find stability acting as a group they are all back to bidding for unique vulnerabilities, and there probably aren't 212 great ones on every platform at all times.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#57
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

NSO's clients have effectively unlimited budgets. The bang for the buck on exploits is probably pretty shocking compared to alternative intelligence collection methods; sending actual people out to do stuff is incredibly expensive. When you raise the price of exploits --- which you should do for other reasons! --- you don't necessarily harm NSO. Since they effectively take a cut of exploit valuation, you may even hel…

As with any asset that's hard to lock down, if the scrap value is high enough relative to salary of employees then they can't estimate how many phones can be exploited before the next "steal stuff from work" event. As such the NSO Group would end up limiting its clients to fit its pipeline and have trouble buying exploits since most other market participants have a single workforce with a drastically lower rate of lo…

NSO's clients are all organizations with effectively unlimited budgets. That's the premise. Even the shadier companies in NSO's space sell principally to state actors. It's unlikely that Google can drive the price of an exploit past the level that any country can pay for. These are petty cash figures.

NSO builds implant technology, so they add some value of their own, but NSO is essentially a middleman in this market. Driving up the prices of the underlying asset, when buyers aren't price sensitive, helps the middleman.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#58
post #43
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not sure why you're downvoted, but the $3M/year total rewards payoff is likely smaller than the corporate administrative and developer time (for review) costs. I.e. if this was a charity it would pay out less than 50 cents on the dollar.

I downvoted because "cybersec researchers" do not in fact routinely make 7 figures. For strong pentester types reporting the typical (real) vulnerability the VRP handles, the median is probably in the low 6's.

6 figures from breaking systems and reporting them responsibly?

Sounds amazing, what's the catch?

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#59
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know if 'extremely valid' is good English but it's how I would characterize your assessment. I totally agree. The challenge, however, is constructing a sustainable model to incentivize product teams to reciprocate this closer working relationship. I would say all but the smallest of companies running bug bounties also have an internal security function that is already doing reporting on vulnerabilities, time…

I think there are two separate issues, though: * properly qualifying a bug bounty submission * actually fixing the thing From what I understood from your original comment, was that sometimes things get qualified as “wontfix” because of internal struggles. I understand that these struggles exist, as with any large org with conflicting priorities, especially when the issues are not 0day severity. I think, however, from…

Your points are totally valid and I agree with them in principle, I just see them as existing on a spectrum.

One pretty interesting example is GitLab's bounty program because you can see both sides, both the reported issues and how they are tracked on the engineering side:

https://hackerone.com/gitlab/hacktivity?type=team

https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues?label_name=Hac...

There's very good organizational alignment here from what I can see, and overall the program seems to be quite adaptive and well supported (e.g. the comment about eliminating the 50% bounty here https://hackerone.com/reports/1154542#activity-11394543, 'unduping' a report here https://hackerone.com/reports/402658 ). It's about as best-case as you can get for a bug bounty...relatively small, single-product company that exposed to the sunshine effect of a public issue tracker.

That said, if you peruse every one of those issues you're going to find instances where they drop the ball, take too long, make mistakes, etc. etc.

So I would just say that if you ask anyone that has run a bug bounty, they will likely say they were surprised how difficult it was. You'll also generally find that they are advocates for the researcher community and want to run the best program they can. Everything else is largely a function of the dark art of business prioritization and the quality of the experience will be a function of how well they and their team is able to navigate it.

Re: Google launches new vulnerability reward platform

#60
post #35
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> only to be told it was a known issue (but private), won’t be fixed (but is within 48 hours), and that you don’t qualify for any compensation This kind of issue is rampant and opaque among bug bounty programs. IMO if a company says a bug is a wontfix, that's an immediate moral justification for public disclosure. If they say it's a known issue, they don't give a timeline of when it will be fixed, and it's still not…

For what it's worth: you don't need an artificial moral justification to post immediately. Post immediately if that's your thing.

I specified "moral" because most bug bounty programs' terms have a blanket prohibition against public disclosure (at least until vulnerability is resolved), and in some cases public disclosure could be legally ambiguous as well (because CFAA is so vague and broad).
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