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macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

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Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#221
post #183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I see you asserting this over and over. What I don't see is you providing any real evidence that this is a core part of the decision-making process. Apple isn't particularly incentivized to find a different way that avoids the tools they already have that already make it harder and costlier for parties to get around their security mechanisms. That is not the same as making decisions because they protect the business…

I agree that there is no direct evidence that this decision was part of their formal decision-making process. But there is still something to be said for designing systems where it's not possible for those negative incentives to exist, whether or not there is any current intention of taking advantage of them. Of the tens of thousands of people who had a hand in shaping macOS today, it's impossible to say what their c…

> designing systems where it's not possible for those negative incentives to exist

No doubt, but even in simple systems this is considerably more difficult than it sounds. Incentive systems are not easy, and any incentive system is often twisted into a game that produces unexpected poor behaviors. Try to achieve that at a 100+k employee company and you're guaranteed to end up with misaligned or counterintuitive incentives.

The reason something stronger than simple assertion matters here is because Apple actually has added an incentive system: trumpeting privacy as a core feature means they tie their brand to their ability to deliver on privacy. That means that being called out for privacy issues has greater potential harm for the company, and thus its bottom line, in a way that's far more direct and monetarily impactful than $100 annual developer fees ever will be.

Even cynically, you can see the same mechanic at work with the recent reduction of app store percentages for small businesses. Apple has made it a core part of its developer outreach that the app store is a good thing for developers: they've made it part of their brand. If they're called out for something that makes many of those developers disagree, or even for something that makes users perceive that part of the brand as incorrect, it has implications to the whole company's bottom line (not just the developer id sliver of it).

> it's useless to talk only about the intentions you can prove just by looking at their formal decision-making process

For what it's worth, my point isn't tied to formal decision-making, it's tied to the informal parts as well. What I'm saying is that this can be a completely technical decision that relies on the existing business structure without ever taking into account whether it will raise revenue from developer ids. The developer id's existence is a fact. The “DoS resistance” characteristics, if you will, of having the developer ids cost money is a fact. As a system architect, leveraging those facts for system security seems perfectly reasonable. Yes, absolutely they should have taken privacy into account as well. “We haven't used it” and “we won't use it” aren't the same as “we can't use it”.

But here's the thing: to me, the strongest indicator of whether a company is committed to an approach is whether they react positively when they are called out, or whether they double down on their mistakes. Apple was called out here, and they've committed to doing just about all of the things they should be doing. You could use this same framing to say that Apple isn't as committed to developers thriving on their platform as they are to living up to their privacy commitment, of course.

Tl;dr: customers are part of the incentive system, tying your brand to a commitment aggressively as Apple has tied theirs to privacy has an impact on customers, and this is a great way to introduce an additional external forcing function to your internal teams.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#222
post #210

> Those who consider that Apple’s current online certificate checks are unnecessary, invasive or controlling should familiarise themselves with how they have come about, and their importance to macOS security. They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after all, and what should replace them. I agree that anyone critiquing Appl…

The browser vendors have been looking at this problem for a long time. See https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-a... for example (bloom filters included).

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#223
post #210

> Those who consider that Apple’s current online certificate checks are unnecessary, invasive or controlling should familiarise themselves with how they have come about, and their importance to macOS security. They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after all, and what should replace them. I agree that anyone critiquing Appl…

Why can't Apple download all footprints of bad apps locally instead of monitoring every single invocation of apps? Is second execution of an app the same security risk as the first one? That's the design flaw.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#224
post #25

Interesting, but reading the conclusion I'm fascinated in this affaire how technically knowledgeable people loose common sense to defend their favorite brand: - Per launch verification is terrible for privacy, vis-a-vis Apple and the whole network when it happens in plain text - "They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after…

Yeah, the article's last paragraph irks me... to reformulate it in the context of domestic spying, it'd be like saying "NSA's communication monitoring have kept you safe for years, now that you've heard of it, you decide it's a bad idea?". Most people probably never noticed this phone-home feature existed, just like they never knew that NSA was recording everything. (Obviously anyone who bothered to look under the ho…

The Apple thing was not designed for explicit mass-surveillance; NSA’s programs are. That’s kind of a big difference.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#225
post #2

A common refrain in arguments that we don't need laws to protect privacy is that the market will take care of it. The market can't act against what it can't see. Privacy loss is often irreversible. A common refrain in arguments that we don't need to reject closed source software to protect privacy is that being closed source doesn't hide the behaviour, and people will still notice backdoors and privacy leaks. Sometim…

The market only acts fairly when the product is a commodity. The time for the market to react for a product with the complexity of a mac is decades. As the ecosystem grows, the cost of switching increases. Therefore market starts acting more and more inefficiently. This is why countries have state intervention in such cases. And anti trust exists. If the option was a mac with privacy vs a mac without privacy but $10…

> The time for the market to react for a product with the complexity of a mac is decades.

