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WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

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Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#51
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please stop bringing up this "never roll your own crypto" argument. It's a guideline, not a hard rule. Signal actually rolled their own crypto and aren't constantly criticized for that, on the contrary. Signal is praised for rolling it's own crypto. Don't get me wrong, the Telegram crypto can (and should) definitely be criticized. But please criticize that they use "bad crypto" or "strange crypto" or "unreviewed cryp…

There's no need to continue litigating Telegram's crypto. (the criticisms are well enough known that people either aren't going to listen or can just go read them)

I’ve not heard of Telegram’s crypto criticisms, and I follow tech. Why would I know to just go read it?

It’s almost as if your cognitive time series is not the same as everyone’s.

(why the parens)?

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#52
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As did Signal (called Axolotl back then)? All protocols are invented at some point. Telegram did a terrible job marketing this one but it has been a long time now and the only issue I ever heard of was fixed some years ago. It's still not exactly pretty, but then look at TLS and I'm actually quite okay with mtproto. The real issue is that mtproto is never used. It isn't implemented in most clients for no apparent rea…

You mean Signal which was created by Moxie Marlinspike and other legit cryptogaphers and security researchers? Who rolled Telegram's crypto? No idea. Why should we trust them? No idea. I think I'll go with the people who have been contributing to the field for years and are highly respected.

I’d rather take the service which is not hosted on US servers over one that is, given that I can verify neither of their server code.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#53
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You mean Signal which was created by Moxie Marlinspike and other legit cryptogaphers and security researchers? Who rolled Telegram's crypto? No idea. Why should we trust them? No idea. I think I'll go with the people who have been contributing to the field for years and are highly respected.

I'd rather go with cryptanalysis and/or audits than big names. Both protocols are old enough now to have had ample opportunity. And I can't tell if Moxie really means to improve the status quo or works for some three letter agency and builds just enough metadata opportunities into popular messengers and opportunistic encryption into WhatsApp to be helpful without being suspicious. To avoid redundancy, I posted these…

> And I can't tell if Moxie really means to [...]

Not a fan of Moxie either but you got a source for that?

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#54

Probably because: All chats use the same Signal protocol outlined in this whitepaper, regardless of their end-to-end encryption status. The WhatsApp server has no access to the client’s private keys, though if a business user delegates operation of their Business API client to a vendor, that vendor will have access to their private keys - including if that vendor is Facebook. ( https://scontent.whatsapp.net/v/t39.856…

Yeah. It is really clear that Facebook is finally getting around to just implementing this feature of effectively having "hosted clients" for companies to be able to more easily--and yes: less securely--build chat bots (a mechanism that I appreciate is maybe less than ideal to encourage, but frankly just doesn't feel that bad and certainly isn't a surprise: Facebook has been taking about this for a year or two now); and all of the "changes" this week have been directly because of this, including the Privacy Policy update... the key article about which even explicitly said:

> The move, the spokeswoman said, is part of a previously disclosed move to allow businesses to store and manage WhatsApp chats using Facebook's infrastructure. Users won't have to use WhatsApp to interact with the businesses and have the option of blocking the businesses. She said there will be no change in how WhatsApp shares provides data with Facebook for non-business chats and account data.

And yet, somehow, everyone is just in complete hysterics over all of this, claiming Facebook is evil and undermining the feeling of security people have in WhatsApp, with lots of talk of switching not only to reasonable alternatives like Signal, but also to less secure messaging protocols like Telegram (or, frankly, Matrix). People at my supposedly-smart privacy company--Orchid, building something akin to "incentivized Tor for general VPN use"--are even panicking about this news, and it is really frustrating how no one even seems to want to analyze this carefully... "bUt FaCeBoOk Is EvIl!!" :/.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#55
post #53
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd rather go with cryptanalysis and/or audits than big names. Both protocols are old enough now to have had ample opportunity. And I can't tell if Moxie really means to improve the status quo or works for some three letter agency and builds just enough metadata opportunities into popular messengers and opportunistic encryption into WhatsApp to be helpful without being suspicious. To avoid redundancy, I posted these…

> And I can't tell if Moxie really means to [...] Not a fan of Moxie either but you got a source for that?

