Live data from Hacker News

Intel Problems

stratechery.com

151–160 of 431 posts

Re: Intel Problems

#151

I think one day we’re going to wake up and discover that AWS mostly runs on Graviton (ARM) and not x86. And on that day intel’s troubles will go from future to present. My standing theory is that the m1 will accelerate it. Obviously all the wholly managed AWS services (Dynamo, Kinesis, S3, etc.) can change over silently, but the issue is EC2. I have a MBP, as do all of my engineers. Within a few years all of these ma…

This is kind of what should happen right? I'm not an expert, but my understanding is that one of the takeaways from the M1 success has been the weaknesses of x86 and CISC in general. It seems as if there is a performance ceiling which exists for x86 due to things like memory ordering requirements, and complexity of legacy instructions, which just don't exist for other instruction sets.

My impression is that we have been living under the cruft of x86 because of inertia, and what are mostly historical reasons, and it's mostly a good thing if we move away from it.

Re: Intel Problems

#152
I found the geopolitical portion to be the most important aspect here. China has shown a willingness to flex its muscles on enforcing its values beyond their borders. China is smart, and plays a long game. We don't want to wake up one day and find they've flexed their muscles on their regional neighbors similar to their rare earths strong-arming from 2010-2014 and not have fab capabilities to fall back on in the West.

(For that matter, I'm astounded that after 2014 the status quo returned on rare earths with very little state-level strategy or subsidy to address the risk there.)

Re: Intel Problems

#153
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Modern process node designations (5nm, 3nm...) are not measurements any more, they are marketing terms. The actual measure of shrinking is a lot smaller than the name would mean to indicate, and not approaching the quantum limits as fast as it may seem.

I did not know that! Though, that answer raises its own questions... If the two are entirely unlinked, what's stopping Intel from slapping "Now 3nm!" on their next gen processors? Surely some components must be at the advertised size, even if it's no longer a clear cut all-or-nothing descriptor, right? What's actually being sized down and why is it seemingly posing so many challenges for Intel's supply chain?

>"Now 3nm!" on their next gen processors?

Nothing.

It started when Samsung were using features size just to gain competitive marketing advantage. And then TSMC had to follow because their customers and shareholders were putting a lot of pressure on them

While ingredient branding is important, at the end of the day the chip has to perform. Otherwise your ingredient branding would suffer and such strategy would no longer work. Samsung are already tasting their own medicine.

P.S - That "Now 3nm!" reminds me of "3D Now!" from AMD.

Re: Intel Problems

#154

Perhaps now the "Why do people obsess over manufacturing?" question that many tech workers ask when other US industries were decimated will become a bit less quizzical.

It was more economics and political policy wonks, economists and politicians in general, who didn't just ask that question, but thrust forth the prescriptive rhetoric through a large grid of trade agreements, "Globalism is here to stay! Get over it! Comparative Advantage!" This is only the first in a long, expensive series of lessons these people will be taught by reality in the coming decades. I'm guessing this kind…

The US decided that it didn't like all the political disorder that came with managing a large proletariat. Instead, it decided to outsource the management of that proletariat to Asia and the 'global south.' Our proletariat instead was mostly liquidated and shifted itself into the service industry (not that amenable to labor organization) and the welfare/workfare rolls.

There are so many things that the US would have to reform to become more competitive again, but we are so invested into the FIRE economy that it's not unlike the position of the southern states before the Civil War: they were completely invested into the infrastructure of slavery and could not contemplate an alternative economic system because of that. The US is wedded to an economy based on FIRE and Intellectual Property production, with the rest of the economy just in a support role.

I'm not really a pro-organized-labor person, but I think that as a matter of national security we have to figure out a way to reform and compromise to get to the point to which we develop industry even if it is redundant due to globalization. The left needs to compromise on environmental protection, the rich need to compromise on NIMBYism, and the right needs to compromise on labor relations. Unfortunately none of this is on the table even as a point of discussion. Our politics is almost entirely consumed by insane gibberish babbling.

This became very clear when COVID hit and there was no realistic prospect of spinning up significant industrial capacity to make in-demand goods like masks and filters. In the future, hostile countries will challenge and overtake the US in IP production (which is quite nebulous and based on legal control of markets anyway) and in finance as well. The US will be in a very weak negotiating position at that point.

Re: Intel Problems

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The only comparable data point says that this is a terrible idea. Huh, I would say completely opposite thing. AMD wouldn't have survived if it kept trying to improve their own process instead of going to TSMC.

