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It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

blog.robinhood.com

391–400 of 445 posts

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#391
post #331

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Whereas these crashes can and do occur today, the non-realtime aspect of settlement and clearing mitigates to a large extent. See the 2010 flash crash example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_flash_crash How so? I'd argue that the SEC policy of breaking "clearly erroneous" trades before settlement exacerbates that kind of flash crash: market-makers can't step in to prop up prices and then hedge their exposure, b…

> I'd argue that the SEC policy of breaking "clearly erroneous" trades before settlement exacerbates that kind of flash crash: market-makers can't step in to prop up prices and then hedge their exposure, because their trades will be broken and their hedges won't. I'm a bit lost on your response. Are you advocating against SEC or stock exchange intervention? Remember that trading can be halted by stock exchanges also…

> "It's an explanation but doesn't explain why other stock brokers didn't impose the same limitations"

Other brokers did impose trading restrictions on GME (and other stocks) around the same time as Robinhood. Webull, M1 Finance, Public, and E-Trade all halted buys of GME.

Others, including Interactive Brokers, TD Ameritrade, Schwab, and Trading 212 implemented restrictions such as halting options trading and greatly increasing margin requirements.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#392

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> if Robinhood couldn't meet the new deposit requirements, I think the existing trades just wouldn't settle (and obviously they wouldn't be accepting new ones)? Defaulting on clearing obligations is the old school way for a brokerage to go under. The moment that happens, customers’ funds and assets are segregated and what is left goes into receivership. The parent company would then file for bankruptcy protection to…

I don't think this is the same as what you're referring to. Under the DTC rules, this would likely have been an "Additional Participants Fund Deposit". The rules seem intentionally vague about what happens if you don't make this payment. As far as I can tell, the rules allow the DTC to unilaterally demand an uncapped deposit from a participant at any time. Fidelity has $3.3 trillion AUM. Imagine if all its customers…

Exchange rules, clearinghouse rules and statute are extremely clear on this. Default to your clearinghouse and you are shut down.

Fidelity, the asset manager, doesn’t clear its own trades. National Financial Services, LLC, a separate legal entity, clears some of its trades [1].

Becoming a clearing broker is a huge deal because it takes an enormous amount of discipline.

[1] https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/Downloads/client-center/D...

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#394

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree, what I personally think needs to change is high speed/algorithmic trading on the millisecond (microsecond?) level. It should be humans trading, not machines. Sure they can listen to the machines but at the end of the day it should be on human time, say at least 10 minutes for transactions to complete without possibility of any changes to the transaction

The market was designed as a system for human interaction. I think the atomic unit of time should be at the clock speed of humans. It increases the transaction cost, but in a more responsible, sustainable way imo.

What's the benefit to me of increasing my pension provider's costs, therefore making me worse off in my retirement?

When we talk about "increased spreads" everyone pays the costs of that. What's the upside?

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#395

Real time equities settlement and clearing is a terrible idea. It sounds great. But it breaks a lot of good stuff. I'm surprised the CEO of a brokerage is advocating for it. (The article is a bit loose with the terms settlement and clearing. Again, surprising from the CEO of a company that almost got taken out by internal clearing failures.) If you only think about the American stock market from the perspective of a…

> When you expand it to institutions, real-time settlement means having to warehouse all the funds they might need to trade with in a day with their prime brokers as cash. Not Treasuries. Cash.

You are seeing this change in terms of the existing system ("100% collateral parked at intermediaries!"). But ultimately it might be possible to get rid of (some of) the intermediaries altogether, and move to direct atomic exchange of bearer instruments.

The Ethereum "defi" phenomenon is showing us a glimpse of what's possible. It would require an upgrade of the dollar to a CBDC though, or perhaps just wider use of stablecoins such as USDC.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#396
post #243
post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Imagine letting companies like Nikola and Valeant Pharma continue to rip off investors.

If investors believe shares of these companies are a ripoff, they can sell any holdings and / or abstain from buying. Just like they can do in nearly every other type of market. If a used car salesman is trying to rip me off, I walk away from the deal. I don't need to be able to short his inventory! And the supply / demand dynamics of the used car market will trend toward equilibrium without any such shorting.

