As someone who worked on Intel's phone chip: we definitely didn't win it. We fucked it up twelve ways to Sunday. Why: giant egos. There were turf wars between Austin, Santa Clara and Israel over who would design it, and the team that won out had long since lost its best principle engineers and had no clue how to spin the architecture to meet the design win. Otellini's hindsight hedge is pure spin: we knew the landing…
I have a theory about why turf wars like this happens: the more successful and wealthy an entity, the greater opportunity there is for a manager to take wealth instead of make it. When you’re scrappy and broke, the only path to success is to make the company successful. When the company is rich and multitudinous, an individual can gain more from politics and turf wars rather than actually trying to push an already hi…
Pieter Hintjens (creator of ZeroMQ) wrote a lot about this, and how organizations from big companies to small charities to software projects ought to design their internal structures of roles, titles, voting, auditing, to defend themselves against this kind of attack. Particularly if there's any kind of treasury, an opportunist will become tempted to take that role, but any kind of credit will attract people who want to take the credit without doing the work, power structures will attract people who want the power, and programmers who "just want to code" and avoid politics will find themselves at the bottom of a dysfunctional infected organisation structure with no power, no credit, and being instructed by distorted requests.
IIRC he tried to design the ZeroMQ organisation so that there wasn't any way for one person to insert themselves in a key point.
I'm not sure where on his blog I was reading that, but it's related to his writings about psycopaths[1] as the opportunists, and might be part of his book Social Architecture[2]