Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Before, I was trying to figure out how mac's would ever be used anywhere near something classified or secret for a company. Relying on a personal firewall on the device itself seems ill-fated. Maybe it could be considered an additional layer of security, but I've yet to work at a place where a personal firewall is part of the security concept, no matter which OS. It's either firewalls at the gateway, maybe addition…
An application firewall on the device serves a different purpose to that running off-device, namely the ability to filter traffic based on the origin (or destination) application. Clearly if your kernel or userspace are compromised that's not much use, and that's where external controls kick in. You can't determine (absent some custom network and protocols) which piece of software was responsible for a given packet o…
> In essence it's about raising the number of independent failures required to result in a compromise.
Sure, it doesn't hurt, minus maybe the case that a vulnerability in that firewall itself is used.
> If you imagine the application firewall on the device has its policies managed rather than selected by the user, it starts to make more sense.
That's a requirement I guess. You don't want accountants and HR people handling popups by a firewall app. :-)