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What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

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Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#391

Post by asteroidbelt »

elihu wrote: post #350
asteroidbelt wrote: post #324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Approval voting is simpler than IRV and (as far as I know) it isn't worse than FPTP in any way FPTP might be better than approval voting, because approval voting favors weak moderate candidates with no agenda. With FPTP the people alternate lefts and rights and the system develops. With moderate candidates the system may stop progressing: no reforms, no bugfixes.

If the voting public prefers a weak moderate candidate with no agenda, then that's the candidate that should win. I think weak moderates usually flop, though, if there's no particularly compelling reason for people to want that person to be president. The way I look at is that it's a kind of relief valve. If both major parties (assuming there are two, maybe there'll be more...) nominate not-so-great candidates, then…

> If the voting public prefers a weak moderate candidate with no agenda

No voting public prefers other candidates, and moderate candidate as backup.

I give you an example I posted in another thread:

* 60% want a dem candidate to win

* 40% want a rep candidate to win

* 70% are willing to join strategic voting to avoid allowing other party to win

In this case, the dem candidate looks like a correct winner.

With ranked choice the the dem candidate would win.

But with approval voting strategic "moderate" candidate wins. If they are moderate, that's good. But they can easily be just weak nobody.

It is not exactly what voting public prefers. That choice is a fake choice, like a girl, do you want to go to bed or be thrown into a forest with angry wolves.

> if there's no particularly compelling reason for people to want that person to be president.

The reason is to not let opposing party win. Strategic voting.

> If both major parties (assuming there are two, maybe there'll be more...) nominate not-so-great candidates, then the voters have an option to elect someone like Tom Hanks.

And they will if it is some form of ranked choice, but not just approval.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#392

Post by sofixa »

alexitorg wrote: post #297
Taniwha wrote: post #229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think that RCV is at best a hack, a compromise for people who don't want to get too far from FPP. IMHO if you are electing individual people (a mayor, a US president, a city council, a US Senator) then STV is more equitable (it is pretty close to RCV if you are electing a single person). But if you are electing parties (like the US House) then MMP is a fairer solution

I'm Australian so I might be biased, but I don't like MMP. It seems to be optimising for democratic outcome (well at least a parliament that looks like the distribution of first party votes) while ignoring all other factors. Many countries that use it seem to have weak governments that can't get much done. There is parties that won't work together because one is secessionists (Catalans), right wing (national rally in…

It's interesting you gave France as an example, because they have a nice workflow/system to avoid this.

There are presidential elections every 5 years, which are "standard", if no candidate gets over 50% of the votes, there's a second round between the first two candidates from the first round. A month later, there are legislative elections, the concept being that people will send the new president a parliament he can work with if they're OK with him. Macron won with 20 something % in the first round ( second round was against the aforementioned National Rally, so his victory was guaranteed), but his party got 50%+ in the legislative elections because people decided to give him a chance to enact his program, even if he wasn't their first choice. That isn't always the case, and if the far right wins the presidential elections next year i'm certain they won't have a parliamentary majority.

To avoid a popular wave sweeping everything, the legislature id bicameral, the aforementioned legislative elections only for the lower chamber, the National Assembly. The higher chamber, the Senate, which is more limited in powers but can still exert influence over the lower chamber's law making, is indirectly elected by mayors, local/departmental/regional councilors with staggered 6 year terms ( every 3 years half the seats are up for election).

IMHO it's overall a good system that allows for everyone to be represented, enables governments to be stable ( but doesn't force it). The main thing i'd improve is ranked choice voting for single seat elections ( presidential, local).

