Indeed, I've been feeling indifferent about all these timing sidechannels ever since the very first ones (Spectre/Meltdown). The PoCs have not been particularly convincing to me, given that they are extremely contrived and rely on knowing the exact details of the system being exploited to such an extent that someone with those details would be better off with other ways in, and assumes those details haven't changed at all during the amount of time required to do the attack --- the nature of these side-channels is such that even the smallest change in environment can completely change the results.
In other words, if I choose a process on my system at random, and dump a few dozen bytes from it, I can technically claim to have leaked some data; but the use of that data to an attacker likely depends strongly on factors which are outside of the attacker's control. It's somewhat like finding a (real-world) key on the ground: you theoretically now have access to something you shouldn't have, but you have next to no idea what that something is.
But I feel confident that these issues are purely academic and, while interesting, serve more to provide content for PhD theses than represent urgent hazards on the web.
They also provide content for sensationalist clickbait articles and fuel the paranoia that drives society towards authoritarianism and furthers the war on general-purpose-computing, which IMHO is a much bigger issue to worry about.