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Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

shkspr.mobi

21–30 of 33 posts

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#21
Why do you need the date in the reply tweet?

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As I understand it, the premise of the method is that, at day D, you already have written the contents of tweet Tr (to be posted as a reply to T) and so you can already compute its hash and tweet the hash as part of T on day D. Then on day D+N, you tweet Tr, which hashes correctly to what you said it would, and thus is extremely unlikely to have been tampered with.

Where does the date string contained in Tr come into play?

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#22
post #21

Why do you need the date in the reply tweet? - As I understand it, the premise of the method is that, at day D, you already have written the contents of tweet Tr (to be posted as a reply to T) and so you can already compute its hash and tweet the hash as part of T on day D. Then on day D+N, you tweet Tr, which hashes correctly to what you said it would, and thus is extremely unlikely to have been tampered with. Where…

Human readability. You are correct that the existence of the hash shows when the original message was written. But for human readability and understanding, I thought it was useful to have.

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#23
post #4
post #3

My critique of this blogpost will have the sha-256 hash:2738490299aeefee10202fa46283bc856

I’ll post in 25 years in the future once I brute force this hash.

There's actually an unlimited number of messages that will result in that hash. For all we know, that sha will also result from the hashing of "I'm a giant idiot" repeated an enormous number of times. I'd hazard a guess that there is probability 1 that this is the case.

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#24
post #14

Niantic (The Company behind Pokemon Go and Ingress) would do something similar for events in Ingress: They had a "measurement window", in which they would look at the state of the gameboard in a certain city and count stats (details irrelevant for the story here). The measurement window was 10 minutes long, but they would look randomly at one specific second and count the state at that second. Before each measurement…

This sounds very interesting but I'm a little confused by the problem they were trying to solve -- what were they trying to prove knowledge of?

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#25

Why would you use twitter for something like this when you could simply create a blockchain DAPP that runs on Ethereum? All you'd need to do is learn the Solidity language, compile it with Mist and purchase some initial startup gas to pay for the executions. Then, the integrity of your predictions would be guaranteed by a globally distributed network of several mining organizations, rather than dependent on one polit…

I‘m working for a blockchain-backed secure timestamping service

https://documents.originstamp.com/

Also wrote a CLI:

https://github.com/dennis-tra/originstamp-cli

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#28
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’ll post in 25 years in the future once I brute force this hash.

There's actually an unlimited number of messages that will result in that hash. For all we know, that sha will also result from the hashing of "I'm a giant idiot" repeated an enormous number of times. I'd hazard a guess that there is probability 1 that this is the case.

Unless it is super long, I guess chance of not getting the original message by brute force is super super low

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#29
>Modern hashes like SHA256 are probably resistant to collisions in Twitter’s limited message space.

Actually, no. 140 characters alphanumeric translates to 833 bits of entropy. This is significantly more than the 256 bits in SHA256, and due to the pigeonhole principle, collisions are guaranteed. That said, it's still nontrivial to bruteforce the hash, because searching thorough 256 bits is hard, but that's unrelated to the "limited message space".

Re: Staking Claims with Scheduled Tweets

#30
post #29

>Modern hashes like SHA256 are probably resistant to collisions in Twitter’s limited message space. Actually, no. 140 characters alphanumeric translates to 833 bits of entropy. This is significantly more than the 256 bits in SHA256, and due to the pigeonhole principle, collisions are guaranteed. That said, it's still nontrivial to bruteforce the hash, because searching thorough 256 bits is hard, but that's unrelated…

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