Earlier quoted context omitted.
On Firefox you can disable this via an about:config setting (set keyword.enabled to false).
ahh cool.. but a binary toggle is a bit to coarse. it would be nice if the input string contains a whitespace, it will perform the search engine query for you automatically, or allow some custom regex expression to determine whether to query search engine.
Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
121–130 of 170 posts
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#122But using google, slack, skype, gitlab, bitbucket... is fine to send sensitive data?
No, it definitely isn't. Github (and probably others) will show you big scary warning messages if you commit things like AWS keys.
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#123Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#124http://jsonprettyprint.net/ ranks high for "json pretty print" in Google and is an example where data hits their server.
More on http://jsonprettyprint.net/privacy - well formated.
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#125If you could sandbox part of the screen to say this thing is standalone and cannot perform any networking abilities and is cut off from everything else on the page that would be great. The browser could recognise that tag and you get a safe space for people to copy/paste/interact with online web tools. I'm pretty sure you can do this with WASM right now, but the browser doesn't inform the user that this is a safe spa…
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#126Earlier quoted context omitted.
I work at a place that takes this all very seriously. No. Google search is available but monitored, skype/gitlab/bitbucket/etc are all blocked. Code formatting tools are blocked to the extent possible and people are instructed not to use them. Folks that slip up and get caught are usually written up the first time, after that they are terminated. The only way to legitimately use tools like these from work are if they…
Do you work in a field that warrants this kind of stringent requirements or is the security team overzealous? Do these kind of rules extend to using third party libraries etc?
Re: third party libraries, yes absolutely.
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
And a good one too. I'm currently maintaining https://0bin.net , and because we encrypt everything client side, people feel like they can post anything they want. We get some pretty personnal stuff. They really should not. It's a can of worms. We can get compromised. Bought. Receive a court order (we comply with dmca). Or they could be on the wrong URL (typo squatting, phishing...). Don't trust random online services…
> [...] because we encrypt everything client side, [...]. We get some pretty personnal stuff. How do you see what people post? Do you see people talking about it, or do you have other means of determining what kind of content gets posted? Just curious; I'm sure your encryption is on point.
This allowed us to discover we were pretty popular on the crypto community and in specific fan fic subreddits. Which lead us to implement btc tipping and reader mode.
We also got reports, tickets, dmca, etc.
We cannot brute force our thousands of paste encrypted payloads, but for a sample, it's easy to follow the bread crumbs. And if we do it, others do it too.
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#128For those criticizing the author for 'fantasy' security problems, it seems relevant to emphasize that they work at a bank---their threat model is probably rather more vigorous than most.
I dunno, I worked at a bank that was about to be a Capital One direct competitor and I we weren't really worried about "leaking implementation details" via the structure of our tokens. Sounds like some security through obscurity.
I have seen idiotic implementations of JWT which effectively leak session details that should only be kept server-side because "it was just easy to validate it on the client-end of things"... this specific example is an extreme one from my career history, and was caught long before it ever made it to prod.
But.
In this engineer's "hello world"-level implementation of JWT they effectively overloaded the session with incredibly sensitive data that should have been server-side-only (later to back-pedal and say this was a "dev only" implementation!). They did use JWT.io to debug their "implementation", and having done that did leak non-trivial details to a third party about how our authentication system was built.
This guy was a "junior engineer" who was hired because of nepotism - making this an even more extreme case... but really it's not. I've worked with incredibly ignorant, careless, not trustworthy, desperate, etc. people through my entire career (admittedly being those things myself sometimes).
Anywho - not leaking implementation details, and potential software/infrastructure secrets is not security through obscurity.
Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#129Re: Why I Actively Discourage Online Tooling like jwt.io and Online JSON Validators
#130Earlier quoted context omitted.
> they work at a bank---their threat model is probably rather more vigorous than most Until one day when you work with ACH files and start having existential dread about the american payroll system.
Yes it's sometimes rediculus with what regulated businesses can get away with as long as it's either historical or had been certified to be secure at some point in time.