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Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

paulgraham.com

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Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#31

Something I don’t understand in this article is the “People won’t understand your ideas if they’re any good.” Like, the idea behind Google is, “Let’s make another search engine, but make it really good.” That’s not a crazy idea, is it? Was the problem that VCs thought existing engines were good enough and that Google’s wouldn’t be enough better to be worthwhile?

The crazy idea was using commodity servers and set your infrastructure up so that you can just let them die and keep going.

AltaVista, for example, ran on a couple of pretty beefy Alpha servers at the time.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#32
Speculative comment: if the product is advertising, then Google and Facebook have cornered that market and it looks like search and personal social network advertising could be natural monopolies. So there won’t be more Google’s, because there are already two and that’s what the market can support.

If that’s true the only way to generate Google-like companies (in terms of innovation) is to find a different business model, which means both founders and investors have to be more open minded, more patient, and more brave. That’s your first problem.

Probably the best alternative I can see is to charge individuals very small subscriptions for valuable products, but to make it at scale. Say you have 100m users and charge < 1 dollar each per month or even per year, and then you keep building new products using the great team that built the first one. Why hasn’t this happened? See above.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#33

This article shows its age with the quote: > The median startup coming out of Y Combinator wants to raise $250-500k. I think raising comparatively small amounts stokes a kind of vigour you can't get when sitting on a few million in cash. I wonder how this dynamic has shifted the outcome of Y Combinator alumni companies. Perhaps we would have more Googles if this trend of raising less had persisted. Money breeding laz…

I think it really depends. Money in the right hands can be amazing because you can aggressively pursue an idea that takes a lot more money to get off the ground. This requires a clear idea of what matters to the business. If you don’t have that idea, money can allow you to pivot and tune your product quickly and hire the very best.

The downside is the temptation to do everything, to not make decisions. Money enables you to do that too with disastrous results.

In short, money is great. Not having a clear, disciplined strategy is the problem.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#34

I often think about how YouTube was the bargain of the century. YouTube would be one if the biggest companies ever if it had remained independent.

I don't think YouTube would have been one of the biggest companies if it remained independent.

The problem is that YouTube is still not profitable, and also without a support from a big company like Google they would be sued into oblivion by MPAA and RIAA.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#35
Yup: When I was looking for VC funding, lots of VC Web sites claimed to like innovation. Eventually I concluded much the same as in Phil's essay.

The nutshell description I formulated was the VCs want a startup with a product/service easy enough for any grandmother to understand, traction growing up and to the right, in a huge market, with five founders, with all credit cards maxed out, with at least four of the spouses pregnant, about to go under, and desperate.

For one step more, they are looking in the rear view mirror and want to bet on patterns.

For one more, they want to fund the company to go to "the next level", i.e., the big go to market effort.

The VCs in effect believe that any startup that is successful will, on the way to being a big success, say, worth 1+ billion, at some point nearly necessarily be desperate for some venture funding: Then that's where the VCs want to write a check and get on the BoD.

Even if the VCs are willing to do seed funding, they believe that for each level more VC cash will be essential. Then they hope to be the best positioned to make the series A round with the up and to the right and go to market effort.

Here is where I see the VCs failing:

First, the patterns they are looking for are too rare to be promising. Instead, for the future, the main pillar of the success will be something new, powerful, and valuable for a large market. For this, it will be necessary for VCs to work effective with things that are new, powerful, and valuable. This is not always easy. Relatively few VCs are able to do that. Even if they are able, the limited partners of the VCs won't like that.

Second, there really is a good pattern with fantastic evidence from the past. It is just that the VCs don't see this pattern.

Third, let's look at this pattern with its fantastic evidence. At first, we will just use some examples and then later will explain with much more substance and meaning.

(a) In WWII, the US had big need for some better weapons. The usual VC approach would have the US go to the designers of the 16" battleship guns and ask for 18" or 20". Well, the US was smart enough not to do that. Instead, Szilard, Teller, Wigner, Einstein, Fermi, etc. led the US to the A-bomb that ended the war in the Pacific in about a week.

