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AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

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11–20 of 108 posts

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#11
post #9
post #6

>...one of the standard steps is to shift traffic off of one of the redundant routers in the primary EBS network to allow the upgrade to happen. The traffic shift was executed incorrectly... This supports the theory that between 50%-80% of outages are caused by human error, regardless of the resilience of the underlying infrastructure.

Which leaves a question: why not engineer around humans, such that they are never needed in the day-to-day running of the systems?

Any high availability system inherently aims for that, but "never" is a strong word. Sooner or later, you need to upgrade or replace physical hardware.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#12
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which leaves a question: why not engineer around humans, such that they are never needed in the day-to-day running of the systems?

"The trigger for this event was a network configuration change. We will audit our change process and increase the automation to prevent this mistake from happening in the future."

Sure now, but I wanted to know why they didn't do that from the beginning.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#13
post #9
post #6

>...one of the standard steps is to shift traffic off of one of the redundant routers in the primary EBS network to allow the upgrade to happen. The traffic shift was executed incorrectly... This supports the theory that between 50%-80% of outages are caused by human error, regardless of the resilience of the underlying infrastructure.

Which leaves a question: why not engineer around humans, such that they are never needed in the day-to-day running of the systems?

That "engineering" you speak of? That's the source of the human error.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#15
AWS was numero uno in terms of customer visibility and the image of a pathbreaking cloud service, before the incident.

Lack in transparency in reaching out to customers is the biggest mistake what AWS did. They would learn from their mistakes, their servers and networks would be more reliable than ever.

This incident has given a reason for people to look at multi-cloud operation capability, for disaster recovery and backup reasons. AWS monopoly would be gone, there would be many new standards which would be proposed to bring in interoperability and for migrations between clouds.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#17
tldr: ""The trigger for this event was a network configuration change. We will audit our change process and increase the automation to prevent this mistake from happening in the future."

AMZN has gotten a lot of flack over this outage, and rightly so. But I do want to dissuade anyone from thinking anybody else could do much better. I worked there 10 years ago, when they were closer to 200 engineers, and the caliber of people there at that point was insane. By far the smartest bunch I've ever worked with, and a place where I learned habits that serve me well to this day.

I know the guys that started the AWS group and they were the best of that already insanely selective group. It is easy to be an arm chair coach and scream that the network changes should have been automated in the first place, or that they should have predicted this storm, but that ignores just how fantastically hard what they are doing is and how fantastically well it works 99(how many 9's now?)% of the time.

In short, take my word for it, the people working on this are smarter than you and me, by an order of magnitude. There is no way you could do better, and it is unlikely that if you are building anything that needs more than a handful of servers you could build anything more reliable.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#18
> The nodes in an EBS cluster are connected to each other via two networks. The primary network is a high bandwidth network... The secondary network, the replication network, is a lower capacity network used as a back-up network... This network is not designed to handle all traffic from the primary network but rather provide highly-reliable connectivity between EBS nodes inside of an EBS cluster.

During maintenance instead of shifting traffic off of one of the redundant routers the traffic was routed onto the lower capacity network. There was human error involved but the network issue only provoked latent bugs in the system that should have been picked out during disaster recovery testing.

Automatic recovery that isn't properly tested is a dangerous beast; it can cause problems faster and broader than any team of humans are capable of handling.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#19
post #14

tl;dr version?

An EBS node in a EBS cluster is connected to two networks. One is used for the traffic to and from the EBS volumes(Primary network), the other is used to replicate the EBS volume on a EBS node to a different EBS node(Secondary network). Amazon wanted to upgrade the capacity of the primary network. Their standard step doing this is to shift the traffic to a redundant router. This step was executed incorrectly. This resulted in the traffic not being routed to the primary network but instead to the secondary network which has less capacity. All this traffic satured the secondary network and resulted in the EBS volumes becoming "stuck". When the traffic got routed the right way all the EBS volumes were trying to remirror. Part of the remirroring process is that the EBS volumes search the cluster for free space to remirror to. The EBS cluster couldn't handle this load and new capacity was needed for the EBS cluster.

Amazon offers a 10 day credit equal to 100% of their usage of EBS Volumes, EC2 Instances and RDS database instances. This credit will be automatically applied to the next bill.

Re: AWS Service Disruption Post Mortem

#20

tldr: ""The trigger for this event was a network configuration change. We will audit our change process and increase the automation to prevent this mistake from happening in the future." AMZN has gotten a lot of flack over this outage, and rightly so. But I do want to dissuade anyone from thinking anybody else could do much better. I worked there 10 years ago, when they were closer to 200 engineers, and the caliber o…

Agreed. It has actually given a very nice excuse to developers like me. Whenever your manager comes up to find why something that you are working on is not up, you can simply reply with something like this -

If AWS with some of the smartest engineers can be down for that long do you think that our crappy service will be up 100% of time?

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