Earlier quoted context omitted.
The line is far less blurry than you suggest. The stats from the article say 70% of vulnerabilities come from [insert list of a few memory-wrangling mistakes here]. I'd consider any language that enables the top 70% of vulnerabilities to happen to be unsafe. Maybe a safety ranking is in order? How many CVEs from [year], weighed by severity, are impossible to happen in [language]. Obviously this idea has serious probl…
An statistical approach like that has the flaw any the most used language would always appear to be at the top of the "most unsafe". Instead, people should be schooled to write better code. Thats it. Don't let some random new employee with no certifications write safety-critical code. Don't hire people who are under qualified. Its really that easy. I have no idea, honestly, how you would introduce a use-after-free bu…
I understand what you're saying, but I'm not sure I agree.
For example, look at Google Chrome. They've got mountains of cash. They've got loads of people working for them, and loads of job applicants if they want more. They've got a strong business case to work on security. They've got in-house pen testers, and a bug bounty program. They've got code reviews. They can afford any static analyser on the market. They've got sandboxing. They've got open source so many eyes can spot bugs easily. They can dictate terms on requirements - if Chrome vetos a new web standard and it's as good as dead, and if Google decides plugins have got to go, they go.
And they've got 177 CVEs so far in 2021 [1] - including such greatest hits as use-after-free, buffer overflows and out-of-bounds access.
You and I think we're writing secure C++ - but if the best-resourced team in the world can't write secure C++, isn't it more likely we're just fooling ourselves?