The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
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The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
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Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#2Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#3Oh noes!
I just found the following security vulnerability: someone could smash their way into my house, and then threaten to hit me with a large pipe unless I gave them my bank information. Damn those hippie system designers that didn't include an armored work area!!!
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#4This is not the problem it's made out to be:
1. An application running as a different user can only connect to the X server if it has access to the .Xauthority file. This means there's no risk of having another user connect to your X session and sniff keystrokes, unless you explicitly chmod o+r ~/.Xauthority.
2. One should never run untrusted applications.
Now, I will grant that better GUI process isolation and/or granular X permissions would be useful, in that it would lay the groundwork for a safe way of allowing an untrusted remote (or local) process to display a GUI on the local X screen. I've also always wished window managers would highlight windows from a different user with a red border, mostly so I could tell which file browser window I'd started with sudo.
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#5The X server architecture, designed long time ago by some happy hippies who just thought all the people are good and non-malicious Oh noes! I just found the following security vulnerability: someone could smash their way into my house, and then threaten to hit me with a large pipe unless I gave them my bank information. Damn those hippie system designers that didn't include an armored work area!!!
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#6I seem to recall the "Secure Keyboard Entry" option (in the application menu) in Terminal on OS X is supposed to stop the su/sudo problem on OS X at least for terminals.
the thing you are referring to on os x is similar, with a system-wide capability. when you enter passwords for keychain and similar things, these have secure input enabled by default. i think it's up to the application to enable it, but when it's enabled for a field, no other application can intercept those events.
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#7I seem to recall the "Secure Keyboard Entry" option (in the application menu) in Terminal on OS X is supposed to stop the su/sudo problem on OS X at least for terminals.
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#8Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#9I seem to recall the "Secure Keyboard Entry" option (in the application menu) in Terminal on OS X is supposed to stop the su/sudo problem on OS X at least for terminals.
xterm has a secure keyboard option from its menu (control+click) that is supposed to prevent other applications from being able to receive X11 events related to input. the thing you are referring to on os x is similar, with a system-wide capability. when you enter passwords for keychain and similar things, these have secure input enabled by default. i think it's up to the application to enable it, but when it's enabl…
Re: The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
xterm has a secure keyboard option from its menu (control+click) that is supposed to prevent other applications from being able to receive X11 events related to input. the thing you are referring to on os x is similar, with a system-wide capability. when you enter passwords for keychain and similar things, these have secure input enabled by default. i think it's up to the application to enable it, but when it's enabl…
xinput is still able to read all keys when xterm's secure keyboard is enabled.