And besides all that specific to France, i disagree about "classic" MMP. It forces cooperation and compromise, much better than a party forcing through with whatever they want because there's nobody that can opose them.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#393

Post by ad8e »

godelski wrote: post #242
magila wrote: post #238

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One big problem with approval voting is that it presents voters with a difficult conundrum: what do you do with candidates you don't particularly like but would still strongly prefer over one-or-more other candidates? If people are too lenient with their approval it increases the risk of someone no one really likes getting elected over someone a majority would have preferred. If people are too stringent you start run…

Fine, go STAR or Score/Range. Honestly I prefer those systems (in that order and I'd argue most people that are pro cardinal systems have that same preference[0]). Nice benefit is that people can bullet vote and we collapse to Approval which is a "good enough" system. > but would still strongly prefer over one-or-more other candidates? In fact, this is why I argue for STAR or score. It encodes information for better…

Small correction: The term "bullet voting" means voting for one candidate only (001000), rather than voting 0 or 1 on each candidate (101011). It is caused by low engagement from the voters, who only take the time to learn about one candidate, their favorite. It has been a problem for approval voting in practice, and it is unclear to what extent it affects score methods in practice.

I think STAR is slightly worse than Score, is comparable to Approval, is much better than IRV, and is likely better than Condorcet methods. STAR has some odd behavior which can be explored in a 3-person race. Score has less-problematic behavior caused by risk-taking with equilibrium voters (not like voters behave in any way similar to Nash equilibria though, and who knows what the real-world behavior will be).

However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming political resistance, if its properties are simpler to convince voters. Majority criterion sounds nice even when it is inefficient. Much like Top Trading Cycles losing to Gale-Shapley in school choice algorithms (excluding Boston).

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#394

Post by SilverRed »

asteroidbelt wrote: post #306
e1g wrote: post #285

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Still ~90-95% voter turnout (vs ~60% in the USA)

And lower than 90% turnout is better, right? Because when people are forced to vote, they are on average more likely to vote for a random name they heard on TV than for a candidate with a program they read and the background they studied.

In an optional voting society, parties are incentivized to radicalize and enrage their supporters so they bother to go vote.

In Australia everyone knows the two parties and has a rough idea what they support. I doubt there is very much "random name voting" going on which is shown by the consistent voting patterns over the years.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#395

Post by sofixa »

godelski wrote: post #330
munk-a wrote: post #282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree about the consistent distribution in parliaments. I do think that parliamentary governance is, overall, just a better way to elect heads of state - but up here in Canada we have a parliament and, while the NDP certainly does hold some sway, we're drifting toward a two party system. Surprisingly, it seems most likely that the CPC might collapse and get absorbed into the LPC which then provides conservative…

> but up here in Canada we have a parliament and we're drifting toward a two party system Actually this is kinda my point: Canada: Liberal + Conservative = 81.1% (90.5% with Bloc, 97.6% w/ NDP, ) Australia: Liberal + Labor = 84.8% (95.4% with National) Germany: CDU + SPD = 56% (68% w/ AfD, 79.7% w/FDP, 89.4% w/ Left) France: REM + LR = 71.8% (79.9% w/ MoDem, 85.4% w/ UAI, 90.8% w/SOC) I can continue if needed... Thes…

> France: REM + LR = 71.8% (79.9% w/ MoDem, 85.4% w/ UAI, 90.8% w/SOC)

As i explained in great detail elsewhere here, you can't use that out of context. French legislative elections are after presidential ones to send the just elected president a new parliament he(or maybe soon she) can work with. If Macron loses next year, REM will have close to nothing. So, it's more like "president's party gets around a majority". Note that this isn't always the case, and Chirac's second term was with a socialist majority parliament he had to work with.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#396

Post by pandem »

barsonme wrote: post #294
anonporridge wrote: post #272

Earlier quoted context omitted.

While multimember districts would be a huge improvement, I wonder if we also should start having the conversation if geography based representation is the right approach for the internet age. I for one, have more in common with a minority identity widely dispersed across the country but connected through the internet than I do my next door neighbors. My niche identity never gets proportionately represented in governm…

No. Government and politics are primarily local because most problems are local. For instance, I have zero clue about life in NYC. Letting me directly influence decisions in NYC is wholly unfair. I have no skin in the game! How good or bad their transportation is doesn’t affect me. Whether their local tax rate is high or low doesn’t affect me. But it most definitely does affect them. Likewise, nobody in NYC is affect…

