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The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

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Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#201
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

That reasoning goes farther: What existence do you imagine you have apart from your car, apart from your neighborhood, apart from East Timor or Jupiter? The whole unity is "you."

I sometimes notice how much my environment is a part of my personality. I get to a different environment and some of my habits change, simply because the objects I used for my old habits are no longer there.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#202

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why does a brain being a physical system necessitate it being deterministic? It seems like the more we learn about quantum mechanics, the more things seem to be probabilistic than deterministic. The physical brain being probabilistic fits perfectly with the idea of free will.

I don't consider randomness as any more "free" than determinism - the concept of "choice" does not appear anywhere on the whole tradeoff spectrum between total randomness and total determinism. It does emphasise the point that any discussion based on a dichotomy between determinism and free will is fundamentally flawed, as randomness can be a relevant factor, so an anti-determinism argument is not necessarily a pro-f…

Well, the definition of randomness is basically the inverse of determinable... it is something that is not predictable.

The important characteristic for randomness is that there exists no knowledge that, if possessed, would allow you to predict the outcome. In that sense, free will meets the definition of random.

In other words, not all randomness is free will, but all free will is random.

So yes, anti-determinism does not prove free will, but determinism would disprove it.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Trolling is not appreciated on HN.

You intervened in a subthread you weren't involved in, to rudely ask "what's my point", failed to understand the exchange that followed, and continued by throwing the "rulebook" at me. Is being a spiteful busybody appreciated on HN?

> You intervened in a subthread you weren't involved in

Thats a loaded way to phrase “you posted a reply on hacker news”

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#204

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What is your definition of free will? > unfolding of those deterministic processes Doesn't sound free to me. Is a computer running a program exercising its free will?

I think this actually perfectly shows how nebulous our definition of "free will" is. I sure can't define it, I can only observe what other people seem to think it means. The definition I tend to observe is one that fits in with a dualistic view, of some outside force making decisions for our body.

I am not sure why the 'outside force' is required for free will. What characteristic does that provide that is needed for free will?

If the physical world is non-deterministic, then there is nothing stopping a physical thing from having free will. If an 'outside force' can exert free will, why can't a physical thing?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's the same as intelligence or pornograph: you can't measure or really define it, you just know it when you see it. Aka, it's not within the realm of science and people should stop pretending it is.

I never really liked that quote because of course you can define pornography. Just because it exists on a spectrum and there are grey areas doesn't mean you can't define it. That's the case for just about everything.

Pornography isn't just a spectrum though it is? It requires a multi variable analysis and even then different people disagree a out what is or isn't pornographic.

Or is there some algorithm that will take a jpeg and 100% correctly tell us if it's porn or not?

The same is true of intelligence or free will.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is if you assume the world is Markov, but in our granularity of thought and limited perception, the only way we can reconcile subsequent observations is through history. In other words, you can't peer into the universe itself at any individual moment to observe all properties because you have access to partial information, the world could be markov, but the lack of your perceptive abilities requires that you tre…

A choice happens in a short timeframe, Libet measured half a second for the simplest choices. Distant history simply doesn't happen in the right time.

I disagree. To be precise, I disagree with the notion that our choices are ours, as you said and that they are not dependent on history.

A choice is conditioned on a myriad of things, from whether you had your coffee in the morning 8 hours ago and the milk had gone bad, to whether your parents paid attention to you 20 years ago when you were a child.

Literally everything matters because experiences shape our brain's structure and that is precisely one of the factors that need to be accounted for in some cases. Not necessarily what one's own brain structure is like, but other people's as well, so as to gauge and expect their reactions to our decisions.

If the universe is Markov (which also means hidden variables as a means of predicting quantum processes which iirc was disproven except when said hidden variables were traced all the way to the beginning), then the current frame has enough information to fully describe all future states.

However, regardless of whether it is Markov or not, we, humans, need history because it enables us to generalize and approximate the future because we do not have the capacity to peak into the exact state of the universe at any given point.

While the process of making decision needs a short amount of time, the decision itself is conditioned on history and we need history to make predictions because we lack compute.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The parent comment has exactly demonstrated that is already meaningful. Coherence is tricky, because there are a lot of concepts and words already that we use every day, that are certainly meaningful and useful, but that would have a hard time to pass your "coherence" test.

> The parent comment has exactly demonstrated that is already meaningful. Would you mind explaining? I don’t see that they have done that. > Coherence is tricky, because there are a lot of concepts and words already that we use every day, that are certainly meaningful and useful, but that would have a hard time to pass your "coherence" test. Perhaps so but the existence of day-to-day commonplace irrationality is no j…

> Would you mind explaining?

Alright. They pointed to how you used the concept of "of the opinion". This is the phrase that you have used yourself in the previous comment.

