131–140 of 201 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are presupposing that there is a material difference between these two. Whenever you have a discontinuation of your conscious experience (for example, when you go to sleep and wake up), you can view that as one person disappearing, and a copy waking up in the morning. In fact, unless you believe in a transcendent soul as the seat of consciousness, it must be equivalent. So, when you step into the teleporter, you…
> Whenever you have a discontinuation of your conscious experience (for example, when you go to sleep and wake up), you can view that as one person disappearing, and a copy waking up in the morning. In fact, unless you believe in a transcendent soul as the seat of consciousness, it must be equivalent. Only if our conscious experience truly stops during sleep (which as far as I know isn't actually backed up - there's…
And even if 'whatever makes up experience is baked into the physical', that doesn't give a path to a time-stable identity. In fact, it makes that even less plausible, as it implies that every atom leaving your body, every cell that dies, and certainly something like losing a hand or getting a transplant, fundamentally changes your psyche at the physical level.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I always imagine this will be the divide between rich and poor in the future. The more expensive technology will break the person down and send their atoms to the destination to be reconstructed, it will be slower but it will be the same person. The less expensive technology will scan the person send that data and they will be printed out from a a futuristic atomic printer in a process that kills the original. I imag…
You are presupposing that there is a material difference between these two. Whenever you have a discontinuation of your conscious experience (for example, when you go to sleep and wake up), you can view that as one person disappearing, and a copy waking up in the morning. In fact, unless you believe in a transcendent soul as the seat of consciousness, it must be equivalent. So, when you step into the teleporter, you…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure, the two copies won't feel, see, hear anything in common. But I also don't hear the sounds I heard yesterday, or feel the sand I felt last year, or even taste the tea I tasted this morning. Regardless of what gives rise to consciousness, there is no continuity in physics, every moment is separate, even if it is caused by the previous one. If you copy me, I am not either of the copies, I am the thing that existed…
> There is no known process in physics that could give meaning to that identity. I am arguing that we don't know enough about consciousness or about the universe to claim there is no difference between the original and the copy. So saying "there is no known process in physics" doesn't undermine my position. Here is one possibility, perhaps a bit silly, but if we are in a simulated universe, not that I think this is l…
Also note, a hash or a mind in a higher-level universe is exactly a transcendent soul: it transcends what we call physical reality (or it transcends 'the simulation' in that story). Just because it's framed in scientific concepts doesn't make it any more or less scientific than Brahman or Christian souls.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It doesn't just raise questions about the self, but also lots of legal questions. Imagine you would transplant a brain in a different body. Who is that person now legally? Technically, only a single organ got transplanted, and everything else is still the body donor. But of course the person has the memories and presumably the sense of self of the brain donor. But the finger prints, iris scan and DNA of the body dono…
> Of course we don't even know whether this sense of self is really purely attached to the brain. That brain is still connected to the rest of your body, and who knows what the body chemistry of the body donor will do to the new brain? Imagine just one aspect of this. A thyroid disorder. If the donor body was hyperthyroid, the head transplant would result in someone with the symptoms of hyperthyroidism. Angry, irrita…
The fact that this is uncontroversial to a lot of people mostly just shows how intellect-focused our society has become. Plenty of other value systems treat the Self as the entire body, not merely the head. Perhaps if we did too, we might not have so many issues with obesity and drug abuse. Dualism has consequences. I once read someone describe academics as “floating heads with bodies attached.” I think that could ap…
Get back to me when people are swapping brain hemispheres with each other. Then we can have a meaningful discussion over the nature of self in a transplant scenario.
Even if they spends years in physical therapy and in the end aren't able to move and walk like a "normal" person, this could transform the lives of many people in impossibly meaningful ways given it works even to the level face transplants work today.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>It is also probably just conceptually wrong to think that our bodies are just a side accessory, especially when it comes to understanding how much of our actual intelligence comes from being embodied. There's not a single study to show this, so calling it 'probably wrong' is just disingenuous. All the current results simply say 'sensory data impacts our cognition', which people who think that the brain encompasses t…
> The real test would be whether 'faking' body parts by sending mock sensory data would lead to the same result as having the real body part. How about a test that fakes that body part which receives sensory data and triggers a response? Perhaps it can lead to the same results as having a real brain! /s (Sorry, couldn't resist!) On a serious note, articles about how for example the gut affects our mental state (all t…
Of course, but that's because our gut is directly connected to the brain. Hardcore embodiment people will tell you that you're literally thinking with your gut. It's not like I'm saying you could just swap bodies and it wouldn't have an effect, it absolutely would, my point is simply that this is due to causation, because of the body influencing the brain, rather than distribution where the body is literally part of the mind.
>And as long as we aren’t there/don’t know for sure, I’d put forward that the mere possibility of a “body replacement” actually destroying personality to an unknown extent is enough of a reason to never deploy it in foreseeable future except as last resort.
Sure, but I'd say it's essentially what we're doing already. We know e.g. hormone treatment as part of sex reassignment causes changes to the brain and definitely influences personality. It's not like anyone is proposing this sort of stuff for fun (I think).