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Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

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Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#81
post #78
post #5

I find authentication the least problematic place where risk based on ip is used. Etsy, for example, will suspend your seller account if it sees too many logins from different IPs or if it's from an IP it has flagged before. It also has terrible seller customer service so it could take weeks to get it un-suspended. Heard of some people using Private Relay getting hit by this during the beta so hopefully Etsy gets rid…

My guess is that they'll just say Safari isn't supported and push people to Chrome.

Chrome on iOS is also Safari.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#82
post #78
post #5

I find authentication the least problematic place where risk based on ip is used. Etsy, for example, will suspend your seller account if it sees too many logins from different IPs or if it's from an IP it has flagged before. It also has terrible seller customer service so it could take weeks to get it un-suspended. Heard of some people using Private Relay getting hit by this during the beta so hopefully Etsy gets rid…

My guess is that they'll just say Safari isn't supported and push people to Chrome.

Hmm - and alienate anyone on mobile Safari? I doubt it.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#83
post #4

> As of writing this blog I was in Switzerland and the IP used to egress my traffic was in a region located in the US. If this also tends to change a lot and fast you can basically throw away IP addresses as data of your RIBA. Wait, so my data will be routed to US servers, as an EU resident, where the data protection laws are not as strong as where I live? This is a really bad idea, as US is known to tap any data the…

You have no control where your packets get routed on the Internet, by design of the basic protocols. Personal data should be protected by TLS (edit: and/or application-level encryption) so packet routing is irrelevant to privacy and data protection. I am very worried that the demand for protection of personal data (which is good) is mutating into an expectation of fully regional Internets that do not peer with each o…

Every time I bring up on HN that enforcing national (or regional) law on any extranational company that sends packets to your country will inevitably result in the internet being siloed into legal regions, I get super angry responses. HN seems to love the idea of regulating, taxing, etc. any company that communicates over the internet with people in their country (I’ve even seen packets compared to physical packages subject to customs), but hates to recognize the logical conclusions of that.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#84

I hadn't known there was a term for this braindead idea that websites should hassle you based on your IP address. Of course there has to be a term, compartmentalization is necessary for getting good people to do bad things. It's fantastic that Apple is continuing to mitigate commercial surveillance. It's easy to discriminate against us lone individuals who hide our IP addresses, but Apple's market is too big to rejec…

> this braindead idea that websites should hassle you based on your IP address So if you only ever log in to your financial institution from NY city, they shouldn't be suspicious if they see an attempt to log in from North Macedonia?

It was a nice temporary hack in the game of cat and mouse. Now a solution that doesn’t depend on that signal will be required.

My bank sends me a card with a grid of coordinates and I have to enter the character at the coordinate when I login, after entering my password, thereby proving something I know and something I have, without also requiring me to have a phone

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have no control where your packets get routed on the Internet, by design of the basic protocols. Personal data should be protected by TLS (edit: and/or application-level encryption) so packet routing is irrelevant to privacy and data protection. I am very worried that the demand for protection of personal data (which is good) is mutating into an expectation of fully regional Internets that do not peer with each o…

> Personal data should be protected by TLS I guess it's sort of a good thing that Apple is getting into the business of giving away snake oil to combat people selling it. The big iOS privacy changes that would help are DNS over HTTPS (maybe it already does this and requiring permissions for non-HTTPS network access. Maybe they could limit relay routing to non-HTTPS browser traffic?

Before calling private relay ‘snake oil’ and talking about DoH, perhaps you should do a little bit of research?

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have no control where your packets get routed on the Internet, by design of the basic protocols. Personal data should be protected by TLS (edit: and/or application-level encryption) so packet routing is irrelevant to privacy and data protection. I am very worried that the demand for protection of personal data (which is good) is mutating into an expectation of fully regional Internets that do not peer with each o…

It is easier for US to ask Apple to monitor the traffic for a specific user, if the exit node is in US soil. Although the sibling comments say that it is probably a bug, and I hope that it actually is.

Thanks to the design of Private Relay, apple can’t monitor a specific user’s traffic.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It broke it in the sense that it removed a signal that would allow the service to distinguish legit users from possibly malicious ones. In the case of a legit user that has in the past always authenticated from an IP address or address block geolocated to say, Seattle, the service can look at any authentication attempt from elsewhere as anomalous and raise additional challenges. However, with Relay, that signal is lo…

Why would my visitor be surprised that I'm suspicious though? They're choosing to be suspicious. Another analogy I could make is someone that is blocking their caller ID. Should they be surprised that fewer people will take their call? They're lumping themselves in with spammers. I think Apple -- and anonymizing proxy/VPN services in general -- should be communicating that to their customers.

The difference between Apple and other anonymizing proxy/VPN services will be the size of the user base.

Websites will have to choose if they're willing to provide a worse UX to Apple customers.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It broke it in the sense that it removed a signal that would allow the service to distinguish legit users from possibly malicious ones. In the case of a legit user that has in the past always authenticated from an IP address or address block geolocated to say, Seattle, the service can look at any authentication attempt from elsewhere as anomalous and raise additional challenges. However, with Relay, that signal is lo…

IIRC, in one of the WWDC talks, Apple's advice is stop relying on IP address as a signal of the user's location. Either make use of the location APIs on the platform or work out something different.

Trusting location APIs is also silly, as those can be spoofed easily. What Apple is really doing here is subverting the entire concept of geo-blocking services, which is great.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#89

“Welcome back! Hey looks like you are using a new device, how about we just ignore that greeting and use this other separate login process every fucking session”

secure, httponly cookies exist and just might help in easing that pain point.

Re: Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

#90

We're anticipating having to make some changes to our fraud scoring which uses things like location vs. credit card address as signals.

Good. I’m tired of wasting my time with dumb bullshit like vendors thinking my credit card billing address is “suspicious” somehow.
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