Earlier quoted context omitted.
For HD, you'd also need a valid vendor-signed key to do the key exchange (which would get swiftly revoked once public), and/or to crack the trusted execution environment.
This isn't true. Multiple Google devices have had their Widevine keys leaked/recovered and Google has waited around before revoking them since it would break hardware playback on the device or cause other issues. The Nexus 6, for one, has been downgraded from Widevine L1 to L3 as a result.
EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
21–30 of 50 posts
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#22So, the only thing stopping a user from obtaining a clean copy of the content is the fact that the CDM is closed source? What if a CDM vendor leaked the source code? I guess the DRM server would block them after a while, but before they notice, the user would have free access to the content, right?
The primary purpose of content encryption tools is to trigger DMCA 1201 anti-circumention provisions to prohibit people from writing decryption tools. Nothing more and nothing less. All DRM schemes are a form of obfuscation; some particularly secure ones use hardware decoding enclaves not present on desktops that are harder to crack, but that's about it. The only practically useful DRM schemes are ones where any tool…
It could be argued that DRM is an inconvenience or does the manufacturer determine that?
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Exactly - which is why the CDM is a contentious topic because you have no way to see what's inside it. Also, technologies such as HDCP, Trusted Execution Environment prevent the decrypted and decoded frames from being leaked. At least, that's the intention. And the CDM vendors are Google, MSFT, and Apple. There's no way they are going to leak their code :) What's really strong is the rotation of decryption keys. Cont…
IMO it isn't that hard to crack a DRM system. My understanding is that most of the protections are legal, not technical, as in, if you do it, they'll sue the hell out of you and win.
And maybe going to platforms where the whole hardware is specialized is not what most people have in mind when they think DRM but the basic building blocks are similar. Microsoft's "Guarding Against Physical Attacks: The Xbox One Story" talk is also one of the few examples I know of where a manufacturer explains how they implemented such a system. [1]
[1] https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/chen/
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#24So, the only thing stopping a user from obtaining a clean copy of the content is the fact that the CDM is closed source? What if a CDM vendor leaked the source code? I guess the DRM server would block them after a while, but before they notice, the user would have free access to the content, right?
The primary purpose of content encryption tools is to trigger DMCA 1201 anti-circumention provisions to prohibit people from writing decryption tools. Nothing more and nothing less. All DRM schemes are a form of obfuscation; some particularly secure ones use hardware decoding enclaves not present on desktops that are harder to crack, but that's about it. The only practically useful DRM schemes are ones where any tool…
What if those tools are hosted outside of the US where the DMCA has to force?
Certainly the US is a larger centre of gravity when it comes to tech, but it's not the only place.
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#25So, the only thing stopping a user from obtaining a clean copy of the content is the fact that the CDM is closed source? What if a CDM vendor leaked the source code? I guess the DRM server would block them after a while, but before they notice, the user would have free access to the content, right?
Exactly - which is why the CDM is a contentious topic because you have no way to see what's inside it. Also, technologies such as HDCP, Trusted Execution Environment prevent the decrypted and decoded frames from being leaked. At least, that's the intention. And the CDM vendors are Google, MSFT, and Apple. There's no way they are going to leak their code :) What's really strong is the rotation of decryption keys. Cont…
Also Adobe, although I'm not sure if their CDM (Adobe Primetime) is still relevant.
> which is why the CDM is a contentious topic because you have no way to see what's inside it
Related to this: Firefox takes steps to try to contain the CDM blob within a sandbox. [0] See also this old blog post from before Firefox switched from Adobe's CDM to Google's WideVine CDM. [1]
[0] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox/Architecture#GMP_p...
[1] https://hacks.mozilla.org/2014/05/reconciling-mozillas-missi...
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
IMO it isn't that hard to crack a DRM system. My understanding is that most of the protections are legal, not technical, as in, if you do it, they'll sue the hell out of you and win.
Yeah, there are many trivial systems out there that mostly provide legal protection. But there are also some pretty sophisticated DRM systems that are technologically quite well implemented and take a large effort to break. BD+ is one of these for example. And maybe going to platforms where the whole hardware is specialized is not what most people have in mind when they think DRM but the basic building blocks are sim…
But then video game consoles are special. They were always these closed, tightly-controlled ecosystems. General-purpose devices, like phones and computers, typically lack this kind of integration between their components. Yes, there's ARM TrustZone, and that's about it. Thankfully. And I'm not aware of anything similar on x86 PCs (besides the Apple T2, which was recently compromised).
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#27Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#28So, the only thing stopping a user from obtaining a clean copy of the content is the fact that the CDM is closed source? What if a CDM vendor leaked the source code? I guess the DRM server would block them after a while, but before they notice, the user would have free access to the content, right?
It's security through obscurity. For pure software stuff, like Widevine L3, you can just patch the browser or insert a shim to spit out the decrypted video somewhere. https://github.com/artemist/widevineproxy
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
The primary purpose of content encryption tools is to trigger DMCA 1201 anti-circumention provisions to prohibit people from writing decryption tools. Nothing more and nothing less. All DRM schemes are a form of obfuscation; some particularly secure ones use hardware decoding enclaves not present on desktops that are harder to crack, but that's about it. The only practically useful DRM schemes are ones where any tool…
> The primary purpose of content encryption tools is to trigger DMCA 1201 anti-circumention provisions to prohibit people from writing decryption tools. What if those tools are hosted outside of the US where the DMCA has to force? Certainly the US is a larger centre of gravity when it comes to tech, but it's not the only place.
Re: EME, CDM, AES, CENC, and Keys – Building Blocks of DRM
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
The primary purpose of content encryption tools is to trigger DMCA 1201 anti-circumention provisions to prohibit people from writing decryption tools. Nothing more and nothing less. All DRM schemes are a form of obfuscation; some particularly secure ones use hardware decoding enclaves not present on desktops that are harder to crack, but that's about it. The only practically useful DRM schemes are ones where any tool…
Does the term marketing encompass open source software? Microsoft thinks so, but is that legally confirmed? It could be argued that DRM is an inconvenience or does the manufacturer determine that?