Earlier quoted context omitted.
hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. I'm not sure why you're concluding that de-duplication implies lack of encryption. the de-duplication occurs prior to encryption. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to f…
Dedupe and cleartext metadata as stated in the article I referenced, would allow for the following possibilities: If an attacker could figure out the hash method used by dropbox on the files and intercept a few hashes from a victim, it's plausible that an attacker could trick the service into thinking that he had uploaded the files on his own account, allowing access to the victim's files. Could you explain what woul…
Dropbox Lack of Security
21–30 of 193 posts
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#22http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/gowvu/doityourself_e...
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#23If you have sensitive data, encrypt it yourself. Encrypt it on your local drive, back up encrypted data, encrypt it before uploading it to Dropbox. Doing otherwise is akin to not having a proper backup process: it's either because of laziness or ignorance.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#24hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage serve…
"(A)ll data is encrypted before it's stored on the backend" statement is completely worthless unless (at the very least) you also describe how the keys are generated and managed.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#25It is possible to design a Dropbox-like system with the following properties: 1. Files are stored encrypted. 2. The service provider does not have the ability to arbitrarily decrypt the files. By "arbitrarily decrypt" I mean decrypt at any time they wish. They will be able to decrypt if the owner's client is actively connected. 3. When someone uploads a file that is identical to an existing file, it initially is stor…
Let F be an arbitrary file.
Let N(F) be the name your client knows the file by.
Let H(F) be a hash of the file that produces a 256 bit hash.
Let AES(X,K) be X encrypted using AES with key K.
When you upload to the cloud, you upload AES(F,H(F)). In a local database, you store (N(F), H(F)). When you later retrieve the file from the cloud, you receive the encrypted data, and you can lookup the key, H(F), in your local database.Note that if two different upload files with the same content, they pick the same encryption key (since the key comes from a hash of the content), and so the same data gets uploaded. The service can thus do de-duplication, even though it has no access to unencrypted data.
So far, all this provides is secure storage. What makes Dropbox useful is that a file uploaded on one computer can be downloaded on another, and that only works if the downloader knows H(F).
This is solved by also uploading a copy of that local database I mentioned, the one that stores the (N(F), H(F)) pairs. This can be encrypted with the account password.
Syncing between different devices on the same account is then a two step process. First, the name/key database is synced, and then both devices have access to the keys and then the files can be synced.
I believe web access can be handled via this system. Dropbox's web interface requires Javascript, so it could have the browser retrieve the name/key database and decrypt it using the account password, which gives it the access to the key to decrypt a given file.
For shared folders, you can use a public key system, where the keys for the shared files are encrypted with the public keys of each person you are sharing the folder with, and the encrypted key files are stored in the cloud. Anyone accessing the shared folder grabs the key file for the folder and uses their private key (which is protected by the account password) to get K(F) for the file.
I believe this covers everything Dropbox does, with the properties that:
1. They can't decrypt your files.
2. They can de-duplicate completely.
3. Your account password is the key for everything for you.
4. It satisfies all of their advertising claims for security.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#26It is possible to design a Dropbox-like system with the following properties: 1. Files are stored encrypted. 2. The service provider does not have the ability to arbitrarily decrypt the files. By "arbitrarily decrypt" I mean decrypt at any time they wish. They will be able to decrypt if the owner's client is actively connected. 3. When someone uploads a file that is identical to an existing file, it initially is stor…
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#27truecrypt ftw If you're uncomfortable with dropbox, put a truecrypt partition right inside your dropbox folder.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
tarsnap
I'm guessing tarsnap doesn't satisfy the 3rd criteria, nor is tarsnap able to decrypt the user's files, even when the client is connected. Perhaps cperciva can comment.
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#29hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage serve…
Re: Dropbox Lack of Security
#30hi there, arash from dropbox here. all data is (as we state in the referenced help article) encrypted before it's stored on the backend. all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud. re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage serve…