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GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

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Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#81

Post by njt »

R0b0t1 wrote: post #33
njt wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> GPG exists, and no one has really proposed good solutions [...] > if you're going to complain please work towards solving the issue Perhaps because you are asking the wrong question: "PGP/GPG is old, broken, and insecure, what is an exact drop-in replacement that I can substitute for it?" Instead, the question should be: "PGP/GPG is old, broken, and insecure, what is a replacement for [this specific thing I am tryi…

I know. I am aware of the appropriate questions and some (most) of their answers. But these things still do not seem to get adopted. Best I've seen is a few projects pick up signify. Signal is OK I guess, but still does not solve a lot of things a decentralized system can. People always join these conversations to namedrop projects to sound smart and security conscious, apparently not having tried to integrate them i…

> these things still do not seem to get adopted

If I understand your comment correctly, the reason you are using an old, insecure, and broken tool is because the secure replacement is not as widely used?

Are you looking for some specific percentage of the population to adopt it? What is that threshold?

> Signal is OK I guess, but still does not solve a lot of things a decentralized system can.

Serious question: what problem does a decentralized tool that old, insecure, and broken solve that you would use it instead of one that is secure but "centralized"?

> People always join these conversations to namedrop projects to sound smart and security conscious

I can't judge other people's motivation for mentioning PGP/GPG alternatives, but the projects they mention certainly fit the criteria for being secure replacements. Are you going to disregard their answers because you have deemed their motivations unfit?

> apparently not having tried to integrate them into their existing workflows.

If you could explain your specific PGP/GPG workflow, perhaps someone might be able to suggest something to replace it.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#82

Post by njt »

tomcooks wrote: post #43
njt wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> GPG exists, and no one has really proposed good solutions [...] > if you're going to complain please work towards solving the issue Perhaps because you are asking the wrong question: "PGP/GPG is old, broken, and insecure, what is an exact drop-in replacement that I can substitute for it?" Instead, the question should be: "PGP/GPG is old, broken, and insecure, what is a replacement for [this specific thing I am tryi…

GPG is broken and insecure‽

And old. See the many comments and articles posted in this thread to that effect.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#83

Post by throwaway45209 »

creamytaco wrote: post #78
cpach wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27331942

None of these are alternatives to PGP. There is nothing that comes functionally close to replacing it.

The current wisdom is to have specific tools/constructions for specific purposes, so as to eliminate/reduce footguns and to incorporate modern cryptography.

Edit: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#84

Post by creamytaco »

throwaway45209 wrote: post #83
creamytaco wrote: post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

None of these are alternatives to PGP. There is nothing that comes functionally close to replacing it.

The current wisdom is to have specific tools/constructions for specific purposes, so as to eliminate/reduce footguns and to incorporate modern cryptography. Edit: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html

Current wisdom != a single blog post.

I disagree with every single one of his points btw and from the looks of it, so do a lot of others.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#85

Post by R0b0t1 »

njt wrote: post #81
R0b0t1 wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know. I am aware of the appropriate questions and some (most) of their answers. But these things still do not seem to get adopted. Best I've seen is a few projects pick up signify. Signal is OK I guess, but still does not solve a lot of things a decentralized system can. People always join these conversations to namedrop projects to sound smart and security conscious, apparently not having tried to integrate them i…

> these things still do not seem to get adopted If I understand your comment correctly, the reason you are using an old, insecure, and broken tool is because the secure replacement is not as widely used? Are you looking for some specific percentage of the population to adopt it? What is that threshold? > Signal is OK I guess, but still does not solve a lot of things a decentralized system can. Serious question: what…

Bunch of straw questions, I don't care to answer them. Answer your own pointless questions.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#86

Post by throwaway45209 »

creamytaco wrote: post #84
throwaway45209 wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The current wisdom is to have specific tools/constructions for specific purposes, so as to eliminate/reduce footguns and to incorporate modern cryptography. Edit: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html

Current wisdom != a single blog post. I disagree with every single one of his points btw and from the looks of it, so do a lot of others.

