21–30 of 211 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd rather have someone hack 1700 local elections than one 'national standard' quite frankly. The inefficiency delights me
People are always rallying to add blockchain for voting without realizing that the paper ballot is a proof of work that predates it by a significant margin.
“Where I come from, when the government says someone's guilty that's how you know they're innocent,” she says. “It's different here?”
Eight states[0] still have electronic voting systems without paper backups. They're un-auditable. I'm not going to weigh in on the current politics of this situation, but US Election security is awful, now, and since at least 2000. I actually did my degree thesis on designing electronic voting systems (and built one), and ultimately concluded it was impossible to make them fully secure. The best you can do is paper b…
I'd rather have someone hack 1700 local elections than one 'national standard' quite frankly. The inefficiency delights me
Eight states[0] still have electronic voting systems without paper backups. They're un-auditable. I'm not going to weigh in on the current politics of this situation, but US Election security is awful, now, and since at least 2000. I actually did my degree thesis on designing electronic voting systems (and built one), and ultimately concluded it was impossible to make them fully secure. The best you can do is paper b…
What’s your thinking on the “request” process of mail-in ballots? To me, it’s wild to think all one needs to request a ballot is a name, address and ssn... and on top of all of that, you can get the ballot sent to a different address...
I would say though that "scale matters." If an electronic voting system is compromised the "scale" could be the entire state, and millions of votes, but each time a mail ballot is stolen via identity theft, you're risking it being detected/getting caught, so it ultimately scales to fewer than thousands of potentially problematic votes (which is bad, but not democracy breakingly so, like electronic/computer voting insecurity).
Eight states[0] still have electronic voting systems without paper backups. They're un-auditable. I'm not going to weigh in on the current politics of this situation, but US Election security is awful, now, and since at least 2000. I actually did my degree thesis on designing electronic voting systems (and built one), and ultimately concluded it was impossible to make them fully secure. The best you can do is paper b…
I'd rather have someone hack 1700 local elections than one 'national standard' quite frankly. The inefficiency delights me
Making a claim like this reeks of partisanship.
If you've ever worked in an environment where money was changing hands (banking, trading, etc) or where security was the real deal (three-letter agencies), or even in the insurance industry, you know that election integrity controls are a half-baked freshman project by comparison.
(For myself, I don't care who wins. I don't believe it matters. But don't piss on me and tell me it's raining.)
Eight states[0] still have electronic voting systems without paper backups. They're un-auditable. I'm not going to weigh in on the current politics of this situation, but US Election security is awful, now, and since at least 2000. I actually did my degree thesis on designing electronic voting systems (and built one), and ultimately concluded it was impossible to make them fully secure. The best you can do is paper b…
TIL, electronic voting machines are CLOSED SOURCE (hardware and software) - that should be completely unacceptable in an open democracy. It makes me wonder how a statement like this can be proved. > There is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised When it comes to something as important as elections the mantra should be: don't trust. verify.
I don’t see security flaws with closed source software that prints backup paper ballots. If anything, it’s better than an open source machine that doesn’t print a paper backup. Those paper backups can be even audited by the voter at the moment they vote. You’re not going to be dumping the source code from a voting machine that is in use.