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Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

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41–50 of 237 posts

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#41

It's frustrating to see Signal's reputation undermined in technical circles by the shortsighted zeitgeist. Signal's constitutional emphasis on usability supports user demographics that no other security product can attract. My elderly relatives use Signal now instead of Skype. This drew in other family members who just wanted to video chat with grandma and grandpa. Matrix will never win markets like this. When tech n…

> When tech nerds nit pick Signal's implementation, they ignore that the unfederated nature of Signal limits the damage these decisions can cause. It limits the damage that some decisions can cause, but exacerbates others. Signal only allows the first-party client to connect to its network; if the developers were legally compelled to add a backdoor into that client, users would have few options. Its security depends…

Compile your own client binary and use that?

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#42
post #10

Signal’s recent (not even yet out for many) implementation of mention-only notifications has reinvigorated my investment in them. I am a bit more confident now that usernames will eventually come. But the fact that it’s so slow to change is quite ironic, considering that the whole point is “the ecosystem is moving”. Well apparently it moves like molasses.

What are mention-only notifications?

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#43

It's frustrating to see Signal's reputation undermined in technical circles by the shortsighted zeitgeist. Signal's constitutional emphasis on usability supports user demographics that no other security product can attract. My elderly relatives use Signal now instead of Skype. This drew in other family members who just wanted to video chat with grandma and grandpa. Matrix will never win markets like this. When tech n…

My primary concern about Signal and usability is the insistence on using phone numbers to identify a person as a user ID.

Anything that relies on SS7/PSTN working correctly is a very bad design choice in my opinion.

Giving out your phone number to possibly untrusted contacts is also a bad decision because it opens up opportunities for scams, spam and social-engineering attempted hijacks of accounts (SIM swap attacks etc).

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#44
Could Signal use phone number pairs to robustly implement a "make me visible to" discovery method?

It could certainly implement contact matching based on number pairs instead of just numbers, but I haven't reasoned through whether it could robustly (and efficiently I suppose) keep other parties from enumerating the number pairs.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#45

It's frustrating to see Signal's reputation undermined in technical circles by the shortsighted zeitgeist. Signal's constitutional emphasis on usability supports user demographics that no other security product can attract. My elderly relatives use Signal now instead of Skype. This drew in other family members who just wanted to video chat with grandma and grandpa. Matrix will never win markets like this. When tech n…

My primary concern about Signal and usability is the insistence on using phone numbers to identify a person as a user ID. Anything that relies on SS7/PSTN working correctly is a very bad design choice in my opinion. Giving out your phone number to possibly untrusted contacts is also a bad decision because it opens up opportunities for scams, spam and social-engineering attempted hijacks of accounts (SIM swap attacks…

Signal is moving to allow users registering without a phone number. The infamous PIN was a necessary step to achieve that and other features, such as proper group management, which has just been released.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#46
post #13
post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are all exact reasons I have never used Signal. Additionally I find concerning the choice to bet the farm on SGX which has been repeatedly broken with repeated opportunities to extract the keys, at which point cracking small numeric pins is trivial. Moxie simply promised they always patch right away and never take the keys when they have such opportunities to do so. I do believe him, today, but I don't believe…

You can't coherently be alarmed by Signal's use of SGX while at the same time endorsing systems that use no cryptography whatsoever to protect the metadata Signal uses SGX for.

Matrix lets people host their own servers and in doing so put the metadata anywhere they are comfortable.

One can have metadata for sensitive internal corporate channels stay on a network they own in whatever country they want while still being able to chat with outside parties on matrix.org or other servers. Several friends host their own servers and more recently matrix p2p is rapidly maturing to dump the need for servers at all for many use cases.

Federated systems allow people like me to choose to host a server for my own family in my own home closet rack so data shared between my family and I never leave our network.

Still others can host matrix as a Tor hidden service where it will be very expensive to even learn who to target.

If all participants are using Tor and not using identifying information like a phone number, then bulk deanonymization becomes very expensive, particularly if many small highly targeted social circles roll their own.

Signal does not give users a choice but to trust one SPOF setup built under a one size fits all threat model that flows all IP metadata to one place which can leak information regardless of any encryption.

I don't want a world where one central party holds all communications metadata in one place under one legal jurisdiction with one proprietary memory isolation technology under one threat model.

Moxie here likes to point out that email demonstrates all the things that can go wrong with federated systems, but if had chosen the popular alternative of letting a single party take over this whole class of communication, we could all still be using AOL.

