It's because it's a huge can of worms that leads to really grandiose claims that aren't supported by Godel's statements, of the sort the article is already beginning to make.
It also shifts the conversation into becoming fundamentally a philosophical question rather than a logical or mathematical one, which is okay, but considerably changes the table stakes of what background knowledge we need.
> If there are unprovable statements in any consistent set of axioms, might we also conclude there also be an unprovable but true statements?
That is one potential philosophical position. Another philosophical position is that there are no "true" axioms schemes, but rather that axiom schemes are always indefinitely extendable. Truth lies instead in how we choose to apply the axiom schema to the external world, which is outside the purview of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. Both positions are supported by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.
For example, do you believe that the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is true? That is, although it is independent of ZFC, do you believe that objectively we are only allowed to use CH as an axiom or Not(CH) as an axiom. One of those must be objectively wrong. Some people do some people don't.
Likewise, do you believe that the imaginary numbers are "true?" That is the axioms that make them up are not artificial statements that somebody can up in pursuit of an abstract theory, but are immutable truths of the universe and that in fact you cannot choose an alternative axiomatization because it would be "wrong?" Some people some people don't.
What about the natural numbers?
There are many philosophical positions you can take on the notion of mathematical truth and the crucial thing is describing Godel's theorems with reference to truth suggests that Godel's theorems help decide among these notions of mathematical truth, when in fact what happens is that Godel's theorems stretch and shrink to accommodate different philosophical frameworks. The former is why I think a lot of people accord Godel's theorems a mystical status that makes it very difficult to have coherent discussions about them.
To pedagogically illustrate why the notion of truth can be confusing, I'll repeat two questions I've listed elsewhere which I think are good things to meditate on for first-time readers of Godel's Incompleteness theorems and explore why the often grandiose philosophical proclamations arising from Godel's theorems require very careful footing.
I answer them in my post history, but I would recommend you don't look at those before you've come up with answers yourself.
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First, Conway's Game of Life:
Conway's Game of Life seem like they should be subject to Godel's incompleteness theorems. It is after all powerful enough to be Turing-complete.
Yet its rules seem clearly complete (they unambiguously specify how to implement the Game of Life enough that different implementation of the Game of Life agree with each other).
So what part of Game of Life is incomplete? What new rule (i.e. axiom) can you add to Conway's Game of Life that is independent of its current rules? Given that, what does it mean when I say that "its rules seem clearly complete?" Is there a way of capturing that notion? And if there isn't, why haven't different implementations of the game diverged? If you don't think that the Game of Life should be subject to Godel's Incompleteness Theorems why? Given that it's Turing complete it seems obviously as powerful as any other system.
Second, again, in most logical systems, another way of stating that consistency is unproveable is that consistency of a system S is independent of the axioms of that system. However, that means that the addition of a new axiom asserting that S is either consistent or inconsistent are both consistent with S. In particular, the new system S' that consists of the axioms of S with the new axiom "S is inconsistent" is consistent if S is consistent.
What gives? Do we have some weird "superposition" of consistency and inconsistency?
Hints (don't read them until you've given these questions some thought!):
1. Consider questions of the form "eventually" or "never." Can those be turned into axioms? If you decide instead to tackle the question of applicability of the incompleteness theorems, what is the domain of discourse when I say "clearly complete?" What exactly is under consideration?
2. Consider carefully what Godel's arithmetization of proofs gives you. What does Godel's scheme actually give you when it says it's "found" a contradiction? Does this comport with what you would normally agree with? An equivalent way of phrasing this hint, is what is the actual statement in Godel's arithmetization scheme created when we informally say "S is inconsistent?"
At the end of the day, the philosophical implications of Godel's incompleteness theorems hinge on whether you believe that it is possible to unambiguously specify what the entirety of the natural numbers are and whether they exist as a separate entity (i.e. does "infinity" exist in a real sense? Is there a truly absolute standard model of the natural numbers?).