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On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

aeon.co

141–150 of 172 posts

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#141
post #126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely! Re-education, rehabilitation is exactly THAT! It's altering the synaptic connections in the brain to bring their behavior in line with what we view should be the case in civilized society. You just seem to have a problem with making that process more efficient. And it is all just particles moving around, but that doesn't mean we have to ignore what is very likely an unpleasant experience from your subject…

> You just seem to have a problem with making that process more efficient. No, I have a problem with that process being done without the consent of the person, even in cases where there the person has not harmed anyone else. I have asked you about that elsewhere in this discussion; your response will tell me whether it actually is an fundamental difference in our viewpoints or whether you are just describing things u…

It isn't sophistry, it's showing that your own reasoning fails to hold because a word like choice is meaningless when you really analyze it. If free will doesn't exist, then there are no choices, only the illusion that you made a choice.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#142
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How can you claim things that happen inside the human brain have causal influences on things outside the brain and yet at the same time ignore the causal influences the outside world has on the internal brain processes? Information flow is a two way street if it can happen in one direction as far as I am aware. What you seem to not grasp is the idea that external events can influence your behavior.

> How can you claim things that happen inside the human brain have causal influences on things outside the brain and yet at the same time ignore the causal influences the outside world has on the internal brain processes? I have done no such thing. Obviously the causal influences go both ways. > What you seem to not grasp is the idea that external events can influence your behavior. What you seem not to grasp is that…

Ponder this.

Can you ever willfully choose option C, if you never knew or had anything lead you to think that option C was even an option?

Or better yet, can you willfully imagine a new color that's not in any way related to the colors or any combination of colors you've already seen before? Or further, not related to ANY CONCEPT you're already aware of?

You can't. But if you could, how would you ever describe it to someone? After all, if you describe this new color using other ideas you're already acquainted with, then it is thus in some way related to those very ideas used to describe it...

This shows that, any "new" ideas you imagine, are nothing but a combination of ideas you're already familiar with. Otherwise, to become familiar with ideas that are not in any way related to what you're already familiar with, can ONLY come from your senses. Hence, all concepts/thoughts/ideas you ever have ultimately stem from your senses (seeing, hearing, etc).

Since all ideas ultimately originate from our senses, then the thoughts we have and decisions we make are ultimately subject to the stimuli inputted to us. Thus we are as mechanical as anything else in this world. Fundamentally no different than a rock in how it operates on the physical stimuli inputted on it. Granted we are much more complex than a rock and hence have much more complex responses to our stimuli, but nonetheless just as deterministic.

The brain may attempt to control what's external to it, but the way it does so has been programmed from the stimuli inputted on it (from DNA instructions, to nutrition, to physical stimuli).

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#143
post #126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You just seem to have a problem with making that process more efficient. No, I have a problem with that process being done without the consent of the person, even in cases where there the person has not harmed anyone else. I have asked you about that elsewhere in this discussion; your response will tell me whether it actually is an fundamental difference in our viewpoints or whether you are just describing things u…

It isn't sophistry, it's showing that your own reasoning fails to hold because a word like choice is meaningless when you really analyze it. If free will doesn't exist, then there are no choices, only the illusion that you made a choice.

You keep getting hung up on the word "choice" instead of addressing the actual substance of what I'm saying. I don't see any point in further discussion on those terms.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#144
post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To add to my previous response to this: while I do think it's justified to imprison a convicted murderer, I do not think it's justified to force someone imprisoned for murder to undergo, say, brain surgery that is claimed to remove their propensity to murder.

So forcing them to do everything else is fine, just as long as no one touches the brain. Removing a foot ok though? What about the death penalty? That can be done without rearranging the brain.

> forcing them to do everything else is fine, just as long as no one touches the brain.

I have made no such claim. You keep attacking straw men instead of addressing what I'm actually saying.

> Removing a foot ok though?

I have made no such claim.

> What about the death penalty?

I have already pointed out that the natural consequence (i.e., in a state of nature if there is no society) of attacking someone else for no good reason can be death. So imposing death as a penalty for a sufficiently heinous crime seems to me to be justifiable in principle, if you are sure to a moral certainty that the person did the crime.

Where our current system falls down horribly is in that last part: we impose the death penalty when we are not even close to meeting the strict standard of moral certainty that I just stated.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#145
post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So you think it is value added to society for a person to be able to murder someone? I have never claimed any such thing. > Imposing a punishment is PRIMARILY a preventative action. Punishing murderer A can certainly deter potential murderer B. But punishing murderer A obviously can't change the fact that murderer A committed a murder. And it might not deter potential murderer C, who either thinks they can escape p…

Then if you could change a person and make them incapable of murder, would you not do it? If you could prevent murder, why aren't you morally compelled to? If you chose to let it happen, that means you approve of it. My position is that reducing murder as much as you can is the correct position, to include making that number zero, just like stopping all rape is better than just reducing the number of rapes. Is it OK…

> if you could change a person and make them incapable of murder, would you not do it?

