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macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

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Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#251
post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why can't Apple download all footprints of bad apps locally instead of monitoring every single invocation of apps? Is second execution of an app the same security risk as the first one? That's the design flaw.

You mean bad certificates rather than applications. OCSP can be locally cached, and Apple's implementation does exactly that. But eventually you'll have to refresh the cache and then the implementation needs to be fault tolerant (Apple's wasn't). OCSP leaks what vendors your installed applications are from. The list of leaked certificates changes daily, so any good implementation is going to check again at least seve…

> OCSP can be locally cached, and Apple's implementation does exactly that.

In the earlier HN thread when the server was offline, it was said that Apple only cached OCSP results for 5 minutes. Is that not true? If it is true, I don't think that's what GP is asking for as far as local caching.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#252

Any opt out protection racket should be illegal. Even if it is "anonymous", someone could be identified from their behavioural patterns which are unique to each human. I hope that Apple gets at least hundred billion fine for such brazen violation of privacy so they will learn their lesson and they should be ordered to delete all personal data they don't have legitimate business need for.

Why would they try to identify you from your "behavioural patterns", when they already have the device identifier and your Apple ID, which identify you are your computer uniquely? Which, to be very specific, they _do not send_. They COULD identify you extremely easily, and they specifically chose not to do that.

It's sent unencrypted. Anyone else could use said patterns to track and identify, with good reason because they do not have the ID.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#253

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>maybe blockchain will solve the problem of trust among humans Absolutely not. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/blockchain_an...

There's so much wrong with this post I'm not even sure where to start. Literally almost every paragraph starts something untrue. The whole article is written from a false understanding.

I’m actually curious what’s wrong about it? I read it from an outsider perspective and it’s full of very convincing arguments against “blockchains.” You’re absolutely correct that he’s writing from his understanding, but Schneider’s been in the field for decades (more than many Bitcoin proponents are old), so I’m more inclined to believe he knows what he’s talking about than some other random person on the internet.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#254
post #2

A common refrain in arguments that we don't need laws to protect privacy is that the market will take care of it. The market can't act against what it can't see. Privacy loss is often irreversible. A common refrain in arguments that we don't need to reject closed source software to protect privacy is that being closed source doesn't hide the behaviour, and people will still notice backdoors and privacy leaks. Sometim…

The market only acts fairly when the product is a commodity. The time for the market to react for a product with the complexity of a mac is decades. As the ecosystem grows, the cost of switching increases. Therefore market starts acting more and more inefficiently. This is why countries have state intervention in such cases. And anti trust exists. If the option was a mac with privacy vs a mac without privacy but $10…

> The market only acts fairly when the product is a commodity.

The market only acts fairly in the window after a product is commoditized and before regulatory capture happens.

And in some cases that window is closed before it opens.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#255
post #2

A common refrain in arguments that we don't need laws to protect privacy is that the market will take care of it. The market can't act against what it can't see. Privacy loss is often irreversible. A common refrain in arguments that we don't need to reject closed source software to protect privacy is that being closed source doesn't hide the behaviour, and people will still notice backdoors and privacy leaks. Sometim…

The market only acts fairly when the product is a commodity. The time for the market to react for a product with the complexity of a mac is decades. As the ecosystem grows, the cost of switching increases. Therefore market starts acting more and more inefficiently. This is why countries have state intervention in such cases. And anti trust exists. If the option was a mac with privacy vs a mac without privacy but $10…

"The market only acts fairly when the product is a commodity."

Based on context (rest of your comment), did you mean "substitute good" instead of "commodity"?

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#256
post #10
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Microsoft SmartScreen is very similar to Apple's approach. Although I believe you can disable SmartScreen on Windows still which, afaik, you cannot do on macOS without resorting to "hacks" such as editing the hosts file to loopback the Apple OCSP server. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_SmartScreen

Good thing too because it is easy to screw up signing. For example, even the dotnet team has trouble with it https://github.com/dotnet/core/issues/5202

Exactly. The policy applies to everyone. Unsigned new binaries (executables) on the internet are not to be trusted by the general public.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#257

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's so much wrong with this post I'm not even sure where to start. Literally almost every paragraph starts something untrue. The whole article is written from a false understanding.

Can you please explain what those untrue statements are and what his false understanding is?

The “false understanding” is most likely how he starts at the conclusion of “Bitcoin == bad” and works from that instead. But both types of essays are ok. The former is just an “argumentative” or “persuasive” essay, while the latter is akin to a “compare and contrast” one.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#258
post #17

Another fun fact about this system: something changed in how the binaries are evaluated and one VST plugins I've downloaded months ago was marked as malware. The plugin is quite popular in community so I think it's unlikely it contains actual malicious code (in fact I've contacted the developer and he said he has done some fixes for Apple's security policies recently). Imagine my shock when I open an old project in A…

>I don't want to worry about whether my music will work five or ten years from now This is exactly what Apple has already done to the iTunes world, music you had a decade ago is suddenly inaccessible

> [...] music you had a decade ago is suddenly inaccessible

Music bought via iTunes doesn't have any DRM since 2009.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#259
post #223
post #210

> Those who consider that Apple’s current online certificate checks are unnecessary, invasive or controlling should familiarise themselves with how they have come about, and their importance to macOS security. They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after all, and what should replace them. I agree that anyone critiquing Appl…

Why can't Apple download all footprints of bad apps locally instead of monitoring every single invocation of apps? Is second execution of an app the same security risk as the first one? That's the design flaw.

In answer to the first: Because the information is unreliable without more invasive technologies ensuring that the local file is up to date. To the second: Perhaps not, but if the information on bad actors (app distributors in this instance) you'll continue running a compromised app.

Are you familiar with OCSP conceptually? I have done a reasonable amount of work with signatures and certificates, including OCSP. All my experience is in a commercial, enterprise context but I think these technologies need to start filtering down to the consumer before the capability for security evaporates.

I think it's a consumer-positive direction for Apple to provide this service. I would be interested to hear from someone who holds the view that this is not a service, or disagrees in other ways, but I think this is the right direction for consumers. The alternative, as I see it, is that every person installing an app needs to start searching for CVE notices and headlines in trade papers declaring a compromise.

Apple have applied an enterprise middleware to their infrastructure. I think perhaps they could have been more transparent in the delivery. A lot of the outrage now is driven by people only finding out about the underlying process for the first time. I stand by the right of these companies to choose their business model to disallow (or restrict) execution of apps they believe to be compromised. I also firmly believe in a varied and free market for software, hardware, and infrastructure.

In essence: You can choose to use Apple and do it the Apple way. Equally you can choose to build your computer from components sourced from anywhere, install any free OS, and any apps. Personally I do choose to do it the Apple way, and I am inconvenienced by that from time to time. I curse my computer and its creators on a daily basis. It's part of the relationship we all build with our tools.

got a bit off track towards the end...

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#260
post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The real key word is "legally". IP addresses + other metadata (browser fingerprinting and the like) can be enough to sufficiently identify an individual, or at least a household, for some purposes, such as making a more effective advertising profile.

Coulda woulda shoulda isn’t evidence.

I'm having trouble figuring out your meaning in this context. Care to explain?
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