(b) Teller saw that fusion had promise of much more yield and in a few years had Castle-Bravo with 15 megatons of yield.

(c) The WWII aircraft engines went from 9 cylinders in one row to four rows of 7 cylinders per row and extreme efforts with supercharging, intercooling, magnesium, huge propellers with tips moving close to the speed of sound, etc. But a few people in each of Germany, England, and the US saw the promise of gas turbines, and we got some fantastic jet engines. Four of these on an airplane quickly put the Atlantic passenger steamships out of business!

(d) A few people saw that reproducing the marks on a sheet of paper would be a big advance in office work and ... we got Xerox with nearly a license to print money.

(e) Ike wanted to see what the Soviets were doing. So, Kelly Johnson at Lockheed put some long, narrow wings on an existing jet airplane and gave Ike the U-2. When a U-2 got shot down, soon Kelly showed up with an armload of engineering drawings talking about titanium and a special engine that Pratt and Whitney had (a turbo jet up to about Mach 2.5 and then a ram jet to Mach 3.2 or so). Kelly got his check, and the US CIA got their SR-71 -- speed 3.2 Mach, altitude 80,000+ feet, range on one load of fuel ~2000 miles, and never shot down.

(f) Word whacking was a pain, really expensive. The IBM correcting Selectrics were only a little better. But an early microprocessor, a simple operating system, some simple word whacking software, a floppy disk, and some simple printers quickly eradicated the typewriters. We got Intel, Apple, Microsoft, and more.

The examples (a) -- (f) are only a few of the dozens we could list from military projects, biomedical projects, various tools, various services, etc.

So, for each of (a) -- (f), at the beginning, the project had to be evaluated. The rear view mirror as VCs apply it would not help. Instead, the need was to work effectively with ideas that were new, powerful, and valuable.

Fourth, let's look at some "substance" supporting the patterns illustrated by examples (a) -- (f). What is needed is a way to evaluate ideas that promise to be new, powerful, and valuable for a large market.

Okay, one more example: GPS. If the USAF charged a penny for each commercial use, they'd soon own the world and everything in it???? Well, they'd have a lot. Uh, at one time I was working at the JHU/APL lab in the group that did the first version of GPS, for the US Navy, especially for the missile firing submarines. I heard the stories. The project was first on the back of an envelope. With not much more in ideas, it got funded and the rest is history.

So how was the evaluation done? Sure, first some physics. Next some math. Next some engineering. Money allocated. Work done. Rockets launched. All done.

So, here it is: The foundation of the pattern for the evaluation to confirm new, correct, and significant was some science and math that could be checked. That's the pattern: The crucial core of the project is an idea based on some science, math, and engineering on paper that can be checked. That's the pattern.

In the more advanced countries, there are plenty of people who can generate such ideas, do the science, math, and engineering (e.g., the LHC) and plenty of people who can check the work with high accuracy. E.g., there are problem sponsors at the US NSF, NIH, DARPA, ONR, etc. that can do the checking or manage the checking done by others. Research university Ph.D. committees do such evaluations around the world daily.

Surprise. Please sit down for this: US technology VCs just will not, Not, NOT, no matter what, not even under promise of $trillions, not with water torture, not with anything, do or manage such evaluations. Feet locked four feet deep in reinforced concrete, they won't do it.

Results: First, from all I can see, the most promising path to the future is new ideas, presented just on paper, as science, math, and/or engineering, that are powerful and valuable for big parts of our economy and that can be evaluated accurately. Did I mention "just on paper"?

That's what the JHU/APL did for the first version of GPS -- on paper. That's what Kelly Johnson (there's a picture) brought to the CIA for the SR-71 -- an armload of engineering drawings. On and on.

The B-29 is what carried the A-bombs that ended the war in the Pacific. That plane cost ballpark as much to develop as the bombs! A joke about VCs is that they would say "You build it, drop the first bomb, and we will fund the gasoline for the flight of the second bomb."

