This seems far from clear. Just because a system is capable of turing complete computation does not imply that a generic state of the system will typically eventually produce intelligence or even something which is sophisticated in some sense.
As a trivial example, consider a variation of Conway's game of life which, in addition to black and white cells, also has green cells, where any cell next to one or more green cells will be a green cell in the next time step. A generic state in such a variation will have at least one green cell, and therefore all parts of it will eventually be green, and so no useful long running computation will be done, certainly none which takes where the green cells are into account. But, such a system would still be turing complete, because one could start in a state in which there are no green cells, and in those states you just have Conway's game of life.
That trivial example works as an existence proof, but even for less extreme cases it isn't clear.
Consider ordinary conway's game of life. To paraphrase a question from Alex Flint on Alignment Forum (https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/3SG4WbNPoP8fsuZgs/agenc... ) Suppose we have some 10^50 by 10^50 square where an agent is supposed to be implemented, and this 10^50 by 10^50 square is at the top left corner of a, say, 10^100 by 10^100 square, where the rest of the square is initialized randomly, is it even possible for the agent to be such that it has a high chance of successfully influencing the large scale state of the rest of the 10^100 by 10^100 region in the way that is desired? It isn't clear. It isn't clear that a structure can withstand the interactions with a surrounding chaotic region. Perhaps some systems are such that they do allow Turing-complete computation, and are such that typical states result in complex behavior, but are also such that all really structured behavior is always very "fragile", and can only continue in a structured way if what interacts with it is in a small set of possible interactions.
To be capable of Turing complete computation, is not, I think, sufficient for "life" (a self-maintaining thing) to arise from typical/generic states, even when under the assumption that typical/generic states lead to continually complex behavior (to exclude the spreading green cells case)
Also, I don't think we can confidently say that the Plank time is "the universal frame rate". Better to refer to Bremermann's limit and the Margolus–Levitin theorem , though these bounds depend on the amount of energy available. (10^33 operations per second per joule, where the energy is the average energy of the system doing the computation)