The Congress does not decide the New York local tax rate or how west coast cities handle their forest. You can have a local government and Congressional elections that are not tied to your specific location. As far as I know now the only position that both someone in California and someone in New York would vote for is POTUS.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#397

Post by croisillon »

sofixa wrote: post #392
alexitorg wrote: post #297

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm Australian so I might be biased, but I don't like MMP. It seems to be optimising for democratic outcome (well at least a parliament that looks like the distribution of first party votes) while ignoring all other factors. Many countries that use it seem to have weak governments that can't get much done. There is parties that won't work together because one is secessionists (Catalans), right wing (national rally in…

It's interesting you gave France as an example, because they have a nice workflow/system to avoid this. There are presidential elections every 5 years, which are "standard", if no candidate gets over 50% of the votes, there's a second round between the first two candidates from the first round. A month later, there are legislative elections, the concept being that people will send the new president a parliament he ca…

That’s not correct, Chirac won the parliament in 2002, the first time the presidential election was for 5 years. The former system (7 years president) allowed more diversity and that’s how he got to work with a left prime minister, 10 years after having been himself the prime minister of a left president.

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#398

Post by adamjb »

godelski wrote: post #351
adamjb wrote: post #332

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>These 4 countries have 4 different voting systems but what they have in common is a parliament where seats are assigned proportionately to votes (there's no winner take all). That is wrong. Australian lower house seats are single member aka winner takes all. edit: and Canada is FPTP

> Canada is FPTP Yes? I said those 4 examples use different election styles, not that Canada doesn't use FPTP... > Australian lower house seats are single member aka winner takes all. >> The lower house, the House of Representatives, currently consists of 151 members, each elected using full-preference instant-runoff voting from single-member constituencies known as electoral divisions (and commonly referred to as "e…

>Yes? I said those 4 examples use different election styles, not that Canada doesn't use FPTP...

FPTP is a winner takes all electoral system. You said Canada had "a parliament where seats are assigned proportionately to votes (there's no winner take all)".

>Winner-take-all refers to

>>> a legislative body is elected by dividing the jurisdiction into geographic constituencies, each electing exactly one representative. Although this may result in diverse representation due to different political groups making up majorities of different districts, within each district, only one political party or group will be able to elect a candidate[1]

This is exactly what Australia and Canada's lower houses have. And looking it up now, France too.

>considering the impracticality of implementing a non-winner-take-all system without a significantly larger number of representatives

The Australian senate has 76 senators. The Australian house of Reps has 151 members. The Australian senate elected with a non-winner-take-all system. The Australian house of reps is elected via a winner-take-all system.

>If we give more seats and apply proportionate seating this is functionally equivalent to just dividing the electorate further and using winner-take-all.

It is not. To illustrate: imagine a country of 1 million where instead of left-wing and right-wing parties they have left-hand and right-hand parties. So there everyone votes for the right-hand party except for the 10% of people who are left-handed. As handedness is fairly evenly distributed, in a single member electorate system it would be basically impossible for the lefties to take a single seat. So you'd expect the parliament to be 100% right-hand party no matter if it comprised a single member or 10,000. However with a proportional system (e.g. SLV) with electorates of 10 or more you could expect the parliament to roughly reflect the 90/10 split.

We see this in the real world, where places with single member seats (e.g. Canada, France, Australia lower house) have worse parliamentary diversity than those with multi member seats (e.g. Germany, Australia upper house).

>And if this is why you're throwing my comment out the window I think you missed the entire point and I do not appreciate the lack of good faith here.

As you haven't made it very clear at all, what is your point?

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#399

Post by caf »

godelski wrote: post #256
caf wrote: post #210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The non-monotonicity tactical voting possibility is overblown: it only really works in the toy "which is the favourite pizza of these 30 students" examples. In real world elections, the conditions where it is even theoretically possible arise only rarely (A > B > C with three choices, but B > A and A > C with two choices, and A's lead over B significantly greater than B's lead over C in the three choice scenario, and…

The non-monotonicity is actually pretty important and we have real world examples of this. Clay mentions the Alaska race in this comment[0]. We've seen this issue in Southern states that used this to disadvantage black voters. This is also the reason Bernie would spoil Biden (and vise versa). So I'm not sure what you're getting at. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27598975

Let's look at the "Bernie would spoil Biden" example.

