Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most videoconferencing systems are not E2E-encrypted. They encrypt the link between each participant and the central server. This makes implementation simpler in a few ways. A good E2E-encrypted system would involve Zoom never having the keys at all, so "key storage" would be irrelevant. The issue here is merely that Zoom claimed to be E2E-encrypted when they were not. They could have simply said "encrypted" and ther…
Wouldn't E2E encryption of a call with 40 participants require each user to have 39 times the upload bandwidth, in order to send 39 video streams encrypted with different keys? And potentially several times the computational cost on the client, in order to downsample video according to the different available download bandwidth of every other participant? Is there anyone doing group videoconferencing with E2E encrypt…
I think you use public key cryptography to securely distribute an encryption key for that call. So the host sends 39 messages encrypted with different keys containing a shared key. Then everyone uses the shared key to encrypt/decrypt the call data.