For entrepreneurs, paper and pencils are cheap! Can buy a lot of computing for $2000. A lot of Internet bandwidth is cheap. So, do the math, etc., write the software, build a server, plug it into the Internet, go live, get users, run ads, make money. To me that's the most promising path to success. But VCs will have nothing to do with it.

For the VCs waiting to fund the big go to market effort, in the past a lot of companies that were successful grew just from retained earnings and never took equity funding. Now with cheap paper and pencils, computing, the Internet, etc., that path seems relatively promising now.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#36
post #33

This article shows its age with the quote: > The median startup coming out of Y Combinator wants to raise $250-500k. I think raising comparatively small amounts stokes a kind of vigour you can't get when sitting on a few million in cash. I wonder how this dynamic has shifted the outcome of Y Combinator alumni companies. Perhaps we would have more Googles if this trend of raising less had persisted. Money breeding laz…

I think it really depends. Money in the right hands can be amazing because you can aggressively pursue an idea that takes a lot more money to get off the ground. This requires a clear idea of what matters to the business. If you don’t have that idea, money can allow you to pivot and tune your product quickly and hire the very best. The downside is the temptation to do everything, to not make decisions. Money enables…

I'm not sure I agree with that.

Of course there are many moonshot projects where money is of vital importance. But for most things, the market is the best signalling mechanism available. Having little money forces you to be very attuned to the signals of the market, giving you an advantage over those who might insulate themselves from that feedback mechanism with a buffer of money.

It's hard to keep yourself attuned enough while also having money in reserve, though perhaps it is possible to have enough discipline to do so.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#37

> I've tried to explain this to VC firms. Instead of making one $2 million investment, make five $400k investments. Would that mean sitting on too many boards? Don't sit on their boards. Would that mean too much due diligence? Do less. If you're investing at a tenth the valuation, you only have to be a tenth as sure. This turned out to be absolutely right, and the That said with the benefit of more hindsight I think…

> That said with the benefit of more hindsight I think the reason there are no more Googles is that FAANG has a stronghold on the largest technology markets. And the FAANGs are willing to pay very large amounts of cash to acquire promising startups. EDIT: Also why is it that the majority of the large tech companies are essentially marketplaces? Is there really that much friction in traditional markets (physical goods…

>Also why is it that the majority of the large tech companies are essentially marketplaces?

They may earn money from a marketplace, but the reason is not because they have a marketplace. They earn money because one they did or do something that others can't or were too late to, such as creating hardware and software people want, creating and operating online services people want (Maps, Cloud Services), infrastructure for retail, or a network where everyone is and can provide some level of proof for identity or credibility.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#38
post #31

Something I don’t understand in this article is the “People won’t understand your ideas if they’re any good.” Like, the idea behind Google is, “Let’s make another search engine, but make it really good.” That’s not a crazy idea, is it? Was the problem that VCs thought existing engines were good enough and that Google’s wouldn’t be enough better to be worthwhile?

The crazy idea was using commodity servers and set your infrastructure up so that you can just let them die and keep going. AltaVista, for example, ran on a couple of pretty beefy Alpha servers at the time.

Could you explain more? I'd love to hear about this

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#39
No. The reason there are few FANGS is that they are platform businesses, and the value of their services is proportional (or more?) to the size of their user bases.

This means winner-takes-all. There were others, but they did not grow users as fast, so they lost.

Another thing to point out is that while search and ads is Google's revenue, with chrome, gmail, android, etc they are achieving a form of lock-in. If anyone else "owned" these surfaces, replacing their search box would be much easier.

The spread risk investment strategy is also correct, since the value of any platform market is low before the winner emerges. After the winner emerges, the value of that platform is the value of the entire market.

Re: Why There Aren't More Googles (2008)

#40
Companies fill ecological niches. When new technologies emerge there is room for a new apex species/(company), and a few smaller wannabes. There just isn't unlimited room for large companies to emerge, and that is the principal reason why there aren't more googles and facebooks around. In the end it has very little to do with VCs and entrepreneurs, except for the ones who happen to be in the right place at the right time to take an as yet non obvious idea and turn it into something huge.
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