tldr: Google's new app bundle signing might be a precursor (well, almost certainly is) to Google's being able to replace parts of and modify your app on the fly when installed by certain targeted users or within certain targeted countries at Google's whim, with users being none the wiser. Google might do this for a lot of reasons, and none of them seem to be good. FWIW, Google promises not to change the functionality…
Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
111–120 of 152 posts
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Which would give them ability to alter basically any app on the play store as they deem fit. Google already controls the operating system, the Play Store, and the SDKs you used to develop your app in the first place. If they wanted to alter your app there is already ample opportunity to do so, what additional trust do you gain by managing your own signing key here?
Isn’t it simply that any changes by Google would clearly not match the developer’s signature so are evident when they are different?
So you tell the OS to "show me this app's signature", and the OS can just lie and show you the expected signature. You want to copy the app to an SD card so you can check it on your Linux PC? The OS can copy the "legal" app.
Also yeah, it seems code signing won't affect anything if the OS wants to be malicious. "Super Secret Messaging App" asks the OS to load encrypt.so, its custom encryption library, and the OS can deliver a no-op library and say "Here it is!". The app wants to check the file's hash, the OS can intercept the hash method's return value and change it to the expected one...
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#113The article linked from this one is worth a read: https://commonsware.com/blog/2020/09/23/uncomfortable-questi... They claim that because Google strips the developer signature and signs it themselves, they can modify the app and re-sign it. They suggest that an authoritarian regime could coerce Google into serving modified versions of eg. E2E encrypted messaging apps to people of that regime’s choice as a condition o…
Apple issue the certificate but you never supply them with the private key. There's nothing stopping them from issuing a certificate with their own key though. It's not like Android where the signing key has to match otherwise apps can't be updated (amongst other things). They must be doing some re-signing on their side because the binary you upload is huge and it goes through optimisation on Apple's side so the user…
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#114Earlier quoted context omitted.
The model also shields to a certain extent against conflict of interests (the product is the user, i.e. ads/tracking/hostile maintainership takeover)
> The model also shields to a certain extent against conflict of interests (the product is the user, i.e. ads/tracking/hostile maintainership takeover) Can you explain how? Since I've published things to F-Droid and since they also control signing and building (just like Apple and Google in this article), they can freely modify and change what's published on their store. Just like with Google and Apple, you need to i…
I think the perspective is that the distribution shields its users from possible upstream shenanigans (think stories that we used to hear about how popular free and open source Chrome extensions get bought and sold and ended up showing ads on Chrome opening page)
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's just a little bit weird that Google designed the Play Store and Android with key signing if they then have to ask for those keys. They control the OS and the store, couldn't they just make devices trust Google's app-repackaging-service's key? This would be easier for everyone, and more honest for the consumer user who gets packages signed by whoever actually built it.
This solution is backwards compatible. Changing the installation verification process is not.
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#116Earlier quoted context omitted.
The model also shields to a certain extent against conflict of interests (the product is the user, i.e. ads/tracking/hostile maintainership takeover)
> The model also shields to a certain extent against conflict of interests (the product is the user, i.e. ads/tracking/hostile maintainership takeover) Can you explain how? Since I've published things to F-Droid and since they also control signing and building (just like Apple and Google in this article), they can freely modify and change what's published on their store. Just like with Google and Apple, you need to i…
F-droid is funded by contributions and donations, and they need both. They also have everything out in the open, which brings extra scrutiny.
And the last part is just culture. F-droid is a community project with clear set goals. Google also has clear set goals, they just don't happen to align with their users for the most part.
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#117tldr: Google's new app bundle signing might be a precursor (well, almost certainly is) to Google's being able to replace parts of and modify your app on the fly when installed by certain targeted users or within certain targeted countries at Google's whim, with users being none the wiser. Google might do this for a lot of reasons, and none of them seem to be good. FWIW, Google promises not to change the functionality…
> Google might do this for a lot of reasons, and none of them seem to be good. As a Play Store developer, I give Google the benefit of the doubt. By the way, before you assume a nefarious purpose, consider all Android phones connecting to the Play Store (by definition) have an auto-updating root process. Why does Google need to impersonate an application developer? This is fundamentally why Commonsware scare tactics…
That is a feature. If someone cannot do basic diligence of protecting the signing key, should I really trust them for executing code on my machine?
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
Every content creator I follow seems pretty desperate to get away from YouTube. Creating a system where critical content creators are rewarded by an algorithm that requires burnout behavior continually does not seem like a long term stable business design.
> Creating a system where critical content creators are rewarded by an algorithm that requires burnout behavior continually does not seem like a long term stable business design. Sadly, history has shown that this is completely sustainable. Content creators that burn out will be replaced from among the legion of up-and-comers who are eager for their own shot at the spotlight, and are happy to sacrifice their well-bei…
Re: Google I/O 2021 and Uncomfortable Questions
#119The article linked from this one is worth a read: https://commonsware.com/blog/2020/09/23/uncomfortable-questi... They claim that because Google strips the developer signature and signs it themselves, they can modify the app and re-sign it. They suggest that an authoritarian regime could coerce Google into serving modified versions of eg. E2E encrypted messaging apps to people of that regime’s choice as a condition o…
It's silly, because if you control the OS you control the app. They can push an OS or trusted app update that reads/writes the app's private data, or changes the shared libraries the app depends on, or with a little more work reads/writes the app's memory. Anyone claiming to provide protection from Google on a phone Google has remote root access to is selling a theatrical experience.