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The Insecurity Industry

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41–50 of 386 posts

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#41
post #18

"For example, if you want to see Microsoft have a heart attack, talk about the idea of defining legal liability for bad code in a commercial product." That sort of discussion is quickly dismissed on HN. And probably elsewhere on the web/over the internet. Instead we frequently see discussion blaming users of the software, i.e., Microsoft's customers, or even suggestions to make the customer liable, or comments from "…

Most of the people I went to Uni with ended up in fields where the companies are liable for bad stuff, to a certain degree. It does exist. However: * you get paid a lot less * the companies and industries move very slowly * you spend a lot more time writing long-form, some time just re-using existing stuff wholesale, and almost no time building actually new things I mean like Real Engineering fields. What we do in so…

And still, the Toyota breaking microcontroller code showed that coding practices in Real Engineering are somehow even worse. I hope that improved since then.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#42
post #18

"For example, if you want to see Microsoft have a heart attack, talk about the idea of defining legal liability for bad code in a commercial product." That sort of discussion is quickly dismissed on HN. And probably elsewhere on the web/over the internet. Instead we frequently see discussion blaming users of the software, i.e., Microsoft's customers, or even suggestions to make the customer liable, or comments from "…

Most of the people I went to Uni with ended up in fields where the companies are liable for bad stuff, to a certain degree. It does exist. However: * you get paid a lot less * the companies and industries move very slowly * you spend a lot more time writing long-form, some time just re-using existing stuff wholesale, and almost no time building actually new things I mean like Real Engineering fields. What we do in so…

The gp is arguing that companies should be held liable for the harm that they can and do cause. You are countering that argument by claiming that doing so would require all companies to adopt onerous measures. However, that counter argument is only valid if we assume that all companies can cause the same amount of harm and thus have equal liability, and that doing so is unavoidable.

That assumption is deeply flawed. We do not hold toy car manufacturers to the same standards as actual car manufacturers. We do not hold every manufacturer of screws to the same standards as the manufacturers of screws on airplanes. Or rather, we do hold them to the same standards, just we know that certain use cases basically can not cause too much harm in the event of failure and thus in practice the standards needed to mitigate the worst case are much lower.

Software liability does not mean that everybody suddenly needs to take the same care as safety-critical industries. It only means that if you are making safety-critical software and you are incapable of separating the safety of the critical components from the non-critical components. What it really means is the repudiation of the one-size-fits-all lowest common denominator expectation of quality.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#43

[accidental dupe. see above comment]

I bet aoftware that is so secure to be compared to products of other engineering fields does exist (e.g. avionic systems), but you will have to pay a much higher cost to use it, luke hundreds of thousands dollars since the cost of acheieved the guaranteed security level would also be much higher. Given the low cost of modern consumer software, you really have to understand that you get what you paid for. And if you want security guarantees you don't just need that particular piece of software being secure, you need qualified people to operate it, the hardware running it being secure (probably propietry and cost hundreds of thousands), and the whole software stack being secure as well, from firmware to OS to networking code. This is simply not somehow that your general consumer can afford, and if you enforce that level of security in consumer software like smartphones, it is safe to bet that almost everyone that has a smartphone would be protesting since they would have no Software aviliable on there phone anymore.

Like one comment above said, there do exist ways to enforce that level of software security, (like railway traffic lights) but the cost would be ridiculously high, and those systems are probably not running any consumer kind of software stack, probably without an OS since Linux would has it own vulnerability as well. Those systems are probably made for custom hardware that the software vendor has total control of it as well.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#44
post #42
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of the people I went to Uni with ended up in fields where the companies are liable for bad stuff, to a certain degree. It does exist. However: * you get paid a lot less * the companies and industries move very slowly * you spend a lot more time writing long-form, some time just re-using existing stuff wholesale, and almost no time building actually new things I mean like Real Engineering fields. What we do in so…

The gp is arguing that companies should be held liable for the harm that they can and do cause. You are countering that argument by claiming that doing so would require all companies to adopt onerous measures. However, that counter argument is only valid if we assume that all companies can cause the same amount of harm and thus have equal liability, and that doing so is unavoidable. That assumption is deeply flawed.…

how does linux fare in this scenario? few things are as critical in terms of infrastructure

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#45
post #21
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of the people I went to Uni with ended up in fields where the companies are liable for bad stuff, to a certain degree. It does exist. However: * you get paid a lot less * the companies and industries move very slowly * you spend a lot more time writing long-form, some time just re-using existing stuff wholesale, and almost no time building actually new things I mean like Real Engineering fields. What we do in so…

