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The author of this paper is Claus P. Schnorr[1], of Schnorr signature fame. The paper has almost the same title as a 2017 draft paper[2] of his. The “This destroyes the RSA cryptosystem” quote is not in the linked paper abstract. This seems fishy. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claus_P._Schnorr [2] https://www.math.uni-frankfurt.de/~dmst/research/papers/SVP9...
Given the claims I would have wanted the paper to include factoring for some of the known rsa public keys to demonstrate feasible time.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If that's the case it's funny to think... NSA could have sat on this for years. Though that would be a really hard secret to keep.
RSA has always been a lot weaker than it seems at first... I mean, people have been moving from 1024 to 2048 bit primes... The biggest number I could conceivably brute force is probably about 2^50. Maybe 2^60 with a big budget, or 2^65 with a team of ASIC designers. The mere fact that 2^1024 is considered risky tells you how far from ideal RSA is!!
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If that's the case it's funny to think... NSA could have sat on this for years. Though that would be a really hard secret to keep.
I've held the theory that if anybody found something like fast prime factoring or a P = NP proof, they'd get assassinated pretty quickly. It'd be in basically every government's interest to get the knowledge, then make sure nobody else has it.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If that's the case it's funny to think... NSA could have sat on this for years. Though that would be a really hard secret to keep.
RSA has always been a lot weaker than it seems at first... I mean, people have been moving from 1024 to 2048 bit primes... The biggest number I could conceivably brute force is probably about 2^50. Maybe 2^60 with a big budget, or 2^65 with a team of ASIC designers. The mere fact that 2^1024 is considered risky tells you how far from ideal RSA is!!
I would consider 1024 bits risky in the following 10 years. 2048 bits probably won't ever be broken without significant algorithmic breakthrough or quantum computers.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Factoring_Challenge
[1] https://lists.gforge.inria.fr/pipermail/cado-nfs-discuss/202...
The author of this paper is Claus P. Schnorr[1], of Schnorr signature fame. The paper has almost the same title as a 2017 draft paper[2] of his. The “This destroyes the RSA cryptosystem” quote is not in the linked paper abstract. This seems fishy. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claus_P._Schnorr [2] https://www.math.uni-frankfurt.de/~dmst/research/papers/SVP9...
> The paper has the same title as a 2017 draft paper Not quite the same title. He has papers with similar titles since at least 2010. I wanted to say thanks - this document linked to on his wikipedia page was unexpectedly fascinating! NSA, patents, conspiracies.. https://marc.info/?l=cypherpunks&m=95280154624588&w=2
Earlier quoted context omitted.
"This proves the polynomial time bound."
If true... Hot damn! There's NP-Hard problems that if we had polynomial time solutions for we could vastly improve the quality of life on earth.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If that's the case it's funny to think... NSA could have sat on this for years. Though that would be a really hard secret to keep.
I'd always figured they'd have a (useful) quantum computer sitting in the basement of Ft. Meade at some point, and it's existence would be Top Secret with whatever codeword means "if this leaks, or we think it'll leak, we just assassinate you"