I should have commented earlier in this discussion that you are presuming an awful lot of certainty about something where I don't think any such level of certainty is even possible. How could you possibly be so confident that some brain procedure would really, truly make a person incapable of murder? And would do so without impairing their capacities in any other respect? I can't even put myself in the position of imagining being in that kind of state of knowledge. So I'm not sure I can even respond to questions about what I would or wouldn't do in such a state.

Furthermore, my comments in this discussion about tyranny are based on historical knowledge about past societies where people have held beliefs like the ones you describe--where they really, truly, honestly believed, with certainty or even with what they thought was a high enough probability, that forcing other people to do something, or forcing some kind of treatment on them, would achieve some obviously desirable social goal. And in every single case in history that I know of, those people were wrong. Not just sort of wrong, not just a little bit off--terribly, horribly wrong; lots and lots of people dying wrong.

So when you describe a scenario in which you say you know, with certainty, or even with high probability (you threw out a figure of 90 percent in another part of this thread--I'll respond more specifically to that there), that you could change a person and make them incapable of murder, by some sort of brain surgery or some secret ray that they can't perceive, or by any means other than convincing that person, through discussion and argument, that murder is wrong, I simply don't believe that's actually possible. So I don't factor such impossibilities into my thinking about what I should or shouldn't do.

> Is it OK for a parent to have their child circumcised? Or have their ears pierced?

Personally, no, I would not force either of those things on a child without their consent.

Circumcision is an edge case because there was a time when circumcision was widely believed to be desirable for health reasons, but that belief is now thought to be false. If a parent sincerely believed it was necessary for health reasons, I would not say they were wrong to have a child circumcised. But such beliefs should be checked very carefully--more carefully than, from what I can gather, people checked the belief about circumcision during the time when that belief was widespread.

> Would you not elect to have your ability to murder removed?

As above, I am unable to even consider this as a real possibility.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#146
post #122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> We can donate to organizations that do have the stated purpose. We can vote for politicians who propose laws and policies that make it extremely difficult for it to happen. Sure, if we think such organizations and politicians actually exist. (I'm skeptical that they actually do, but I'm willing to assume they do for the sake of this discussion.) But to me, that doesn't count as "drop everything you're doing and fig…

Exactly how redefining what most people take to mean free will and changing the definition of it is poor wording?

I have already said elsewhere that I disagree with you about "what most people take to mean free will".

I will agree that "poor wording" was just my opinion and you are free to simply ignore it.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#147
post #142
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How can you claim things that happen inside the human brain have causal influences on things outside the brain and yet at the same time ignore the causal influences the outside world has on the internal brain processes? I have done no such thing. Obviously the causal influences go both ways. > What you seem to not grasp is the idea that external events can influence your behavior. What you seem not to grasp is that…

Ponder this. Can you ever willfully choose option C, if you never knew or had anything lead you to think that option C was even an option? Or better yet, can you willfully imagine a new color that's not in any way related to the colors or any combination of colors you've already seen before? Or further, not related to ANY CONCEPT you're already aware of? You can't. But if you could, how would you ever describe it to…

> Ponder this.

Everything you're saying is old hat to anyone as familiar with the literature on free will and cognitive science as I am.

Nothing you are saying is in any way inconsistent with the view of free will I have been defending.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#148
post #132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please stop getting hung up on the term "free will" as an excuse to avoid answering my actual question. You proposed a perfectly clear scenario, and I proposed a perfectly clear second scenario. In scenario A, causal processes in your brain determine that you eat vanilla yogurt. In scenario B, causal processes in your brain determine that you want to eat vanilla yogurt, but causal processes in my brain determine that…

In both scenarios, no free will exists. I didn't trigger my brain processes, only observed them. Neither did you. You are trying to paint a single scenario in which there is an important distinction and then ignore any other scenario where your reasoning fails. For instance, if I chose to kill myself, and you stop me, and I later thank you for stopping me from killing myself, is that difference important? Yes or no?

> In both scenarios, no free will exists.

Not by your definition, no. It does by mine. As I have repeatedly remarked in various places in this discussion, please stop getting hung up on that term; I purposely did not use it at all in my description of the two scenarios in order to avoid that.

> I didn't trigger my brain processes, only observed them. Neither did you.

Your brain processes are part of you, just as my brain processes are part of me. So to say "you" didn't trigger your brain processes is nonsense.

> if I chose to kill myself, and you stop me, and I later thank you for stopping me from killing myself, is that difference important?

