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That's not how 2FA works

shkspr.mobi

181–190 of 269 posts

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#181

They author makes a few good points, but I find the author's critique of Yubikey weak: >Cost. The average YubiKey is £50... If that's too expensive for ensuring your internet security, then either you underestimate the risks, or undervalue your information. If a Yubikey cost 10 times more it would still be a bargain. >Usability. Buy a device, register it, install the app, configure it, find the setting in the website…

Just because it’s a website problem, it doesn’t stop being a problem.

Usability is important if you want adoption outside of the HN crowd.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#182
post #104

The linked article is correct, but uncharitable. It correctly states the behavior of two-factor auth systems but incorrectly understands their value . Yes, 2FA won't protect you from being phished by a site if you aren't careful. 2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole. So no, when someone says "Use 2FA if you might be phished" you shouldn't be replying "That's not how 2FA wor…

If it’s a website which supports API key or any token of sorts (without expiry or long expiry), they could do some real damage even if they can’t use the 2FA again. Another thing would be to disable 2FA. All they have to do to achieve this is to use the phished credentials to immediately login with the original site, trigger 2FA and then show a field to capture it and pass along. Then capture all the cookies. The bes…

Any such password manager you like? Didn't know they could do domain matching

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#183
post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Actually better education and training is often the only real solution. It isn't "victim blaming" if the situation is at least theoretically within the victim's control. If some random "plumber" that I didn't call for shows up at my house, asking to be let in to replace some of my pipes, and I say "okay", then he robs me, is it victim blaming to say perhaps I should have been more suspicious of strange plumbers rando…

> education and training is often the only real solution No. That is never the real solution. At best it is a necessary evil, but generally resorting to this is a reflection of a failure of imagination. The reverse authentication problem in particular is easily solved by the right UI design plus some improved infrastructure behind the scenes. Certificate pinning, for example, would help a lot. The hard part is not co…

If the easy part is the implementation and the hard part is convincing people of its value then I can say one or more of the following are true:

- Your solution is not sufficiently great as to be self-evidently great.

- People (i.e. the victim) must be faulted (i.e. blamed) for their inability to be convinced of its inherent majesty.

- Given convincing's similarity and overlap both with educating and with training, you are having a failure of imagination. (Source: Your comment.)

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole. Not if it also steals the 2nd factor. My response would be more like "2FA is good but not for this problem." This problem is about going to the wrong site. The solution is to go only to the right site.

> Not if it also steals the 2nd factor. In Webauthn/u2f the 2nd factor is a proof that is unique against the particular site. So stealing the 2nd factor is significantly more difficult since it requires compromise of the computer/endpoint used to access the site to pass the wrong site to the hardware token, or cloning the physical device which should be tamper resistant (but not totally unheard of to clone some devic…

> persistent access

Given a successful login and session, perhaps on some sites this is enough for passwords reassign via some backend (likely intended for mobile apps) API?

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#185
post #100
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Conor sold U2F Zero's for less than 10 dollars (years ago) and has a kick starter now to fund his new Solo keys: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/conorpatrick/solo-the-f... https://u2fzero.com/ I have a few U2F Zeros and they have been working fine for years. These are simple devices. You don't need to overpay for them. Edit: Conor was building the U2F Zero tokens for $2.26 USD per unit. Read more here: https://w…

I don't think the kickstarter is relevant now. You just buy them from solokeys.com. There's been Somu since that, and Solo2 is in the offing, with plenty of storage, apparently. I bought Somu partly for convenience, and partly for the promise of PGP support, which unfortunately hasn't been added yet (though there is a development version). In answer to the expense question, two Solo keys appear to set you back 38 qui…

> I bought Somu partly for convenience, and partly for the promise of PGP support, which unfortunately hasn't been added yet (though there is a development version).

It is sad that with PGP being so horribly broken, it still casts its shadow over security products.

PGP should have been dead and buried eons ago.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I use a Yubikey daily and the OP is greatly exaggerating the issues in my opinion. Vanguard for example it took less than a minute to set up. I don't have an "application" installed locally for the Yubikey, it was plug & play. No special software needed. I honestly think Yubikey type devices' largest problems are - 1. Marketing. People simply do not know they exist or how they work (simple or not). 2. Support - Many…

Price. Yubikey's "best seller" goes for $45, that's grotesque. I would be surprised if the hardware costs exceeds $2 per unit and the software (or similar) can be had for free.

It's not about the hardware. In spite of the fact that they can nominally be broken into, most modern USB microcontrollers can easily implement being a security key.

The expense is that the security world hasn't converged on anything remotely approaching a single standard. So, a key has to support ... PGP, OpenSSH, FIDO, FIDO2, U2F ...

