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AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

aws.amazon.com

21–30 of 108 posts

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#21
One of the main cause for "re-mirroring storm," is node not backing off from finding a replica.

Here's Twitter Back off decider implementation (Java)

https://github.com/twitter/commons/blob/master/src/java/com/...

When last time i looked i was little clueless on this. Now I find its usage.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#22
I find it surprising that they did not and do not plan to employ any sort of interlocks/padded walls. What I mean is, if the system is exhibiting some very abnormal state (e.g #remirror_event above a fixed threshold or more than x standard deviations above average) then automated repair actions should probably stop and the issue should be escalated to a human.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#23
post #8
post #3

An automatic 100% credit for 10 days usage, thats pretty good IMO

Well yes, except that that is usually peanuts compared to the lost income from your service being down. Really the only purpose of a SLA penalty is to incentivize the provider to keep the network reliable.

I still don't know why people keep throwing this out there. Yes, if you were effected and it caused you to lose a lot of income because your business could not operate when EC2 was on the fritz then it's your fault, not Amazons. You can't keep blaming Amazon because you didn't build a fault-tolerant application. It's like blaming your electric company because your home is lit by one super huge flood light which burnt out and as a result you couldn't see or get any work done because you kept no backup bulbs in the house.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#24
post #8
post #3

An automatic 100% credit for 10 days usage, thats pretty good IMO

Well yes, except that that is usually peanuts compared to the lost income from your service being down. Really the only purpose of a SLA penalty is to incentivize the provider to keep the network reliable.

I totally agree with your comment about the SLA penalty as an incentive to the provider to take reasonable measures to ensure service.

But that's just in general.

When negotiating bespoke SLA penalty clauses, it can be very illuminating for both sides to discuss lost profit + lost confidence + additional costs to the customer and suggest that these be factored in to the penalty clause.

My experience: both the customer and supplier tend to take a deep breath to evaluate whether this deal is a good one for either of them and begin to reassess their level of risk.

In a off-the-shelf service like Amazon, you as a customer are welcome to suggest a change of penalty to your Amazon account manager, and unless you're something like the US government, you will probably be directed to other cloud providers or your own internal IT organisation!

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#25

tldr: ""The trigger for this event was a network configuration change. We will audit our change process and increase the automation to prevent this mistake from happening in the future." AMZN has gotten a lot of flack over this outage, and rightly so. But I do want to dissuade anyone from thinking anybody else could do much better. I worked there 10 years ago, when they were closer to 200 engineers, and the caliber o…

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Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#26
Did I read this correctly in paragraph 2: " For two periods during the first day of the issue, the degraded EBS cluster affected the EBS APIs and caused high error rates and latencies for EBS calls to these APIs across the entire US East Region."

Their "control plane" network for the EBS clusters span availability zones in a region? If so, this would be the fatal flaw.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#27

I find it surprising that they did not and do not plan to employ any sort of interlocks/padded walls. What I mean is, if the system is exhibiting some very abnormal state (e.g #remirror_event above a fixed threshold or more than x standard deviations above average) then automated repair actions should probably stop and the issue should be escalated to a human.

They will probably do that now. They will probably also make sure they have a powerful SOP for network upgrades as well.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#30
post #20

tldr: ""The trigger for this event was a network configuration change. We will audit our change process and increase the automation to prevent this mistake from happening in the future." AMZN has gotten a lot of flack over this outage, and rightly so. But I do want to dissuade anyone from thinking anybody else could do much better. I worked there 10 years ago, when they were closer to 200 engineers, and the caliber o…

Agreed. It has actually given a very nice excuse to developers like me. Whenever your manager comes up to find why something that you are working on is not up, you can simply reply with something like this - If AWS with some of the smartest engineers can be down for that long do you think that our crappy service will be up 100% of time?

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