You mean the difference that you thanked me afterwards? As opposed to telling me you wished I hadn't stopped you? Yes, that difference is important, because it tells me whether or not my choice to stop you was the right one.

However, your implication that my reasoning "fails" in a situation like this is incorrect. I have never claimed that respecting other people's free choice is the only value, or that it should automatically override all other values. One can always find cases where different values clash, and there is no way to resolve any such case without violating some value. So pointing out that my viewpoint is vulnerable to this proves nothing. So is yours. So is anyone's.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#149
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Theoretically, if I could fix your brain without you even being aware of it so that you don't die from brain cancer, I would. Am I not even aware of it because I'm unconscious and incapacitated, and you're asking the consent of someone else who is empowered (say by my medical power of attorney) to give consent on my behalf? Or am I not even aware of it because you have a stealthy way of doing it that I can't percei…

The later for both, yes, and the line is when you make a judgment for what is likely to happen as a result of current events. If you have the power to make a better outcome happen 90 percent of the time versus 80 percent of the time, you choose 90 percent even if you are wrong some of the time. No ones has perfect information, yet we still make decisions that alter things despite perfect information. We just do the b…

> If you have the power to make a better outcome happen 90 percent of the time versus 80 percent of the time, you choose 90 percent even if you are wrong some of the time

I don't see how this leads to your having to get my consent to make me like vanilla instead of chocolate. If you believed making that change in me would "make a better outcome" with 90 percent probability, by your logic as stated above, you would be justified in doing it without my consent. But you said that case requires consent "absolutely". I don't see how your stated rule does that.

Perhaps I should describe my position on this in more detail. My reason why you should not change my brain without my consent, whether it's to cure my brain cancer or make me like vanilla instead of chocolate (actually in my case it would be the other way around), is that you are not the one who has to live with the consequences; I am. So I should be the one to make the choice whether or not to do it. The only exception, which I have already stated, is if someone has already done harm to others and we are imposing consequences as an alternative to whatever the natural consequences of what they did would be (for example, trying someone for murder and imprisoning them if convicted, instead of letting the victim's family and friends take private vengeance). I'll assume we are not talking about a case where that exception applies in the rest of this post.

(Technically, there is a second exception, cases like the EMT resuscitating a person, since the person is incapable of giving consent. But I've already addressed that: there is a default presumption that the person would consent to being resuscitated if they could. And note that in our current legal system, a person can override that presumption by, for example, having a do not resuscitate order on file with their doctor.)

In the brain cancer example, I suspect you are imagining a case where you have some treatment that can be done easily from a distance without my perceiving it and without any side effects--it just makes the cancer vanish and leaves everything else the same. I have commented elsewhere in this discussion that I don't think such a thing is a real possibility; there's no way you could ever know that there are no side effects with such certainty. (And if you don't, if you're only 90 percent sure that there will be no side effects, then my rule above applies and you should let me make the choice since I'm the one that will suffer the side effects.) But let's assume for the sake of argument that you are certain there will be no side effects; let's say you have a mountain of evidence from past usages of the treatment, easily available and easily understandable by anyone.

But if that's the case, you have no need to do the treatment without my consent; you could just, you know, get my consent. After all, the treatment is a slam dunk from what you're saying; you have this mountain of easily understandable evidence that says it works great and has no side effects. So why not just show me the evidence? After I've seen it I have no reason not to consent, so I'd just consent. And then you wouldn't even have to worry about making a judgment and possibly being wrong. You wouldn't be making the judgment at all; I would.

In other words, your rule, which appears to be something like "if you're at least 90 percent sure that it will lead to a better outcome, you can do things to other people without their consent", requires you to make a judgment whose consequences you won't have to live with, someone else will, and all history shows that that is a very bad idea. What gives you the right to judge on my behalf that, say, 90 percent odds of curing my brain cancer is good enough? That's a judgment for me to make, not you, because I'm the one who has to live with the results. And in the truly slam dunk cases where the results are certain to be good ones, getting consent is also a slam dunk, so "always get consent" still covers those cases.

In short, "always get consent" (in cases where the exception I gave above doesn't apply) is a simpler rule that leads to better results than yours--it does the same thing in the easy cases, and puts the judgment in the hard cases where it belongs, with the person who will have to suffer the consequences of the judgment.

Re: On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines

#150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You say that the world being deterministic somehow makes “we should be nice to each other” an inescapable conclusion… but really, it's just a framing that lets you escape the existing divisive rhetoric. If it became widespread, we'd get new rhetoric.

Rhetoric doesn't stop a car from running over you no matter how the warning is phrased if you choose to not understand said rhetoric. This is not a rhetorical argument.

Could you explain this analogy?
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