Even if the conversation wasn't about free will, that phrase would indicate something meaningful about your thought process, which is why you used it. Also we all, who read your comment had no trouble interpreting your phrase, and neither why you used it that way, what exactly you meant, and why it was meaningful to use it in that way.

Now, the poster who answered to you, pointed to that exact phrase, to ironically show to you that while you (one part of your mind) is sitting here and trying pretend that free will is a meaningless thing (~ to talk about), another part of your mind, uses the very concept of free will, to communicate to us about the first part. To make it clear: you saying "I am of the opinion of..." already implies that you assume that you have free will, to have opinions.

Now, as I am sure you are already preparing to congest about this point, there are many various definitions of free will, where some of them will be used in the concept of "I am of the opinion", and some of them will not be related to it, it is safe to say that there is at least a number of them that are usefully related to your claim.

The ones that are related go something like that: "if you truly had no free will, if you are a simple list of if/thens, or a dumb version of GPT-3, then why would we care that you had this opinion? rulesets cannot have opinions. If you did not have free will, there is no point in talking to you, your "opinion" doesn't matter, it's a meaningless term. But since we choose (consciously or subconsciously) to communicate with you, to discuss your "opinion", it means that we are taking a chance that you do have free will so that we can communicate with you".

Now, that line of reasoning - it's not 100% ironclad, there are presuppositions and assumptions, and this is partly what I meant when I said "coherence of the concept of free will is icky", but I think it is safe to say that you could at least follow it. To do that, you had to use the concept of free will, at least subconsciously, because the concept of "I am of the opinion" is based on it in some form. And since you used that phrase from the beginning, it is already assumed to be useful to you. (Why would you use it otherwise? Do you just type words into ether for no reason?)

It is not the best or most useful explanation of the usefulness of the term free will in general, but it is one of the best that I can see that can directly relate to the funny thing that happened between you and that poster, which you didn't seem to get. Hopefully, if you get the humor, that will tell you much more about the deeper intuitions about the term "free will", than what the logical overthinking about it can.

I am not saying that we can't understand free will with logic. I am saying that in this specific case, the interesting point was the irony and the intuitive connection, instead of logical explanations.

> Perhaps so but the existence of day-to-day commonplace irrationality is no justification for importing irrational specters into philosophy.

How do you equate "usefulness" with "irrationality"?

I said there are useful, meaningful (well-seving as tools of thinking and awareness-ing) concepts that don't have coherent, well-defined borders or black-and-white definitions. That is not the same as them being irrational. A lot of concepts can't be put in very limited contraints of a-b-c logic. And yet we have other faculties that allow us to reason about these concepts. Meaning, we use those concepts because they help us understand the world and pursue our goals.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If you are a materialist, how is this surprising? It's not. But there are other things, which should be surprising to a materialist: we don't see neuronal firings in visual brain areas. We see some kind of an abstraction over those firings. Do abstractions exist alongside the matter?

If you boil water, you see an amount of water changing state from a liquid to a gas, not individual molecules simply gaining momentum.

Do I understand correctly that there's a physical mechanism, which creates something akin to a phase boundary from electrochemical brain processes and that "phase boundary" happens to be me and my perceptions?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#209

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You’re right, I’m convinced I don't think you are convinced. You were just meant to say so.

What is your point?

The point is to demonstrate the obvious repercussions of truly trying on the belief "free will does not exist/not a meaningful thing" on something even so commonplace as an online conversation. If there is no free will, there is no point in having a conversation. People can't have opinions or be convinced, they can't decide, they have no agency. The whole language of rational conversation falls down like a house of cards.

It is an argument ad absurdum that is meant to demonstrate how naive it is to try to prove that free will does not exist (naive and disingenuine: "prove to " already implies has a free will to ultimately agree or disagree with the presented proof).

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#210

Can someone actually provide a definition of free will? Apart from the legalistic definition - the ability to make decisions without being coerced by third parties or external factors - any other meaning seems to require dualism, the existence of some external force that can affect the brain and make decisions with some magical non-causal mechanism, which is to me a rather illogical concept. It seems it is just a neb…

The thing I always want to know in discussions of free will or determinism is whether a determinist believes that the initial conditions of the universe lead to the creation of the world we live in, such that (to choose some absurd examples) the Lego movie, candy corn, and Youtube were all 100% inevitable and predetermined by physics, and could not have failed to have been created exactly as they are, at the exact mo…

Determinism together with quantum "many worlds hypothesis" implies that the world is in a superposition of vast amounts of states. Some of them contain the Lego movie (different versions of), most of them don't. The initial conditions of the universe lead to this superposition.

So even if it was inevitable from the beginning of the universe that the Lego movie will exist in some states, you (your version in this state of universe) can still be surprised to see that the Lego movie exists here.

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