To quote my comment above:
> If you wanted to know if the kernel review process is able to reliably catch malicious attempts you literally could have just asked the kernel maintainers and they'd told you that no, review can't go that deep. Or looked at non-malicious bugs and observed that no, review does not catch all bugs with security implications.
> You'd very likely would have been able to get code past them even if you told them that there are attempts coming and got their approval.
If you want to know that the process isn't catching all attacks, that should be all you need. For the second case, getting patches past a warned maintainer is harder and should be even better evidence of the problems of the process, without any of the concerns. There is a wide range of options to learn about code review, and what they did was one of the extreme ends - just to find "yes, what everyone has been saying is true". And then not putting in the work to make amends after it becomes clear it wasn't appreciated, so now this other student got caught in his advisors mess (assuming the representation of him actually testing a new analyzer and not being part of a repeated attempt to introduce bugs is true - the way he went about it also wasn't good, but way less bad).
But you don't get splashy outrage, and thus less success at "raising awareness" with people that didn't care before, which is what your comment seemed to argue for.