Internet messaging will outlive us all, and if we advocate everyone lock up their communications with one (even benevolent) dictator, it won't end well when the next dictator is not so benevolent.

See: pretty much every social network in China and Russia that is now under state control in spite of early promises of privacy by founders.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#47
post #40
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What’s an example of a system in this space which chooses not to handle that metadata?

I don't need a phone number, nor do I need to upload my contacts' phone numbers[1], in order to use Matrix. [1]: I work around this by running Signal in a work profile with no contacts. So it's... kinda sorta optional, but in practice there are many caveats and complications that make it effectively not. Certainly not when we're claiming it for average users, which is Signal's argument for using it.

I’m not a Matrix user, but it seems like Matrix does in fact handle contact metadata: https://matrix.org/faq/#what-is-an-identity-server%3F

I think there’s a difference between what you’re saying, which seems to be that you personally don’t upload your contact metadata to Matrix, and what I asked / the previous commenter was describing, which is the idea that there are messaging platforms which have decided to not support storing this kind of metadata.

Notably, last I looked, Signal does allow users to opt out of SGX metadata storage, though the initial implementation didn’t cleanly allow for that.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#48
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal is OSS and you can start your own fork & network if you want to. App publishing platforms not having a good binary signature verification system is the orthogonal issue that you're bringing up, that would in many ways apply to matrix for most users too. Most will never bother to sideload it.

> Signal is OSS and you can start your own fork & network if you want to. You can't though, what use is your own fork when nobody uses it?

If you're really paranoid, you'd convince your contacts to use your fork.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#49

It's frustrating to see Signal's reputation undermined in technical circles by the shortsighted zeitgeist. Signal's constitutional emphasis on usability supports user demographics that no other security product can attract. My elderly relatives use Signal now instead of Skype. This drew in other family members who just wanted to video chat with grandma and grandpa. Matrix will never win markets like this. When tech n…

> Thanks to Signal's security posture, global protection from weak ciphers, buffer overflows, and even SGX, is just one software update away.

Conversely, thanks to Signal's centralized model, implementations of backdoors are also one software update away. By the time the "nerds" find out, it'd probably be far too late and lives could be at stake.

It's unfortunately such the nature of the beast that being half-hearted about security does not yield a half-secure product, or a product that's fully secure against half the hostile actors, it yields a product that only gives the presumption of safety, which is far more dangerous.

I use many messaging services in my life as security absolutism leads to a very miserable, very paranoid life, but my expectations are accordingly tempered when I use them, and I let my contacts know my expectations too. Everyday chat? Sure. Sensitive, personal info? Maybe, depends on the exact topic. Trade/state secrets (if I were to handle them)? Hell no.

Re: Moxie Marlinspike has a plan to reclaim our privacy

#50
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> When tech nerds nit pick Signal's implementation, they ignore that the unfederated nature of Signal limits the damage these decisions can cause. It limits the damage that some decisions can cause, but exacerbates others. Signal only allows the first-party client to connect to its network; if the developers were legally compelled to add a backdoor into that client, users would have few options. Its security depends…

Signal is OSS and you can start your own fork & network if you want to. App publishing platforms not having a good binary signature verification system is the orthogonal issue that you're bringing up, that would in many ways apply to matrix for most users too. Most will never bother to sideload it.

>Signal is OSS and you can start your own fork & network if you want to.

Resources and network effects make this a much much less likely endeavor than in federated systems. I can reasonably (and do!) self-host Matrix and XMPP servers for myself and a few friends; I cannot reasonably host a Signal server for everyone I might want to possibly contact via Signal. (And that's setting aside the effort involved in convincing everyone I might possibly want to contact to use my Signal server. It's just not going to happen.)

EDIT: Oh, and I don't think the VoIP side of the Signal server is FOSS? At least I believe that used to be the case.

>App publishing platforms not having a good binary signature verification system is the orthogonal issue that you're bringing up, that would in many ways apply to matrix for most users too. Most will never bother to sideload it.

If the main client developers are pressured to put a backdoor into their client, I would expect non-backdoored forks to rapidly pop up in the stores.

If the platform provider is also legally pressured to not allow any non-backdoored clients into the store... well, I hope that never happens, but if we get to that point I hope more people would bother to learn more and start sideloading things. Maybe wishful thinking on my part.

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