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The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

blogs.scientificamerican.com

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Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#111
post #63
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think a lot of people get mixed up by the idea that "physics determines your actions", as if that's contradictory to "you determine your actions". I love the way https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NEeW7eSXThPz7o4Ne/thou-art-p... puts it, that "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations.

I think there is a bit of circular reasoning here. If by "physics" we mean the way the universe works, then of course we are "within physics", and we determine our actions in exactly the same way as the rock falls to the ground : because this is the laws of physics that those things happen. The actual distinction is what people attribute to the term "physics" itself. For some it is exhaustive and it encompasses every…

Physics is a set of mathematical relationships that aims to describe how things behave. The important distinction seems to be whether one believes that all behaviour of all things everywhere can be reduced to a simple mathematical model, or if there could be instances where something behaves non-computationally at a fundamental level.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#112
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Relativity theories say that objective truth only exists globally/abstractly, and cannot shared between observers.

No; all observers see the speed of light as the same.

Do you see the speed of light?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#113
post #28
post #11

This kind of research shows how deeply dualism is ingrained in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Picture this: You decide to move your hand, then you move your hand. An observer using fMRI or somesuch notes that they observe neural activity before you report making the decision, and they can even predict where and how you are going to move from observations of neural behavior. If you are a materialist, how is th…

I think a lot of people get mixed up by the idea that "physics determines your actions", as if that's contradictory to "you determine your actions". I love the way https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NEeW7eSXThPz7o4Ne/thou-art-p... puts it, that "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations.

> "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations.

But, it doesn't. The reason dualism and free-will are so deeply tied up is because “you are within physics” does not provide a means by which “you” can be the root cause of anything; if you are merely within physics, then you are simply a product of material causes and can only be (to the extent physics is deterministic) a fully-externally-determined phenomenon between the original cause and other fully-determined phenomena.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#114
post #28
post #11

This kind of research shows how deeply dualism is ingrained in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Picture this: You decide to move your hand, then you move your hand. An observer using fMRI or somesuch notes that they observe neural activity before you report making the decision, and they can even predict where and how you are going to move from observations of neural behavior. If you are a materialist, how is th…

I think a lot of people get mixed up by the idea that "physics determines your actions", as if that's contradictory to "you determine your actions". I love the way https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NEeW7eSXThPz7o4Ne/thou-art-p... puts it, that "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations.

It's based on another meme that the laws of physics are a restriction of behavior rather than construction of behavior. And that's why they are thought to conflict with unrestricted behavior.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#115
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think a lot of people get mixed up by the idea that "physics determines your actions", as if that's contradictory to "you determine your actions". I love the way https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NEeW7eSXThPz7o4Ne/thou-art-p... puts it, that "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations.

> "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations. But, it doesn't. The reason dualism and free-will are so deeply tied up is because “you are within physics” does not provide a means by which “you” can be the root cause of anything; if you are merely within physics, then you are simply a product of material causes and can only be (to the extent physics is deterministic) a fully-externally-determi…

That still means you are the proper cause of your actions. The preceding history exists too, but isn't very relevant to the process of choice.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#116
> As McGilchrist puts it, Libet’s apparent findings are only problematic "if one imagines that, for me to decide something, I have to have willed it with the conscious part of my mind. Perhaps my unconscious is every bit as much 'me.'" Why shouldn't your will be associated with deeper, less conscious areas of your mind (which are still you)?

I think I associate the idea of "free will" with conscious thought and conscious decision-making. But it really feels as if most of my decisions come out of the unconscious part of my mind, in which case they might as well have come from an external source. All the conscious part of my mind seems to do is to make up ad hoc justifications. Sure, my unconscious mind is still 'me'; so the decisions are somehow 'mine'; but what difference does it make? It doesn't seem very free in the end.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations. But, it doesn't. The reason dualism and free-will are so deeply tied up is because “you are within physics” does not provide a means by which “you” can be the root cause of anything; if you are merely within physics, then you are simply a product of material causes and can only be (to the extent physics is deterministic) a fully-externally-determi…

That still means you are the proper cause of your actions. The preceding history exists too, but isn't very relevant to the process of choice.

No, it makes it very difficult to locate any boundary between "you" and the preceding history. Dualism is when you simply declare a border.

edit: If everything is "within physics," saying that the preceding history isn't relevant to the process of choice is a declaration that cause isn't relevant to effect. It's an arbitrary assignment for culpability's sake, which is a moral judgment, not a physical or logical argument.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#118
post #67
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly! All of the "YOU don't actually choose to move your hand, it's THIS PART OF YOUR BRAIN" stuff makes no sense. What do you think 'you' are if not your brain plus your body?

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

That reasoning goes farther: What existence do you imagine you have apart from your car, apart from your neighborhood, apart from East Timor or Jupiter? The whole unity is "you."

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#119
post #90
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

> Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. Well, in some way it is, in that they can cut your hands and feet, and you'll still be you. And perhaps if they could just put your head/brain in a jar, and you were still coscious, you'd still consider yourself you...

Or if they slice your brain down the middle in put it in two different jars, would they both think of themselves as you?

Then, if you keep carefully cutting small bits off of those hemispheres, when would they stop being you?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Are you really "of the opinion", or you were just made to write that as an automaton, due to a deterministic causual chain of events? I don’t think it deterministic, at the lowest levels the physics is probabilistic. But I’m sure you can imagine how to express “opinion” as a subjective experience of a brain state that is wholly determined by deterministic factors. > In which case, you don't really have an opinion,…

> You’re right, I’m convinced I don't think you are convinced. You were just meant to say so.

What is your point?
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