I completed a MSc in Formal Methods a decade ago, and I've worked in software projects where the level of rigor was equivalent or superior to any classical engineering field. For example, railway signaling or some real time control systems. We handed in complex artifacts that have had zero defects throughout their lifetime (> 15 years). I believe lightweight formal methods are quite promising and might let software m…

I personally think it would be excellent if that was the only way you were allowed to code. Though I'd probably lose my job haha. I'd sleep better at night.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#46

"For example, if you want to see Microsoft have a heart attack, talk about the idea of defining legal liability for bad code in a commercial product." That sort of discussion is quickly dismissed on HN. And probably elsewhere on the web/over the internet. Instead we frequently see discussion blaming users of the software, i.e., Microsoft's customers, or even suggestions to make the customer liable, or comments from "…

We tried this with general aviation. Private plane manufacturers all went bankrupt, and now the minimum price for a new airplane is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Apply strict liability to software, and you'll see the same results. Every piece of software will have to be constructed with the care of a medical device. Expect most forms of technological progress to come to a halt. Some part of the HN crowd wi…

I’m reading a book called “An American Sickness” and it discusses medical devices. Turns out a lot of them are pretty poor and often have less testing and verification than most people think.

There’s one story about a hip implant that went bad. Turns out the doctor recommending and performing the surgery was also the patent holder and had a vested interest in getting this particular implant in as many patients as possible. Turns out the patient was actually patient #8 who received this particular implant. Also the implant wasn’t fully approved yet and the FDA simply trusted the doctor to monitor the device for problems.

Also this isn’t isolated. The chapter has several examples of medical devices going into patients and patients experience negative health outcomes. Turns out laws are only as good as the agencies that enforce them.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#47
post #42
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of the people I went to Uni with ended up in fields where the companies are liable for bad stuff, to a certain degree. It does exist. However: * you get paid a lot less * the companies and industries move very slowly * you spend a lot more time writing long-form, some time just re-using existing stuff wholesale, and almost no time building actually new things I mean like Real Engineering fields. What we do in so…

The gp is arguing that companies should be held liable for the harm that they can and do cause. You are countering that argument by claiming that doing so would require all companies to adopt onerous measures. However, that counter argument is only valid if we assume that all companies can cause the same amount of harm and thus have equal liability, and that doing so is unavoidable. That assumption is deeply flawed.…

Liability just means more controls to avoid blame and tighter specifications. Malpractice laws don’t make doctors less dangerous, they mostly encourage ass covering exercises.

I worked at a place that had a formally verified application running on some mainframe. It was wonderful, except that the process was excruciating and maintaining that validation prevented any changes. Every code change cost a minimum of $25,000 2002 dollars.

It was dumb. They would have been better off with a paper process and army of clerks.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What we do in software is not real engineering, not even close. The only reason our processes and practices aren't much heavier is because the stakes are lower. People do not die if a Tweet doesn't make it through, but they do if a bridge collapses through. The threat model is also significantly different. If we go back to the bridge analogy, a company like Microsoft has to deal with tens of thousands of people try…

> People do not die if a Tweet doesn't make it through True, and what you're saying is generally true. But what were the total consequences of the Equifax breach? We can't even quantify it. Snowden himself in the article mentions activists and journalists being killed because of these vulnerabilities. There are definitely counterexamples.

That's true. I suspect part of the problem there is lack of liability and therefore lack of willingness to pay for security. They're just going to lose the best security engineers to Google and Microsoft.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#49
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Go is not safe for concurrent code, unfortunately. Specifically, it does not protect against data races on non-atomic types, which can lead to torn writes and break invariants that are required for safety.

Can you do a security exploit with a concurrency bug although in golang? You may corrupt data, but can you cause remote code execution with it?

Yes, not all RCEs are caused by memory bugs.

Re: The Insecurity Industry

#50
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>How many mistakes does someone have to make before we start to suspect there might be problems with relying on that person's work. There's a lot of legitimate criticisms about modern OS security, whether we're talking about Linux/Android, MacOS/IOS, or Windows. However, we can't ignore the scope of these programs. Supposedly Windows 10 is approximately 50 million lines of code and due to its overwhelming popularity…

Does it need to be 50 million lines of code? When you design with security in mind you might have to prune old code and drop some risky optimizations, probably drop some features. Using a higher-level language might help reduce the line count as well at the cost of performance and memory consumption.

>Does it need to be 50 million lines of code?

Probably not and they should try to reduce the size if it makes sense. However, if all of the OS's I listed are above 10 million lines even in the best case scenario a modern operating system isn't going to be anything less than an overwhelmingly large and complex program.

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