The idea is that the Republicans endorse only one candidate, Trump, and the Democrats endorse two: Bernie and Biden. In the non-tactical voting case, the second-last round votes shake out like:

  Trump 45
  Biden 28
  Bernie 27
Bernie is eliminated, the votes in his pile split 24 / 3 between Biden and Trump (a preference flow of 89% to Biden) and the final round of counting ends up:

  Biden 52%
  Trump 48%
..but tactical voting intervenes! A small number of Trump voters (2% of the total electorate) are organised to tactically switch their votes to 1. Bernie 2. Trump, resulting in a second-last round of:

  Trump 43
  Bernie 29
  Biden 28
Now Biden is eliminated, the votes in his pile split 20 / 8 Bernie/Trump (a weaker preference flow of 71% to Bernie, because of Biden voters too conservative to vote for Bernie) and the final round is now:

  Trump 51
  Bernie 49
Tactical voting has won the day!

However, this really illustrates the problems here for the prospective tactical voter:

1. They need pretty perfect information to pull this off. Not just on first round votes, but on how the preferences are going to flow as well. If those Biden votes flowed a little weaker to Trump, all they'd have done is elect Bernie instead; if Trump had been a little stronger overall than they expected in the no-tactical-voting, their tactical voting attempt might have backfired completely and turned a fair Trump win into a loss! Opinion polling just isn't this precise.

2. They have a co-ordination problem. If they switch too few votes, the scheme fails and they just elect Biden with a greater margin than before; too many and the scheme fails and they elect Bernie, a candidate they're presumably less happy with actually getting the Presidency than Biden.

3. All of this only works if the balls line up perfectly in the first place, even setting aside the problem already mentioned of how you know the balls are going to line up. If the second-last round votes are instead Trump 45 / Biden 30 / Bernie 25 then the Bernie to Biden preference flow has to fall under 66% for the scheme to be possible.

Rather than trying to engage in this dubious and risky tactical voting attempt, the Trump campaign would be far better served just spending their resources trying to turn out more of their voters. After all, the theoretical possibility only exists when the margins are tight in the first place.

A tangential matter is that even in an IRV election it still probably makes sense for the parties to either endorse only a single candidate each - otherwise their candidates will waste some of their resources attacking their co-party candidate when they could have launched them against their main opposition - or at least mutually agree to distribute campaigning material advising to give a second preference to their co-party candidate (a so-called "preference swap" arrangement).

Re: What is ranked-choice voting and why is New York using it?

#400

Post by elihu »

r00fus wrote: post #388
gene91 wrote: post #318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://www.fairvote.org/rcv_faq#monotonicity Read "22. Does RCV satisfy the monotonicity criterion?" Say, there's 3 candidates. You want A to win. You think A will lose to B in a 1-on-1 match, but would win C. So you vote C-A-B (or C-B-A, doesn't matter) to increase the likeliness that B got eliminated in the 1st round. Of course, you're now saying that you prefer C over A in a 1-on-1 race. But that's fine because o…

I simply don't get why the person preferring A doesn't rank A first. This scenario only works if you have exactly 3 candidates and the numbers are tight and everyone is tactically voting instead of voting their conscience. In reality most preferential voting schemes have many candidates, and there's too much chaos to coordinate this kind of scenario. Meanwhile plurality voting has candidates winning with way less tha…

> I simply don't get why the person preferring A doesn't rank A first.

Well, that's kind of the point of the example. A normal person who wants A to win would put A as their first choice. But doing that can actually cause their preferred candidate to lose, which is exactly the opposite of the voter's intent. FPTP has a different set of problems that one could argue are worse, but one of the few good things about FPTP is that you can't say about some election result "that candidate lost because I voted for him/her".

Non-monotonic results don't happen in every election, but they're something that can happen.

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