> I don't need to be able to short his inventory

that's because it wouldn't do you any good. if, however, the used car salesman is engaging in fraud and selling expensive cars way under their market value while buying inventory at inflated prices, you could expose this by borrowing a friends mercedes, selling it for USD 100000 (then buying it back at USD 1000, so you can return it to your friend) making a nice profit along the way.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#397
post #136

I have seen on Twitter that Robinhood was unable to use customer funds to satisfy clearing deposit requirements, but I couldn’t find an actual authoritative source on this. Is this correct? It seems to me that, to secure a $300 purchase buy a customer, Robinhood ought to be able to use that customer’s $300.

You're confusing two different things.

One is the payment capability of the customer to pay RH when the purchase is settled (T+2).

The other is the relationship and payment capability of RH to the clearing house (DTCC) for its orders that it has placed with other brokers.

RH is required, as a broker, to provide its own collateral to the clearing house so that the clearing house can guarantee to other brokers that all their trades will be settled at T+2.

RH is not allowed by law to use their customers' money as collateral to DTCC. If RH goes broke, then DTCC does the following:

a) takes all their collateral and uses it to make the other brokers good on their trades (which makes the counterparties good on the trade) b) takes the customers money and uses it to complete the trades (which makes the customers good on their trade).

RH is left to be picked apart.

That's the purpose of the clearinghouse.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#398

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They ended up in a situation where they had to prevent trading, draw down their entire credit lines and then do another funding round to shore up $3.4Bn - it's pretty clear they fucked up their collateral.

Do you consider them having their collateral requirements changed on them at 3am to be them messing up? If your bank tells you your mortgage payment is going to be 10x this month, and you have to scramble to cover that, did you mess up your personal finances?

The bread and butter of any financial company is risk management. That includes foreseeing a pandemic as well as modelling the possibility of sudden stock volatility at 3am.

If you don't envision such a clearly possible scenario as a bank , or a broker (your mortgage payment suddenly going to be x10 is not such a clearly possible scenario) you severely fucked up in your chosen field of business, period.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#399

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> These two clauses contradict each other. If it's in the rules, it can't be "out of the blue". I would strongly disagree with that statement. Just because something is specifically identified as possible doesn't mean that it isn't "out of the blue" when it happens. That depends on a variety of circumstances. In this particular case, I think you can look to the fact that IB, TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab, etc. also h…

> Just because something is specifically identified as possible doesn't mean that it isn't "out of the blue" when it happens. Again, the clearinghouse did exactly what they were supposed to do; step in and prevent RH from ending up in a position where it could default on its obligations. That's not the clearinghouse doing something "out of the blue" that is literally them doing their jobs. I find it absolutely baffli…

> Again, the clearinghouse did exactly what they were supposed to do; step in and prevent RH from ending up in a position where it could default on its obligations. That's not the clearinghouse doing something "out of the blue" that is literally them doing their jobs. I find it absolutely baffling that people are upset at the clearinghouse for doing their job, especially since I'm certain that had the crash been bigger everyone would be furious at them for not having done something.

I'm not sure who else you're referring to, but I'm certainly not upset at the clearinghouse. I just don't think it's fair to blame Robinhood for not having the cash on hand to meet the unforeseen increase in deposits required.

> > In this particular case, I think you can look to the fact that IB, TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab, etc. also had to restrict trading.

> They did exactly what I think RH should have done; tighten or restrict margin trading on GME and put option trading on GME into liquidation only. When volatility starts to grow out of control, it's the brokerage's responsibility to start restricting customer leverage in these instruments, if nothing else for the broker's own protection.

I don't disagree with you on that. It's not obvious to me that Robinhood over-leveraged itself though. If you are seeing some reporting on this that says otherwise, I would love to see it.

> > I am not sure why you think this is attributable to margin trading, other than the fact that Robinhood offers margin trading.