Sorry, was still editing in a bit of context, please see the current version. If there is anything in particular feel free to ask, but the whole analysis is more of a submission of its own that I'm not sure I'm up to writing today.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#56
post #54

Probably because: All chats use the same Signal protocol outlined in this whitepaper, regardless of their end-to-end encryption status. The WhatsApp server has no access to the client’s private keys, though if a business user delegates operation of their Business API client to a vendor, that vendor will have access to their private keys - including if that vendor is Facebook. ( https://scontent.whatsapp.net/v/t39.856…

Yeah. It is really clear that Facebook is finally getting around to just implementing this feature of effectively having "hosted clients" for companies to be able to more easily--and yes: less securely--build chat bots (a mechanism that I appreciate is maybe less than ideal to encourage, but frankly just doesn't feel that bad and certainly isn't a surprise: Facebook has been taking about this for a year or two now);…

Unfortunately, your interpretation of facebook's motives require trusting that they'll only do what their PR says they'll do, and not what they're able to do. Or, even if that is their current reasoning, one then has to trust that they won't then take advantage of said ability in the future.

For many of us, facebook's past actions are more than enough to prove that they do not deserve the benefit of the doubt in this case.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#57
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Didn’t Telegram roll their own crypto?

Please stop bringing up this "never roll your own crypto" argument. It's a guideline, not a hard rule. Signal actually rolled their own crypto and aren't constantly criticized for that, on the contrary. Signal is praised for rolling it's own crypto. Don't get me wrong, the Telegram crypto can (and should) definitely be criticized. But please criticize that they use "bad crypto" or "strange crypto" or "unreviewed cryp…

I am no expert, but "Signal rolling their own crypto" isn't the same as "X rolling their own crypto":

1. Folks spear-heading the Noise Protocol Framework (upon which Signal's protocol is based) are cryptographers [0].

2. They built upon existing standards for one specific purpose: Creating two-way secure channels [1].

[0] https://signal.org/docs/

[1] https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/3gipxdJ22iM

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#58
post #56
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah. It is really clear that Facebook is finally getting around to just implementing this feature of effectively having "hosted clients" for companies to be able to more easily--and yes: less securely--build chat bots (a mechanism that I appreciate is maybe less than ideal to encourage, but frankly just doesn't feel that bad and certainly isn't a surprise: Facebook has been taking about this for a year or two now);…

Unfortunately, your interpretation of facebook's motives require trusting that they'll only do what their PR says they'll do, and not what they're able to do. Or, even if that is their current reasoning, one then has to trust that they won't then take advantage of said ability in the future. For many of us, facebook's past actions are more than enough to prove that they do not deserve the benefit of the doubt in this…

In addition, if this is indeed the backstory, then Facebook’s product management team failed miserably by not owning the story and instead deferring to anonymous internet commenters to explain their changes.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#59
post #54

Probably because: All chats use the same Signal protocol outlined in this whitepaper, regardless of their end-to-end encryption status. The WhatsApp server has no access to the client’s private keys, though if a business user delegates operation of their Business API client to a vendor, that vendor will have access to their private keys - including if that vendor is Facebook. ( https://scontent.whatsapp.net/v/t39.856…

Yeah. It is really clear that Facebook is finally getting around to just implementing this feature of effectively having "hosted clients" for companies to be able to more easily--and yes: less securely--build chat bots (a mechanism that I appreciate is maybe less than ideal to encourage, but frankly just doesn't feel that bad and certainly isn't a surprise: Facebook has been taking about this for a year or two now);…

How is Matrix less secure? As far as I'm aware, all the Element clients now implement E2EE by default.

Re: WhatsApp whitepaper removed sentence about never having access to private keys

#60
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You mean Signal which was created by Moxie Marlinspike and other legit cryptogaphers and security researchers? Who rolled Telegram's crypto? No idea. Why should we trust them? No idea. I think I'll go with the people who have been contributing to the field for years and are highly respected.

I'd rather go with cryptanalysis and/or audits than big names. Both protocols are old enough now to have had ample opportunity. And I can't tell if Moxie really means to improve the status quo or works for some three letter agency and builds just enough metadata opportunities into popular messengers and opportunistic encryption into WhatsApp to be helpful without being suspicious. To avoid redundancy, I posted these…

> And I can't tell if Moxie really means to improve the status quo or works for some three letter agency and builds just enough metadata opportunities into popular messengers and opportunistic encryption into WhatsApp to be helpful without being suspicious.

As if Moxie having opinions that you don’t agree with is evidence for some covert NSA operation or some such. What nonesense.

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