> Nor are we necessarily talking about the customized encryption used by large business enterprises to protect their operations. We are talking about consumer products and services such as messaging, smart phones, email, and voice and data applications. I am very confused by this statement from Barr. Protecting consumer data is protecting a business' operations. If user data is properly encrypted, then a dataleak is…
Allow me to put some words in Barr's mouth for you: "I work in law enforcement, and I am uncomfortable with the idea that the public might have effective tools to communicate privately. But I can't say that directly because then people who aren't paying attention will be upset. So instead I'll be a bit confused about what my point is and draw some distinctions that don't make sense" There is a very compelling case th…
Or rather, it's rare that anyone (including people against this war on encryption) makes a blunt argument that criminals will escape because the police are constrained. The blunt tradeoffs argument is from a classroom or bar. It's not the kind of argument that will be made (bluntly) in a legal, policy or legislative setting.
In any case... I don't think "denied some powers" should be assessed against "risk of criminals escaping justice." One is abstract and the other concrete. The actual tradeoff is between criminals escaping and actual abuse of power by law enforcement. Some amount of both is guaranteed. This tips the scale.