>There is no evidence that FireEye’s hacking tools have been used or that client data was stolen Later in same article... >Beyond the tool theft, the hackers also appeared to be interested in a subset of FireEye customers: government agencies. ??? Which is it?
Interest != Used or Stolen Client Data.
FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
101–110 of 251 posts
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#102As a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't bein…
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#103Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
>I'm not sure anything can protect against a targeted attack from a nation-state. hardware airgap can go a long way
Honestly, system user education/awareness goes even further. Iran nuclear facilities used an airgap but it was social engineering that was the weakest attack vector for Stuxnet to exploit. Same with the South Korean Winter Olympics; a phishing email with a macro embedded Word doc got them in there. A great book on Russian, state-backed hacking group was by a senior Wired writer, Andy Greenberg, called "Sandworm" [0]…
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#105As a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't bein…
If I understand your comment correctly - even though the fingerprints are published, the attacker can still reverse eng the implementation from the tools and bypass antivirus systems at least in the near future?
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#106As a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't bein…
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#107As a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't bein…
If I understand your comment correctly - even though the fingerprints are published, the attacker can still reverse eng the implementation from the tools and bypass antivirus systems at least in the near future?
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#108From their official blog post: > Based on my 25 years in cyber security and responding to incidents, I’ve concluded we are witnessing an attack by a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities. I wonder what nations possess “top-tier offensive capabilities” today. USA, China, Russia, Israel come to mind. Who else? Is there a list or metric to measure a nation’s cyber attack capabilities?
I would confidently say that the top 50 countries by GDP have a solid offensive capability. Some, like Japan, have very specific interests that don't align with what makes the news.
At some point you start getting in to the territory of Hacking Team, NSO Group, Gamma, VASTech, etc. Effectively combining the resources of many smaller governments in to a for-hire enterprise that can provide near-nation-state capabilities.
Here is a list of well known attributions of groups to get you started: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1H9_xaxQHpWaa4O_S...
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#109As a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't bein…
Matthew in accounting shouldn't have permission to run an untrusted binary.
Re: FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why spy on your own citizens when that makes them blackmail-able by foreign nation states? Seriously, the quickest, cheapest, easiest way to spy on someone (edit= everyone) in the US (or any 5 eyes) is through our own "security" agencies, but I'm going to go with stupidity rather than malice on the NSA's part.
> Seriously, the quickest, cheapest, easiest way to spy on someone in the US (or any 5 eyes) is through our own "security" agencies, but I'm going to go with stupidity rather than malice on the NSA's part. No. The quickest and easiest way is probably to send them a phishing message, the next easiest is probably figuring some of their password recovery answers using dossiers compiled by data brokers, maybe after that…
I'm interested to know what you're proposing, but I suspect you simply misunderstood what I meant, and perhaps what your (and everyone else's) file at the TLAs looks like. It's a mighty plump target, and not comparably secure.