Earlier quoted context omitted.
we take as firm as stance as possible on user privacy (google faces and fights these very issues) the government needs to comply with the provisions of the electronic communications privacy act by obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause (or in some cases a court order from a judge). these safeguards protect user privacy, even when the government is involved.
Assuming you store files as a combination of a hash digest function as a key and file data as a value; what controls do you have in place to handle situations where law enforcement discovers some sort of 'illegal' file data on one users account subsequently requests details on users with hash digests that match the data in that file?
Dropbox Lack of Security
41–50 of 193 posts
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#42hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage serve…
In Dropbox's case, users can expect the following:
- Data is probably secure from sniffers
That's it.It matters little whether "Drew has physical access to our storage servers anymore". Your code obviously has easy access to the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the data. This means all of the following scenarios are possible:
- User's data is obtained via the government (users
aren't necessarily even informed about this)
- User's data is obtained by rouge employee (potentially
leaking to _anyone_ or _anything_)
- User's data is obtained by hacker (again, implies ZERO
assurance of data security).
So don't flash around "AES this or that" without making it absolutely clear to the average user that what you are doing is the equivalent of storing their data in a shed guarded by a lock that can be accessed by anyone who can find (or demand) the key that you've hidden under a rock somewhere.Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#43It always seemed obvious to me that Dropbox has access to your unencrypted files because they make them available to you through the web interface .
You could have client side javascript that decrypts the files. http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#44It always seemed obvious to me that Dropbox has access to your unencrypted files because they make them available to you through the web interface .
> because they make them available to you through the web interface. You could have client side javascript that decrypts the files. http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
Someone in an Amazon datacenter that gets ahold of a random backup tape/hard drive can't read it. I'm not sure if Dropbox is hosted on EC2, but if not, it means that Amazon couldn't read the data at all. (If it's hosted on EC2, Amazon could probably get ahold of the key if they really wanted to)
Going off of that assumption, what if the decryption keys were also stored in an Amazon data center? It is then possible for Amazon read the contents of these files. I'd like to hear from Dropbox how this works instead of speculation.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#46This is the first time I've heard someone on HN actually ask for more security theatre. Sure, Dropbox could spend seven figures to get a ISOxxxx whatever consultancy to draw up a 125 page document describing their internal checks, do the obligatory all-hands yearly mandatory training where you have to get 10/10 questions right and question 1 is "A user has uploaded naked pictures of themselves to their account. True…
I might have misunderstood what you meant, but #1 is invalid. If I can look at my data any time I want, I just need the key to it. Dropbox just gives me access to the encrypted stream. Giving access to my data to someone else would therefore just be a question of sharing the key with that person, again, without Dropbox ever having access to this key. Your killer argument is to me #3. If you don't trust a company, don…
I'm a big fan of that architecture, if only because it greatly reduces the payoff of a successful attack. When everything is stored unencrypted (or with a common master key), there's an absolutely massive payoff for the hacker who breaches the security.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#47hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage serve…
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
Assuming you store files as a combination of a hash digest function as a key and file data as a value; what controls do you have in place to handle situations where law enforcement discovers some sort of 'illegal' file data on one users account subsequently requests details on users with hash digests that match the data in that file?
de-duplication doesn't make users any more vulnerable to intrusive government actions. today, a government agency could ask any online service to provide the names of all users who have a particular file, whether or not the service employs de-duplication. and in that case, the government would also need to support its request with a warrant or court order. the rules that provide a check against unwarranted government…
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#49This is the first time I've heard someone on HN actually ask for more security theatre. Sure, Dropbox could spend seven figures to get a ISOxxxx whatever consultancy to draw up a 125 page document describing their internal checks, do the obligatory all-hands yearly mandatory training where you have to get 10/10 questions right and question 1 is "A user has uploaded naked pictures of themselves to their account. True…
It's not security theatre to acknowledge that the security in such a system could be improved, especially as an option for those that require it.
#3 could easily be paralyzing for many businesses. There are already services (like Tarsnap) which are engineered to not require you to trust them; why should we ignore such services and limit ourselves to doing business only with those companies that we can trust implicitly?
As a specific example, I've had a client for a few years which is government funded and quite paranoid about security. However, they also need to communicate with outside contractors. I don't advise them to "trust" their ISP, the outside contractors' network, and all the other businesses in-between. I tell them that nothing sensitive leaves the building unless it's been encrypted, and that once someone else opens that file, it can no longer be considered secure in any sense.
"Trust us" is not a compelling requirement for doing business, nor can businesses limit themselves only to relying on service providers that they trust. Fortunately, the technology exists now to eliminate that requirement.
Dropbox is currently off-limits to all employees at my client.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#50could someone more knowledgable in this area tell me if this is a credible threat?