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Pressing YubiKeys

bert.org

121–130 of 241 posts

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#121

"If you work in tech, you probably have a YubiKey" The author must live in some kind of bubble. This may only be true at Big Tech companies or other companies with a atypically strong security focus.

Physical security tokens are both as old as dirt and the hot new replacement for passwords.

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I remember a story about how our (third party) security operations center doesn’t allow phones on the floor, but most of its customers use Duo Push. So there is a table in the middle of the floor with all the 2FA phones bolted to it.

I don't understand the threats, risk, or solution here.

Threat is that the mobile devices could be used to 1) photograph proprietary systems, 2) exfil data over mobile networks or potentially introduce 3) malware via usb ports.

I don't really get how bolting the devices is a solution for enabling 2FA, unless the access console is also at the same location. But it would prevent 1) and 3).

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#123

The obvious next step is to plug this into a server and control it through USB over IP. Call it "remote, centrally controlled 2FA" and your manager will love it!

have been "The Finger" creator's manager. can confirm that i love this.

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#124
post #45

The obvious next step is to plug this into a server and control it through USB over IP. Call it "remote, centrally controlled 2FA" and your manager will love it!

Considering many services only allow one YubiKey or only one TOTP authenticator ... I might actually need a short term solution like this to beat the 2FA on those services. Otherwise what happens if I lose my key on the road? The 2FA services that allow >1 YubiKey are good, I can have a backup key locked up some place and use them as intended.

Some policies will disable your Yubikey/U2F key if it goes unused for N days. Usually low enough that it's annoying to keep a backup key.

We've used https://rsc.io/2fa to share TOTP keys between multiple individuals. We store the secret key in a shared password store that's also behind a separate 2FA login.

For U2F, check out https://github.com/github/SoftU2F

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#125
post #107

Ways they could solve their problem without significantly compromising security: 1. Plug the yubikey into the monitor 2. Use an extension cord (as they did) 3. Switch back to an otp app (eg Google authenticator or Duo) 4. Credit to conk [1] or agl [2]: extend the conductivity via conductive foil or other material, connect to ground to simulate touch Ways you can improve convenience while reducing security: 1. This! 2…

Yep, don't most of these work with conductivity? I just hacked something together using a paperclip and it works great.

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#126
post #25

A little off topic: Does anyone know of a way to get the results of a yubikey press into a remote desktop session? I frequently remote desktop into laptops that are in arms reach. If I need to use the yubikey, I have to remove it and plug it into my desktop and press it, since it acts as a local keyboard.

USB Redirector or USB Redirector RDP incentivespro.com

Thanks!

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#127
post #39
post #8

Adaprox has various "finger bots" for those who don't want to build their own: https://www.adaprox.io/

This is all great, but not steampunk enough ;) Check this out: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-fcfGwepog Now, electrifying that would be neat!

Uri is one of my favorite creators! Such an awesome mixture of skill and off-the-wall creativity

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I remember a story about how our (third party) security operations center doesn’t allow phones on the floor, but most of its customers use Duo Push. So there is a table in the middle of the floor with all the 2FA phones bolted to it.

I don't understand the threats, risk, or solution here.

The threat actors are SOC employees or visitors who might (maliciously or unwittingly) use their smartphones to record sensitive data.

The risk is data exfiltration. A selfie in front of the SOCs giant screen wall; a compromised phone that keeps recording audio.

The problem is that a third-party SOC will generally need a way to connect to their customers' systems. Sometimes that gets properly implemented as a site-to-site VPN with isolated jump hosts and session recording. In other instances, the SOC gets to use normal employee VPN access, and usually a handful of VPN tokens.

And now you have a fun conflict: One customer insists that no mobile phones are carried inside the secure SOC area. Another uses a VPN solution that requires a smartphone (and, e.g. Duo Push) as the second factor. How do you satisfy both? You take a set of mobile phones, possibly add some measures to stop them from being used as recording devices, and bolt them to a table so they can't leave the secure area.

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#129
post #41
post #10

This could be handy for automating a real world end-to-end test of a yubikey auth flow.

I got into robotics and have been able to do it professionally for several years precisely because it's a useful way to automate real world end-to-end testing.

Your robots are exactly what I thought of when I saw this post. What kinds of common and uncommon use cases are you seeing at Tapster?

Good meeting you at the FLL competition last year! -Cody

Re: Pressing YubiKeys

#130
post #64
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Looking at you, AWS.

AWS, Twilio, PayPal, Coinbase, Gusto, ...

I've got 3 Yubikeys registered on Coinbase, so don't think that's a limitation anymore?

Twitter and AWs only allowing one is just awful though.

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