Tangent by PhD student in Cognitive Science here - My current belief is that consciousness arises at the cross section of 3 core skills: Theory of Mind [0], Autobiographic Episodic Memory [1], and Embodied Cognition [2]. Principally, recognizing that other people have intentions and beliefs different from your own, being able to understand that you have experienced a timeline of personal experiences and these contrib…
To your first point: consider a hypothetical person who is unable to recognise other people as being similar to themselves, i.e. as having minds of their own. We would treat this person as having a serious social disability. We certainly wouldn't conclude that the person lacks consciousness entirely. They could still be capable of experiencing pain and pleasure, and could still be capable of seeking goals, and of abstract thought. They would still have moral standing and personal dignity - it would be immoral to mistreat them, and we would consider that human rights still apply to them.
We are deeply social animals, and this is integral to our sense of self as we usually see it, but I'm not convinced it's integral to consciousness.
I have a similar objection to your second point. Lacking a sense of personal narrative and timeline would constitute a serious disability, but would not render a person unconscious. If you had total retrograde amnesia, you would still be conscious.
I see the same problem with your third point. I'm confident that, under the right concoction of psychotropics, my mental function could be degraded to the point that I would be unable to reason effectively about my future, or to make decisions, while still keeping me conscious. Someone suffering something akin to shell-shock might be unresponsive, but still conscious.