> Because margin trading is literally designed to allow traders to take larger positions than they could otherwise afford. This both increases the total net position that RH customers have and it reduces the total cash that RH has on hand compared to the number of trades, since part of the money is literally loaned to the trader by RH. This isn't a big deal when the positions net out close to zero, but it can be disastrously bad when all your customers start trading in one direction. Example. Without margin if I were to buy $2,000 worth of GME, I have to actually hand $2,000 over to RH. The worst case deposit requirement that the clearinghouse can ask from my position is $2,000, and thankfully I've given that amount of money over to RH. But RH would also let me buy $4,000 of GME on margin. Not only has their worst case deposit requirement gone up to $4,000, but I have only given them enough cash to cover half of it. Part of the responsibility of a broker is to keep an eye on what trades are done on margin to avoid too large of a net position from building up for this exact reason, and to do things like adjust margin requirements to prevent this kind of thing from happening to them.

Right, I know what margin trading is, but that is a good summary. I'm just not sure how you can be so confident that the proportion of margin trading to non-margin trading was high enough that we can attribute most of the problem to the margin trading.

> > If it was in fact margin trading that was causing the problem, why would Robinhood limit buys in general, as opposed to just limiting use of margin?

> They limited buys because they literally couldn't afford the deposit with their clearinghouse. Sells don't require a deposit, naturally. I believe if they'd taken steps earlier in the cycle to limit margin trading RH would have had more cash on hand to meet their deposits and allow customers to keep buying GME, but not on margin. You'll note that other brokerages did limit margin trades of GME specifically, as well as putting GME options (another way to increase leverage) into liquidation only mode. This clearly signals that the other brokerages thought that decreasing leverage in GME was a good idea. Maybe RH should've done the same earlier?

That's exactly my point. If the margin trading was the primary source of problems, it seems like RH would have just limited margin trading instead of limiting all buys (whether on margin or not). Doesn't the fact that they didn't make this distinction suggest that the margin trading wasn't a disproportionate factor?

> > I think the likely explanation for why other brokerages did not have to raise additional funds is because they have a much smaller percentage of customers purchasing meme stocks.

> That is certainly part of it, sure. This goes back to "Gamifying stock market trading is a bad idea". But you also can't ignore that the other brokerages seem to have universally taken steps specifically to unwind the amount of leverage their customers had in GME, all steps that RH didn't seem to do until their clearinghouse forced them. If TD Ameritrade and similar were moving in to stop the GME bubble when they didn't even have the majority of the meme traders, doesn't that imply that RH should have done something far earlier?

I've admittedly read up far less on the other brokerages than I have on Robinhood with respect to the Gamestop stuff. Has it been reported that the other brokerages did not restrict trading due to the same increased DTC deposit requirements? I had just assumed it was due to that, but it sounds like you are pretty sure it wasn't.

Re: It’s Time for Real Time Settlement

#400
post #315

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Capitalism is predicated on the ability to loan out money. If that's true, then it's fundamentally broken (assuming interest bearing loans of course). You will never have a sustainable economic system that is based on interest bearing loans, we see it all the time with people waiting for the next crash to happen. > No debt means no credit for new businesses Not true. There are moral alternatives. If you want to sta…

> If that's true, then it's fundamentally broken (assuming interest bearing loans of course). You will never have a sustainable economic system that is based on interest bearing loans Yes we should all switch the current economic system which has been the root cause of societal development. And we should switch to a fairy-tail system which you describe but miraculously does not and has not ever existed. One where peo…

> > Great empires were built without interest.

> Like which?

I think part of the problem is that the GP is conflating debt leverage and interest. My understanding is that there have been societies essentially without debt leverage, and no societies without loan yield.

As far as interest, all non-altruistic loans have strictly positive yield. You can use contracts to shift payments around and nominally get rid of interest, but you can always calculate an equivalent interest rate from the loan's yield. In the middle ages, they discovered that an investment, an insurance contract, and a contract-for-difference (sale of profit) together (contractum trinius) could perfectly replicate the cash flows of an interest-bearing-loan.[0] Presumably the contractum trinius is what eventually lead to the Catholic Church allowing interest-bearing loans.

My understanding is that the joint ventures set up for Islamic finance end up having cash flows equivalent to interest-bearing loans, though perhaps with important differences regarding collateral and leverage.

The yield on these loans is always strictly positive, and an interest rate equivalent to that yield is easily calculated. You can shift payments around and structure things so that there's nominally no interest, but there's still yield on the loan.

Now, I think there is some healthy debate to be had over the role of leverage and collateral in the economy, and also non-dischargeable debt like student loans.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contractum_trinius

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