It's not just him.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#87

Post by reifyx »

tptacek wrote: post #48
upofadown wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Keeping old messages around for all practical purposes negates forward secrecy in any messaging system. It isn't just an email issue. If they can get your secret key they can pretty much for sure get your old messages. Most email users keep their messages in cloud storage (IMAP) so that changing computers is a non-issue. OpenPGP is an encrypt once scheme so that messages on an IMAP server are encrypted and stay encry…

Systems that lack forward secrecy are by design incapable of preventing archives of eventually-plaintext messages. There's nothing you can do about it; every message you send is irrevocably a part of the adversary's record, and, because you rely on a single long-term key, you know eventually that record will be plaintext. That's why forward secrecy is such a big deal, and why every modern messaging cryptosystem uses…

But this only applies for messages that are deleted on your local device (either manually or through an automatic timer). Otherwise, whatever adversary stole your keys can steal your message archive too, they're on the same device. Now, assuming you aren't going to be deleting most of your mail, I don't see how forward secrecy is "such a big deal" in this scenario. It's certainly nice to have, but it definitely has drawbacks wrt the features I mentioned earlier.

Post-compromise security, on the other hand, makes more sense, since the future messages don't exist yet.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#88

Post by tptacek »

reifyx wrote: post #87
tptacek wrote: post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Systems that lack forward secrecy are by design incapable of preventing archives of eventually-plaintext messages. There's nothing you can do about it; every message you send is irrevocably a part of the adversary's record, and, because you rely on a single long-term key, you know eventually that record will be plaintext. That's why forward secrecy is such a big deal, and why every modern messaging cryptosystem uses…

But this only applies for messages that are deleted on your local device (either manually or through an automatic timer). Otherwise, whatever adversary stole your keys can steal your message archive too, they're on the same device. Now, assuming you aren't going to be deleting most of your mail, I don't see how forward secrecy is "such a big deal" in this scenario. It's certainly nice to have, but it definitely has d…

You can't meaningfully delete messages in non-forward-secret systems, because part of the premise of all these systems is that your adversary is recording everything.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#89

Post by tptacek »

xorcist wrote: post #68
user3939382 wrote: post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I get requests from non-technical people in my life for how they can email sensitive files (to other non-technical users) in a way that is especially secure. My refrain: “Technically there is, but… (contemplates PGP for half a second)… it’s very complicated to setup.” Between email phishing attacks, Dropbox and everyone else on HIBP, I honestly don’t know what advice to give non-technical users besides put it on a US…

In the situation where you want to distribute a sensitive file without a trusted third party of any kind of key infrastructure in place, it's probably easier to not bother with public key encryption. Which isn't too bad: gpg -c secretfile.zip Not sure it can get much easier? To decrypt: gpg secretfile.zip.gpg The point is that gpg is a tool that most people either already have or can install in a trusted way without…

Never use the OpenSSL CLI to encrypt things. It creates unauthenticated ciphertext. It is anything but "perfectly secure".

I don't think it's even the case that the OpenSSL project wants you to be using their code this way. It's just that Unix nerds (hey: it me) find things like this and adopt them, then write things about how they're "perfectly secure" in message board slapfights. It's a microcosm of the whole problem.

Re: GPG-Tui, a Terminal User Interface for GnuPG

#90

Post by reifyx »

tptacek wrote: post #88
reifyx wrote: post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But this only applies for messages that are deleted on your local device (either manually or through an automatic timer). Otherwise, whatever adversary stole your keys can steal your message archive too, they're on the same device. Now, assuming you aren't going to be deleting most of your mail, I don't see how forward secrecy is "such a big deal" in this scenario. It's certainly nice to have, but it definitely has d…

You can't meaningfully delete messages in non-forward-secret systems, because part of the premise of all these systems is that your adversary is recording everything.

I agree with you there. But is your point that any secure email system must critically have forward secrecy, or its insecure? Even though forward secrecy really only gives you any benefit for the messages that you delete, which most people don't in the context of email?

Just thinking, if people had the option between 1) deleting their mail and 2) email search, secure (unlike WhatsApp) and easy (unlike Signal) backups, ability to offload your email archive to the server (it's common to have gigabytes of mail, do you want to store all of it on a mobile phone forever? what happens if you drop it in a river?), and so on, don't you think people would go for option 2?

This is all disregarding the specifics of PGP-encrypted mail, for which I agree is not great.

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