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Slamming political rivals may be the most effective way to go viral

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Re: Slamming political rivals may be the most effective way to go viral

#121
post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The reason for it is that you don't win elections by convincing the other side that they are wrong, and they should vote for you. > You win elections by convincing your side to show up. And the other side not to, either voluntarily or by targeted voter suppression and disenfranchisement. At least, that’s all true in the US, but its mostly artifacts of a strongly-structurally-reinforced two-party system. In multipar…

We see the same patterns in multiparty democracy. It could simply be behavior drawn from US influence, but I doubt it. What the article did not mention (but maybe the study did?) is that under brain scanners, few things trigger pleasure as much as imagining justified violence. It is also very addictive in term of neurochemistry. In multiparty democracies, the one thing that can however temporary reduce the problem is…

"Justified violence" I hadn't read that but I've always thought that there's nothing sweeter then righteous anger. The voice in the back of your head is silenced and you can finally do exactly what you've wanted because ... why?

That has been my saving grace in moments like that I think. I tend to hesitate for just a bit before acting and while that's just as often a bad thing in moments like that it's just enough time for that voice to whisper "How will this look? What would you think about what you want to do right now if someone else did it? Will this action change anything that's happened?"

Re: Slamming political rivals may be the most effective way to go viral

#122
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Arrow's impossibility theorem does not apply to STAR voting. STAR voting is strictly more expressive than Ordinal Voting systems (i.e. RCV), while simultaneously being simpler to implement (and explain/understand). STAR voting also provides other benefits over RCV, such as being district summarizable.

I don’t have to know how STAR voting works to know that Gibbard’s 1978 theorem applies. The only game-forms which are straightforward (meaning, one’s best strategy in what option to choose not depending on how one expects others to choose, or on others’ preferences) are the probability mixtures of “do whatever voter X said to”, “between option A and option B, determine how many voters expressed a preference for A ove…

No, it doesn't, but optimal voting under STAR is less dependent on other voters than in both Plurality and RCV systems. Under STAR voting, it would be far, far more practical to vote your conscience irrespective of how others are voting. This would encourage the middle majority to actually vote.

When further combined with other reforms, such as multi-member districts, this could completely transform the political landscape.

Re: Slamming political rivals may be the most effective way to go viral

#123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Arrow's impossibility theorem does not apply to STAR voting. STAR voting is strictly more expressive than Ordinal Voting systems (i.e. RCV), while simultaneously being simpler to implement (and explain/understand). STAR voting also provides other benefits over RCV, such as being district summarizable.

STAR is not easier to implement than ordinal voting methods in general , it may be easier to implement than IRV [0] in particular. Likewise, while IRV is not district summarizable, some ordinal methods are. And outside of specialized circumstances that don’t apply to usual candidate elections, the additional information on STAR ballots compared to unforced preference ordinal ballots is noise of no consistent meaning.…

> STAR is not easier to implement than ordinal voting methods in general, it may be easier to implement than IRV [0] in particular. Likewise, while IRV is not district summarizable, some ordinal methods are.

Could you provide an example? Thanks in advance.

> Arrows impossibility theorem applies to any balloting system that expresses ranked preferences and produces a ranked result

My understanding is that Arrow's impossibility theorem does not apply to STAR or any other Cardinal Voting system. Is that incorrect?

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