Can we please edit the headline. This sounds disingenuous, a more appropriate headline would be something like "critical vulnerability in Zoom Video Calls that would have put millions of users at risk has been found". This feels like a straight up PR piece.
I really wish there was a changelog for headlines. Too often I see a critique like this and I have to figure out if the comment is referring to the current headline or a previous version. And, if the headline has already unknowingly been 'corrected', it leaves me wasting time trying to figure it out within that framing. And it shouldn't be the responsibility of the poster necessarily to quote it -- because there's no…
Zoom zero-day discovery
221–230 of 246 posts
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#222Related, the two other $200k entries from Pwn2Own 2021:[1] - DEVCORE targeting Microsoft Exchange in the Server category (The DEVCORE team combined an authentication bypass and a local privilege escalation to complete take over the Exchange server.) - The researcher who goes by OV targeting Microsoft Teams in the Enterprise Communications category (OV combined a pair of bugs to demonstrate code execution on Microsoft…
I wonder if the OS world will move towards lightweight but unforgiving sandboxing like OpenBSD's `pledge` and `unveil` system calls. It's crazy to me that most software is still completely fine to run around and set things as fire the instant it's compromised! This is about the implementation in the SerenityOS but it's my favourite explanation so far: https://awesomekling.github.io/pledge-and-unveil-in-Serenity...
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#223It is being sold as if everybody ditched a bullet, while nobody can be 100% certain that this vulnurability has not been alreqdy exploited.
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#224Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#225What percentage of these kind of exploits does hn think are found by these kind of white hat exercises and what percentage are sitting out there in an intelligence service or private entity's 0-day database? I have always been curious.
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#226Naive question. I'm forced to use Zoom by my University, so I run it from a dedicated user (on Linux). That's fairly safe, right?
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#227Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't see how the large majority of security problems could be solved by any OS design. Human failures would just account for 95% of breaches instead of the current 85% (made up numbers). Not saying the OS improvements aren't useful nevertheless..
See Qubes. Your compromised app can’t do much without a Xen hypervisor zero-day.
Of which there have been plenty.
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#228This reminds me of the Skype 'vuln' where you could see weird VPS/colocation servers scooping up links when you send them via their chat feature. /Nobody/ except the recipient and you should be visiting that link, yet it's still an issue. At first I thought it just wanted to generate a 'link preview' but it's more sinister than that. Some random surveillant is looking at every link.
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#229Can we please edit the headline. This sounds disingenuous, a more appropriate headline would be something like "critical vulnerability in Zoom Video Calls that would have put millions of users at risk has been found". This feels like a straight up PR piece.
I really wish there was a changelog for headlines. Too often I see a critique like this and I have to figure out if the comment is referring to the current headline or a previous version. And, if the headline has already unknowingly been 'corrected', it leaves me wasting time trying to figure it out within that framing. And it shouldn't be the responsibility of the poster necessarily to quote it -- because there's no…
While we’re talking feature requests, I think each submission should offer an optional second weblink, reserved specifically for the “original” or “source” URL.
It bothers me when the link is changed after lots of comments reference the previous one.
Re: Zoom zero-day discovery
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe the zero-day isn't disclosed from this pwn2own itself, but importantly, we now know it exists, which means we should consider how many bad actors are already independently aware of it and are exploiting it. Responsibe disclosure processes are just as much about closing the vectors that we can't prove are under active exploit.
the Pwn2Own exploits have generally not already been out there. There have been a long history of these, including some incredible chrome exploits! So the disclosure process tends to work out OK.