This makes me think of the 2 slit experiment as applied to basketballs. There is a period of time that decisions need to be properly considered, presumably simple decisions need little time, and complex decisions need more time. There is also a period of time that is required to make a decision, and a level at which the decision is made.

There are lowly software engineers making decisions like this, some of which may not even percolate to daily stand-up, yet will require the Supreme Court to unpack 10 years from now. And no one really knows.

It's like trying to pass a basketball through a slit. Yes, there's a theoretical interference pattern, and you can calculate it, but you can't do the experiment because you can't pass the basketball through a slit that small (in the case of basketballs, if I recall, the largest slit is angstroms if not smaller).

So in software development, You've got huge uncertainty in the societal implications of some decisions about what information you're going to pass over the network, but you can't even get them all through daily stand-up, let alone to Congress or the Supreme Court. Somewhere along the way, some of them end up on Hacker News with people mis-quoting Eric Hoffer, “Every great security decision starts off as a movement, turns into a business, and ends up as a racket.”

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#226
post #210

> Those who consider that Apple’s current online certificate checks are unnecessary, invasive or controlling should familiarise themselves with how they have come about, and their importance to macOS security. They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after all, and what should replace them. I agree that anyone critiquing Appl…

How many revocations do they do? How about just downloading the whole list to the clients which they can check offline.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#227
post #25

Interesting, but reading the conclusion I'm fascinated in this affaire how technically knowledgeable people loose common sense to defend their favorite brand: - Per launch verification is terrible for privacy, vis-a-vis Apple and the whole network when it happens in plain text - "They should also explain how, having enjoyed their benefits for a couple of years, they’ve suddenly decided they were such a bad idea after…

>I'm fascinated in this affaire how technically knowledgeable people loose common sense to defend their favorite brand...when it happens in plain text

I'm fascinated how technically knowledgeable people don't understand OCSP.

Checking the revocation status of certificates is why OCSP was created. It happens via HTTP. Why? Because you cannot check a certificate used for the HTTPS connection when you are using HTTPS for the connection. Apple leveraged OCSP for Gatekeeper since it does the same thing, checking certificates, in this case a developer certificate. That is all it does.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#228
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lying to the customer about what your product does, or having secret functionality, should be a criminal offence in the same way as breaking and entering or stalking are. Then, we would find out very quickly what people value. I firmly believe this ecosystem (as in privacy violating ad and data selling business model) is only dominant because companies are able to mislead with impunity, so it's basically a form of fr…

The act of breaching privacy is technically difficult to prohibit in a way many of us would find palatable. What should be targeted is the product of said breaches. Something like the blood diamond approach. If your company has PII, then you by law must be able to produce a consented attestation chain all the way back to the source. If you do not, then you're charged a fine for every piece of unattested PII on every…

- Can you demonstrate the provenance of every phone number, email address and other contact mode on your phone? Note people's birthdays? Sure, you only want to target companies. Make sure you choose your acquaintances wisely, I guess, or make sure you record their grant of permission to email them, because people abuse laws like this to harass each other every single day.

- This also punishes possession, not use. If you think about that for a minute, it should become clear both how this doesn't attack the right problem, and how companies would evade it.

- Finally... how are you going to audit Ford or Geico? Honest question. Who pays for the audit of "every piece of unattested PII on every individual"? How often, what is the dispute mechanism, and who administers that? Seriously - this sounds like a job for a new agency combining significant portions of the IRS, the FBI and PwC.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#229
post #206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm sure it probably doesn't to an Apple Cultist with their head in the sand. But for those people, gesturing broadly at all of the evidence available doesn't seem to work either.

Gesturing broadly doesn’t work because it’s not evidence . It is only innuendo. If you had evidence you’d be able to be specific.

There are mountains of evidence available in all corners of the internet. You should know because as one of Apple's elite True Believers, the vast majority of your HN activity is trying vigorously to handwave away any and all evidence of Apple's malfeasance.

The real problem is that for someone like you, no amount of evidence is sufficient. Someone could post a video of Steve Jobs masturbating furiously to Kim Kardashian's iCloud photos folder, and you'd still find some way to spin it as him having an erotic fetish for Apple's data security and privacy practices.

Re: macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years

#230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>maybe blockchain will solve the problem of trust among humans Absolutely not. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/blockchain_an...

There's so much wrong with this post I'm not even sure where to start. Literally almost every paragraph starts something untrue. The whole article is written from a false understanding.

If you’re going to claim Schneier is wrong on crypto stuff, you’ll want to bring a suitcase of evidence along if you want people to take your claim seriously.
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