Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you wanted to know if the kernel review process is able to reliably catch malicious attempts you literally could have just asked the kernel maintainers and they'd told you that no, review can't go that deep. Or looked at non-malicious bugs and observed that no, review does not catch all bugs with security implications. You'd very likely would have been able to get code past them even if you told them that there ar…
the project is 30 something odd years old now, and is no longer a hobby, it is now critical infrastructure that powers virtually everything. it's unfortunate that something happened in the project that cost the maintainers a lot of hours, that comes with the territory of working on important software, i'd argue. i don't want an espionagetastic fundamentally untrustable and inescapable computing hellscape, airplanes f…
what's the non-controversial alternative? alerting the organization before they do it? that doesn't work. that's why scientists do blinding and double blinding.
if you mean something else, then i'm missing parts of this (really complicated) debate.