It's a shame that people still use Telegram when Signal is so much better, and has better credentials all around.
Telegram publishes users' locations online
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Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#12Depending on your definition of 'online' this is true of any app you use.
Telegram could at least take a similar approach to Tinder, who have already learnt from a similar mistake.
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
How can telegram give you government issued ID if it doesn't collect it ?
I think they are being sarcastic.
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#14I wonder if this will be sufficient?
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#15Hmm...So I have Telegram installed via F-Droid (so presumably without Google Play Services). I do NOT have the "People Nearby" feature. I am curious if that means my location is not published?
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#16Telegram has so many anti features and dark patterns that I really wish it was less popular. I honestly use WhatsApp over Telegram because at least I know WhatsApp is insecure while people sometimes act like Telegram is a secure platform.
I’ve heard other folks say WhatsApp is insecure. Do you (or anyone else) have specific examples or concerns?
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#17It's a shame that people still use Telegram when Signal is so much better, and has better credentials all around.
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#18Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#19Hmm...So I have Telegram installed via F-Droid (so presumably without Google Play Services). I do NOT have the "People Nearby" feature. I am curious if that means my location is not published?
I have Telegram on iOS and I can't find any People Nearby feature. It doesn't request the location permission according to Settings either.
Re: Telegram publishes users' locations online
#20>[Line] fixed it by adding a random number to the user's destination This is a imperfect solution. There's two possibilities: the offset (aka "random number") is dynamic, or it's fixed. If it's the former all you have to do is sample enough times to get through the noise. If it's the latter, it's not vulnerable to the previous attack, but if you have a known point of reference (so you can deduce what the offset is),…
It sounds like this approach could be prevented by having a random fixed offset for each user, so that you have no point of reference unless you already know where that specific user is. [Removed bit about regenerating this offset infrequently.]
EDIT: You could even do this in conjunction with the quantization mitigation, which sounds like it would shore up the slight weaknesses with that approach (where being on a quantization boundary makes it obvious where you are in that dimension) for the best of both worlds, as long as you're okay with further decreasing accuracy.