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Users click "accept" to make things work. Filesystem access is going to have nefarious consequences.
That's not how policies work. Schools, organizations and even home users can enable policies to block this feature altogether as well as many others: https://cloud.google.com/docs/chrome-enterprise/policies/
Finally, we can have a local markdown editor with live preview. I just hope it can read files and folders in a particular directory as well, with permission of course.
Not sure why you would say that. Maybe try some vscode extensions such as "Markdown Preview Enhanced" or "Markdown All In One"? Those works both offline and local.
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VS Code sucks and if I were to go the route of a different app there are lot better options out there for markdown editing. This feature has a lot of amazing potential, but some people like the Apple-model so much that they'd prefer only being told what they are allowed to do.
This feature has a lot of amazing potential Lots of potential for abuse, especially. Any API introduced into an industry-controlling browser granting too many local privileges seems absolutely wild given that the Internet's full of people trying new and creative ways to scam, hack, or otherwise inconvenience end users. As someone with professional experience in web security, this API is like a nightmare come true.
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You have to do more than just hit 'Y', you have to navigate in a file chooser and pick the file to save, or write.
Sure why not, let me just create a blog post, with exact steps on how to make your windows more colorfull, and make users inject my DLLs into filesystem. The user will do exactly if i give him exact copy paste paths and commands. And voila.
There is no way this isn't going to open up massive security holes. Even if the browser puts up alert after alert, people are just going to randomly click buttons and then all of a sudden wonder why some random web app is deleting all their files and adding malware. And the spec docs aren't exactly reassuring. This is an exact quote! "This API could be used by websites to try to store and/or execute malware on the us…
I worked on this. The quote is true, in all honesty. Same as downloading and running applications from the web. We do our best to make sure the scenario listed doesn't happen. For instance, on Windows, after a writer is closed, we apply the Mark-of-the-Web, apply SafeBrowsing checks and finally call a system API which may trigger an anti-virus check. On the Mac, we apply the equivalent of Mark-of-the-Web. You may hav…
https://glyph.twistedmatrix.com/2020/08/never-run-python-in-...
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> nothing marked 'from web' and non-executable should be loadable into a memory segment How would you "mark something 'from web'"? This is a file after all. There are ways to sign files (executable or not) but there is no 'from web' flag as far as I know.
You would be incorrect. File Quarantine on OSX: > https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201940 Alternate data stream on Windows: > https://www.howtogeek.com/70012/what-causes-the-file-downloa... I wouldn't be surprised if Linux had it but I haven't used desktop Linux in a long time so I don't know what to search for, but generally having browsers annotate their file streams isn't an uncommon thing to support for filesyst…
Serious question. Since this is going to be enabled by default by Chrome 86, is there any way to block Javascript from using the API? Or force it to ask for permissions? Because it seems like anything that uses the API by default has full access to my filesystem (at least based on the demo on that page). That seems insane. I don't even want anything JS-based to see my filesystem. That's a huge breach of privacy.
There is no way this isn't going to open up massive security holes. Even if the browser puts up alert after alert, people are just going to randomly click buttons and then all of a sudden wonder why some random web app is deleting all their files and adding malware. And the spec docs aren't exactly reassuring. This is an exact quote! "This API could be used by websites to try to store and/or execute malware on the us…
Seems like it can be disabled in flags for now, which I just went in and did. That flag is bound to disappear at some point though… might become necessary to wrap browsers in an isolating sandbox or VM just to be sure they can't touch things they're not supposed to.
Honestly I view this as a good idea regardless (it also helps contain exploits, in addition to official APIs). On Linux firejail is amazing for this (but also consider bubblewrap and others), and AFAIK sandboxie is a good choice on NT. No idea what sandboxing options are on Darwin - looks like it has something built in?
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It appears I could use this to ask a victim to "select your downloads folder" to save files to and then steal or overwrite any file in it.
If the permissions system in place is clear and potent enough, I don't see the problem. You can also ask people to simply download and install an app that can do whatever it wants. It's 2020 and we still can't build web apps that can read and write to local files. Browsers are no longer useful just for reading text.
Maybe, but the odds of the permission system being clear and potent enough that non-technical users understand what's happening is basically zero.
> You can also ask people to simply download and install an app that can do whatever it wants.
And after 20 years we've managed to train many people that that's a red flag that crosses a security boundry, unlike this shiny new way to invite malware into your machine by accident.
> It's 2020 and we still can't build web apps that can read and write to local files. Browsers are no longer useful just for reading text.
That is... not a bug. Web apps are safer precisely because it's so hard for them to touch your "real" local system. Take that away and you erode the security model that made web apps so great in the first place.