The problem here is not the success of AMD after splitting, but the complete retreat of Global Foundries from the SOTA process node. If this happens again with an Intel split then we have only TSMC left, off the coast of mainland China in Taiwan, in the middle of a game of thermonuclear tug of war between the West and China. While Capitalism will likely be part of the solution, through subsidizes for Intel or some ot…

The price of creating the fabs for a new node increases exponentially with every node. I remember when there were over 20 top node players. Now there are 3 if you aren't counting Intel out. If AMD had remained in the game there's no way they could have won.

Re: Intel Problems

#156

Totally reasonable argument, and I think most would be better off with an independent, US-based foundry. Unfortunately, I doubt that the US government functions well enough at this point to recognize the threat and overcome the influence Intel's money would wield against the effort.

I thought GlobalFoundries was US based, and they have a fab in Vermont (and Germany and Singapore)

Yes, but GlobalFoundries have given up development on leading edge process nodes.

Re: Intel Problems

#157

The thing about all of these articles analyzing Intel's problems is that nobody really knows the details of Intel's "problems" because it comes down to just one "problem" that we have no insight into: node size. What failures happened in Intel's engineering/engineering management of its fabs that led to it getting stuck at 14 nm? Only the people in charge of Intel's fabs know exactly what went wrong, and to my knowle…

We actually have a lot of insight in that Intel still doesn't have a good grasp on the problem. Their 10nm was supposed to enter volume production in mid 2018, and they still haven't truly entered volume production today. Additionally Intel announced in July 2020 that their 7nm is delayed by at least a year which means they figured out their node delay problem.

Re: Intel Problems

#158

The thing about all of these articles analyzing Intel's problems is that nobody really knows the details of Intel's "problems" because it comes down to just one "problem" that we have no insight into: node size. What failures happened in Intel's engineering/engineering management of its fabs that led to it getting stuck at 14 nm? Only the people in charge of Intel's fabs know exactly what went wrong, and to my knowle…

We actually have a lot of insight in that Intel still doesn't have a good grasp on the problem. Their 10nm was supposed to enter volume production in mid 2018, and they still haven't truly entered volume production today. Additionally Intel announced in July 2020 that their 7nm is delayed by at least a year which means they figured out their node delay problem.

> We actually have a lot of insight in that Intel still doesn't have a good grasp on the problem. Their 10nm was supposed to enter volume production in mid 2018, and they still haven't truly entered volume production today. Additionally Intel announced in July 2020 that their 7nm is delayed by at least a year which means they figured out their node delay problem.

Knowing something happened is not the same as knowing "why" it happened. That's the point of my comment. We don't know why they were not able to achieve volume production on 10 nm earlier.

Re: Intel Problems

#159
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Modern process node designations (5nm, 3nm...) are not measurements any more, they are marketing terms. The actual measure of shrinking is a lot smaller than the name would mean to indicate, and not approaching the quantum limits as fast as it may seem.

I did not know that! Though, that answer raises its own questions... If the two are entirely unlinked, what's stopping Intel from slapping "Now 3nm!" on their next gen processors? Surely some components must be at the advertised size, even if it's no longer a clear cut all-or-nothing descriptor, right? What's actually being sized down and why is it seemingly posing so many challenges for Intel's supply chain?

This article has a pretty good overview of the situation and other metrics that actually track progress: https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/devices/a-better-wa...

Re: Intel Problems

#160
> And in that planning the fact that TSMC’s foundries — and Samsung’s — are within easy reach of Chinese missiles is a major issue.

Are processor fabs analagous to auto factories and shipyards in World War II? Is the United States military's plan for a nuclear exchange with China dependent on a steady supply of cutting edge semiconductors? Even if it is, is that strategy really going to help?

This article is mostly concerened with Intel's stock price. Why bring this into it? Let's say Intel gets its mojo back and is producing cutting edge silicon at a level to compete with TSMC and supplying the Pentagon with all sorts of goodies... and then China nukes Taiwan? And now we cash in our Intel options just in time to see the flash and be projected as ash particles on a brick wall?

"The U.S. needs cutting edge fabs on U.S. soil" is true only if you believe the falied assumptions of the blue team during the Millenium Challenge, that electronic superiority is directly related to battlefield superiority. If semiconductors are the key to winning a war, why hasn't the U.S. won one lately?

And what does any of this have to do with Intel? Why are we dreaming up Dr. Strangelove scenarios? Is it just that some people are only comfortable with Keynesian stimulus if it's in the context of war procurement?

Post reply on HN