This line of thinking falls into a common issue I have with evo-psych work. The paper proposes a mechanism that could select for intelligence, but doesn't provide evidence that the mechanism caused humans to evolve to be intelligent. It's the equivalent of the "Is-Ought" fallacy for empirical sciences.
I agree with your criticism. Still, I'm trying to figure out exactly what my issue is with evo-psych claims that I don't have with e.g. physics claims. There seem to be some commonalities between the two fields: developing models to explain empirical data. And when working with their models, they're willing to assume a certain degree of causality. I wonder if my issue is that evo-psych is a lot more like history than…
Can you give an example of an analogous claim in physics that you have an easier time accepting?
Not flaming. Just trying to understand a similar situation that might arise from physics.
One of the main issues I have with evo-psych is that you can't run rigorous control experiments, so my "analysis" of the claims amounts to "Well, that seems like a reasonable explanation. But so do a hundred other models...."