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I would be curious to know if anyone has audited this for malicious code, or how one would go about doing that in the first place. Is that kind of software auditing a use case for Ghidra? A demo of using Ghidra to audit Ghidra would be interesting I suppose.
Reflections on Trusting Trust is worth a read. https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...
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I was quite suspicious of it when it was first announced, but an open source RE tool is probably the stupidest place to put a backdoor. Author considerations aside, it’s a great tool, and does pretty well with decompiling.
How well does it decompile itself ? I've always considered that a great test, much like a self-compiling compiler is a notable milestone. (I believe IDA has a check to stop you from doing this. Cracking that was one of the "rite of passage" exercises back in the day.)
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If they could install a virus on Iran's air-gapped uranium centrifuge industrial control systems, I'm pretty sure they could get one on your computer.
Bribing people in generally corrupt and poor countries to smuggle a USB stick is kind a different than just breaking into random persons home in a country with relatively low corruption. Latter might actually be more difficult. Obviously depends on what your end goal is
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Bribing people in generally corrupt and poor countries to smuggle a USB stick is kind a different than just breaking into random persons home in a country with relatively low corruption. Latter might actually be more difficult. Obviously depends on what your end goal is
It's best not to assume a physical presence is required. Who is to say that the people at Let's Encrypt, NoScript, any of the firmwares' authors, or many other places weren't compromised years ago? It's sometimes worthwhile to reflect on where trust is placed.
We’ve found instead that the NSA can just take over your unpatched computer easily instead of putting in the effort of hacking Let’s Encrypt.
I used this again just the other day with the cantor.dust plugin. My rev.eng skills are dull and were never great to begin with, but for anything below a real APT with obfuscation, runtime decoding and unpacking, Ghidra is an equalizer. Between this and Chef from gchq, someone with devops skills can probably skill up to an entry level threat analyst level in a few weeks or months. The tooling available today is reall…
You mean my electricity has been backdoored? Now that's paranoia on a different level, how does that work
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I would be curious to know if anyone has audited this for malicious code, or how one would go about doing that in the first place. Is that kind of software auditing a use case for Ghidra? A demo of using Ghidra to audit Ghidra would be interesting I suppose.
Its used to reverse engineer an unknown binary without the matching source code. Since Ghidra already is open source it be no use to audit Ghidra itself except for learning purposes. It might be useful to reverse engineer a closed source driver so you can write an open source one from scratch.
And if this resulting binary is distributed, audits of the source code wouldn't catch these modifications.
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I don't think there is anything fishy here, although I don't think the NSA can just install anything on my computer, even if I were based in the US. There is a lot of bluffing when it comes to cyber security. Still it might be quite a useful tool.
I guarantee that whatever browser you use, they have 0day for it. Whatever ISP you use, they can inject traffic into it, and they have a much easier time about it if you aren't in the US. If you're someone who uses the Internet, the NSA can take over whatever you use to browse with and have their way with it. If you don't, well that's what their interdiction program is for. The thing is though, the economics of 0day…
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It's best not to assume a physical presence is required. Who is to say that the people at Let's Encrypt, NoScript, any of the firmwares' authors, or many other places weren't compromised years ago? It's sometimes worthwhile to reflect on where trust is placed.
I don’t know. Seeing how extensively these key signing ceremonies (Let’s Encrypt included) are designed against tampering and collusion, I’d be shocked and impressed if they were infiltrated. We’ve found instead that the NSA can just take over your unpatched computer easily instead of putting in the effort of hacking Let’s Encrypt.
Please explain your comment about how key signing ceremonies stop people from being bribed. The creation of those keys creates a root of trust but doesn't stop leaf certs from being generated.