This makes sense, but if he sees rent as an immutable law of progress, then he is simply advocating for the creation of a new rentier monopoly in the political class. This is exactly what he decries as the violent theft of land by English nobles and colonial forces. I’m sure that the nobles would have told you that they were saving the commoners from all those evil landlords, and the colonization of India was actually freeing them from oppressive local warlords.
The main thrust of economic discovery over the last 200 years is that self-sovereignty is the main driver of social prosperity, not authoritarianism, nor collectivism. There is a natural tax on land, which is the cost to defend it, or perhaps the cost of support to a community that will respect a right to ownership. Put that way, the situation is not that the government ‘allows’ landlords to collect rent, it is that the government reverses this by forcing the community to pay for the legal and physical defense of the land, which is given to them for free.
If you removed any central authority, you would get exactly the situation that George is looking for, which is that the landlords would have to pay the community the full value of the rent so that there would be no benefit from recognizing a new owner, and thus all members of the community would be willing to enforce ownership rights. Of course this could also be chaos, so formalization of these agreements turned into government, which made some people very powerful, who found that they could make lots of money renting land if they collected income tax to pay their cost of ownership.
So I’m wary that invocation of his ideas may lead to a violent revolution that will end up in exactly the same place place we came from, which is a powerful class of rentiers using the threat of violence to extract maximum value from productive people.
But still I like the Georgian idea, and I think it can probably be expressed through an insurance bond that secures the physical defense of the property through payments to the community, and a collateral to compensate for any loss of ownership. There should also be room for externality compensation, or possibly even further, conservation fees (Pigou). We have remarkable possibilities for fully-voluntary governance with smart contracts.