For example, you couldn't use some of the older YubiKeys with AWS because AWS only supported time-based TOTP.

That's a LOT of software work, and you can't be "Startup Sloppy" with your code or someone will break it.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#187
post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> education and training is often the only real solution No. That is never the real solution. At best it is a necessary evil, but generally resorting to this is a reflection of a failure of imagination. The reverse authentication problem in particular is easily solved by the right UI design plus some improved infrastructure behind the scenes. Certificate pinning, for example, would help a lot. The hard part is not co…

If the easy part is the implementation and the hard part is convincing people of its value then I can say one or more of the following are true: - Your solution is not sufficiently great as to be self-evidently great. - People (i.e. the victim) must be faulted (i.e. blamed) for their inability to be convinced of its inherent majesty. - Given convincing's similarity and overlap both with educating and with training, y…

The problem is that the people who need to be convinced are not the people who are being harmed by phishing. The people who are being harmed by phishing (non-technically-savvy end-users) are powerless. The people who need to be convinced of the merits of the solution are browser vendors and web site operators. Both groups would need to work together to solve the problem. Getting that to happen is the hard part. It's a very real problem, but it's a political problem, not a technical one.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#188
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Author here. I did provide a few other reasons - mostly around usability of YubiKeys. Try observing a non-techie set one up and tell me if you think it is as easy as it could be. Realistically, you're probably not going to catch a mugger. Otherwise robberies like that wouldn't occur. Snatching a laptop with a key physically plugged in it is probably easier than snatching a laptop and a separate phone. Regardless of m…

> may I suggest spending a couple of days volunteering for a local Victim Support charity. Please try being less condescending. Losing the keys, due to whatever reason, means losing one factor. If the user loses the key, the "mugger" still needs to get the users' passwords. 2FA = something you know + something you own. Having one factor compromised should not compromise your accounts if the service you are using is c…

What’s the second factor with yubikey? The site seems to say it’s passwordless.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#189

They author makes a few good points, but I find the author's critique of Yubikey weak: >Cost. The average YubiKey is £50... If that's too expensive for ensuring your internet security, then either you underestimate the risks, or undervalue your information. If a Yubikey cost 10 times more it would still be a bargain. >Usability. Buy a device, register it, install the app, configure it, find the setting in the website…

I mean, you say all this, but more or less these are the same complaints I hear from even seasoned IT professionals every single day when it comes to security.

Even the "the key is in my coat" is not a joke at all -- I've had clients who got compromised by a malicious insider because some admin wrote passwords on a sticky note simply because "password managers are cumbersome".

I get what you're saying on each point, but understand that security is as much about discipline as the actual security you implement. You can have the best of the best, but it doesn't mean anything without the discipline to use it, and I suppose that's what the author is trying to convey.

You even touch on it in your response about developing the right habits, and that's the author's port -- without discipline, the Yubikey means nothing.

>Again, this is not a Yubikey's problem. It's a website problem.

On this point I can't really agree at all; Yubikey might have a solid solution for a problem, but if no one is implementing it, then it's a solution looking for a problem. The mythical "average user" won't be persuaded to drop any amount of money on a dongle that does nothing; if it doesn't work for a large majority of their most common sites, then it's just a waste of money.

I'd suggest it __is__ Yubikey's problem as they're not promoting their value to sites in a way that implementation is a no-brainer. Checking on their compatibility list fo common chat-applications, common forums, common message boards/imageboards, and common shops world-wide, the adoption is very limited. Surely the admins of popular sites are aware of Yubikey, but at some point there was a decision not to add functionality -- Yubikey needs to make the efforts to promote adoption and figure out where there resistance comes from.

Of my daily sites that I might expect to be aware of/implement some hardware security, only reddit is on the list of "works with Yubikey", and I pretty rarely use reddit. Listing sites my friends and family use on a day to day basis, only Google Accounts comes up.

That's what the post is talking about. Yubikey does not have the penetration to be viable to "average users", and even for tech persons, the device is useless without the discipline to adjust habits in the first place, which most people just don't have.

Re: That's not how 2FA works

#190

They author makes a few good points, but I find the author's critique of Yubikey weak: >Cost. The average YubiKey is £50... If that's too expensive for ensuring your internet security, then either you underestimate the risks, or undervalue your information. If a Yubikey cost 10 times more it would still be a bargain. >Usability. Buy a device, register it, install the app, configure it, find the setting in the website…

> YubiKeys have no password lock of their own I don't know if the author of the blog post means something else but if you're using 2FA tokens (i.e. Yubikey Authenticator) you can put password protection for additional security.

In some scenarios, Windows 10 will also require a PIN to use a key:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/user...

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