61–70 of 100 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The number of bash history files with accidental passwords pasted into them is quite high. Another reason I don’t sudo and instead ssh
Shell history files for admin accounts should be disabled (or at least kept short) for this reason.
To me, user accounts have always seemed like the more reasonable approach to sandboxing vs. cloning the universe to run a single program in a container. Most of my systems have a user for myself, and one or two other users like `sketchy` or `test` or something for programs that I trust enough to run, but don't trust enough to not fuck up my home directory in some way (including modifying startup scripts, which IMHO s…
That's why I think intra-user isolation is better. I would feel so much better if my browser could just access its settings, the download directory, and read access outside my home directory (for libs and such).
I remember a while ago, Ubuntu used encryptfs for home directories, but it was removed. Weird, because I thought it was a great idea
In some ways, encrypting the entire disk is more secure.
I remember a while ago, Ubuntu used encryptfs for home directories, but it was removed. Weird, because I thought it was a great idea
https://talldanestale.dk/2020/04/06/zfs-and-homedir-encrypti...
Hope general zfs support will improve in the installer, though. As well as automation and tooling around automatic snapshots.
To me, user accounts have always seemed like the more reasonable approach to sandboxing vs. cloning the universe to run a single program in a container. Most of my systems have a user for myself, and one or two other users like `sketchy` or `test` or something for programs that I trust enough to run, but don't trust enough to not fuck up my home directory in some way (including modifying startup scripts, which IMHO s…
I run such less trusted programs on other machines . The privilege elevation attack surface is just too big on a normal Linux system. That's why I think intra-user isolation is better. I would feel so much better if my browser could just access its settings, the download directory, and read access outside my home directory (for libs and such).
The tricky part are the profiles afaik. But this could be solved with some concentrated community effort I guess.
I think AppArmor does something similar (I don't know the differences to SELinux in detail, so if someone like to clarify please go ahead). I remember I've seen some AppArmor related stuff regarding Firefox (and LibreOffice I think) in Ubuntu. So seems not much is missing to have at least an sandboxed web browser out-of-the-box on a Linux desktop.
To me, user accounts have always seemed like the more reasonable approach to sandboxing vs. cloning the universe to run a single program in a container. Most of my systems have a user for myself, and one or two other users like `sketchy` or `test` or something for programs that I trust enough to run, but don't trust enough to not fuck up my home directory in some way (including modifying startup scripts, which IMHO s…
I run such less trusted programs on other machines . The privilege elevation attack surface is just too big on a normal Linux system. That's why I think intra-user isolation is better. I would feel so much better if my browser could just access its settings, the download directory, and read access outside my home directory (for libs and such).
You could probably use Qubes OS instead.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's a shame. Honestly though, full-disk is just so darn easy, and nearly as secure. I'll probably just stick with that for a good long while. EDIT: Looks like LUKS is supported now, which is nice: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd-homed#LUKS_home...
Full disk encryption is more secure. If you can't trust your system files who knows whats happening when you enter your password.
To me, user accounts have always seemed like the more reasonable approach to sandboxing vs. cloning the universe to run a single program in a container. Most of my systems have a user for myself, and one or two other users like `sketchy` or `test` or something for programs that I trust enough to run, but don't trust enough to not fuck up my home directory in some way (including modifying startup scripts, which IMHO s…
I run such less trusted programs on other machines . The privilege elevation attack surface is just too big on a normal Linux system. That's why I think intra-user isolation is better. I would feel so much better if my browser could just access its settings, the download directory, and read access outside my home directory (for libs and such).
I regularly have to both download files to other directories than my Download folder and upload files from other directories, such a restriction would break a lot of existing use cases.
The optimal way to achieve this would be to have the file / save picker a completely separate process, which then passes a token to the browser, which the browser then exchanges at some sort of "broker" process that returns a handle to the file.
Isn’t this what Windows has done by default for a while now? Every user’s home directory is private to that user.
It is in fact an simple change to UMASK in /etc/login.defs. The default value is different between various Linux distributions and in fact Unix systems as a whole depending on the "pedigree". On the multiuser systems the default tends to be 022 (ie. 755 permission bits => read and execute to everyone), on "internet server" systems 033 (ie. execute to everyone, such that finger and http://foo.bar/~quux/ works) and 077…
$ dpkg -S /etc/login.defs
login: /etc/login.defs