Wasm is exciting because not only is it a clean, elegant instruction set that has learned a lot from the design warts of JVM and .NET, it also has formal verification as a first-class design goal. This makes it interesting for high-trust environments outside the web context as well. I made a couple of short explainer videos on it: - design goals and instruction set: https://youtu.be/VOaSaShAYb0 - mechanizing safety p…
And yet, "Usenix Security '20-Everything Old Is New Again: Binary Security of WebAssembly" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glL__xjviro
> Notably, they don't appear to even try to break the WA-host memory barrier, which I actually find to be a validation of the core design goal of WebAssembly: isolate the damage a vulnerable program can inflict to the memory space (and thus also output) of that program. Protect the host from the program, but not the program from itself. Also, maybe don't dump WA output you can't validate directly into DOM.